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# VHSIC/VHSIC-LIKE RELIABILITY PREDICTION MODELING

**IIT Research Institute** 

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#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

IIT Research Institute and Honeywell SSED have teamed to develop a reliability prediction model for VHSIC and VHSIC-Like CMOS devices with the intent that the model be suitable for inclusion into MIL-HDBK-217. Traditional methods of reliability prediction modeling have relied on the statistical analysis of empirical field failure rate data. Since no field data was available for this purpose, a reliability physics based modeling approach was used in conjunction with empirical data from life tests, environmental tests, and test structures.

Two separate models were developed; a detailed model and a short form model. The detailed model is based on the characteristics of specific failure modes, manufacturer specific information such as defect density and wearout performance, and key "plication data including temperature and operating time. The short form model is a condensed version of the detailed model and does not require manufacturer specific information but rather easily accessible information. The penalty in using the short model is its lower precision and accuracy relative to the detailed model.

In addition to the data supplied by Honeywell to this effort, a database was built containing life test, burn-in, and environmental test results from a variety of manufacturers. Much of the data contained in this database was used in the quantification of early life failure rates for various specific failure mechanisms. Therefore the detailed model predicting defect related early life failure rates will yield an industry wide representative failure rate. It was also determined in this study that it is these defect related mechanisms that drive the failure rate in the part's useful life. Intrinsic wearout mechanisms have also been modeled which will provide an approximate end of life time as a function of the parts design rules and its particular application.

There was also difficulty in predicting failure rates due to event driven, design related failure mechanisms such as electrostatic discharge (ESD) and CMOS latch-up. Event statistics are generally not available, and robustness varies greatly among products and manufacturers. This can lead to very unpredictable application problem often resolved by reliability engineers.

The detailed model has been validated with the life test data that was available on 1.0 and 1.2 micron processes from three separate manufacturing processes. It was also observed that there were relatively large variations in observed failure rates between manufacturers. The model partially accounts for these variations by including fabrication specific information such as defect density and wearout data.

Another difficulty was the large number of failures reported for which the failure mechanism was unknown, implying some level of uncertainty regarding the completions of the present models.

It is quite apparent from the results of this study that a total quality management approach presents demands which go beyond traditional statistical process control, which seeks stabilization of process outcomes, monitored in terms of measured quantities such as film thicknesses, lateral dimensions, and electrical parameters. Clearly, an additional important requirement exists for monitoring and reducing various process defect densities. This will help to reduce the number of products which contain the types of defects known to cause early life failures. However, achieving the highest attainable quality in an environment where defects are infrequent and randomly placed implies an obvious need for 100% product level electrical testing for time zero failures caused by defects, as well as 100% product level reliability screening for early life failure mechanisms influenced by defects.

This effort also attempted to utilize data from ongoing efforts such as the yield enhancement and generic qualification programs. It was unfortunately concluded that the level of standardization (between manufacturers) necessary for input to a reliability model has not yet been achieved. Therefore, data from these efforts are used as an input to the model in a more qualitative sense in which case a multiplication factor is applied modifying the failure rate.

In summary, it is recognized that there is no perfect reliability model covering all CMOS VLSI devices from a variety of manufacturers. Given this, the goal of the model is to strive for accuracy for most devices, manufacturers, and applications. It is the view of IITRI and Honeywell that the model meets its goals in that it is sensitive to the proper factors effecting reliability in the proper proportion.

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#### **EVALUATION**

The objective of this effort was to develop a reliability prediction model for fielded CMOS VHSIC and VHSIC-Like devices. Since little or no field reliability data was available, an approach was taken that used methods which deviated from the traditional statistical analysis of field failure rate data. The effort was successful in accomplishing this objective with the development of two models, a detailed model and a short form model, for predicting failure rates for VHSIC and VHSIC-Like CMOS microcircuits.

The detailed model is based on the characteristics of specific failure modes, manufacturer specific information such as defect density and wearout performance, and key application data including temperature and operating time. The short form model is a condensed version of the detailed model and does not require manufacturer specific information, but rather easily accessible information. The penalty in using the short model is its lower precision and accuracy relative to the detailed model.

The models account for both time dependent and defect-related failure mechanisms. A data base was built containing the life test, burn-in and environmental test results from a variety of manufacturers. Much of the data contained in this data base was used in the quantification of early life failure rates for various specific failure mechanisms. Therefore the detailed model, in predicting defect-related early life failure rates, will yield an industry wide representative failure rate. The use of actual defect densities, if properly measured, will result in predicted reliability values which are more precise and accurate than conventional regression type prediction models.

It was also determined in this study that it is these defect-related mechanisms that drive failure rate in the parts useful life. We arout mechanisms have also been modeled which will provide an approximate end of lifetime as a function of the parts design rule and its particular application.

The model addresses three time-dependent mechanisms; electromigration, time-dependent dielectric breakdown, and hot carrier effects. The model has factors for chip area, defect density and/or minimum feature size so that changes in technology can readily be factored in. It has a correction factor to modify the model as VHSIC field experience becomes available and to modify the model for a particular fabrication process based on the availability of high quality life tests. The model can also utilize test pattern data from manufacturers in conjunction with the Yield Enhancement and Generic Qualification programs. There is a package factor which considers the number of package pins and includes the following package types: PIN Grid Arrays, Chip Carriers, and Dual-In-Line Packages. It also has factors for EOS/ESD and whether or not the device is on the QPL/QML.

The detailed model has been validated with the life test data that was available on 1.0 and 1.25 micron feature size devices from three separate manufacturing processes. The models will be proposed for inclusion in MIL-HDBK-217 "Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment."

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#### 1.0 INTRODUCTION

The intent of this effort was to develop a reliability prediction model for fielded CMOS VHSIC and VHSIC-Like integrated circuits. Since no field reliability data on these circuit types was anticipated for development of these models, methods were used that deviated from the traditional statistical analysis of field failure rate performance of the device types being modeled.

Since integrated circuit technology is advancing at a pace more rapid than our ability to collect field data and build models accordingly, this program also represented an effort to develop reliability prediction model development methodologies which alleviate the need for extensive quantities of field experience.

It was also an intent of this study is to make maximum use of the voluminous amounts of work done and being done in the area of high density CMOS reliability assurance. Data was collected during this program from Honeywell and other semiconductor manufacturers willing to participate. This approach assured that the prediction models developed are not valid only for Honeywell devices, but rather models that are reflective of the entire VHSIC and VHSIC-Like CMOS industry.

The general failure rate model was developed using data of various manufacturers and therefore calculates an average expected failure rate. In reality, large variations in failure rates are observed between manufacturers. In most cases the root cause for this difference cannot be modeled in a general reliability prediction model. Attempts were made to address this difference by including factors such as defect density, however, there are still many very subtle factors which heavily influence reliability, many of which are not fully understood, much less quantifiable. It should be noted, however, that the model is applicable only for a relatively mature technology that consistently yields acceptable die from every completed wafer.

It is also noted that other factors may strongly influence reliability more broadly defined as trouble free application of products in real systems. Design related overstress, ESD and latch-up robustness fall into this category, and these may vary greatly among products and manufacturers. These are also event driven failure mechanisms, and failure rate prediction would require knowledge of event statistics as well as device robustness.

Additionally, although this is primarily a theoretical, bottom up approach to reliability model building, this study attempted to maximize the use of empirical data, on both specific failure mechanisms and the entire device. This represents a radical departure from traditional failure rate modeling methods since it offers the potential of using data on specific failure mechanisms (from test structures, life tests, etc.), whereas historical methods have required empirical data on the entire packaged part.

Also recognized in this effort is the need for various types of models filling the needs of specific users. For example, to fully utilize the knowledge base of large scale CMOS reliability, a model which uses detailed physical parameters of the circuits being fabricated is required. Additionally, the need is also recognized for a short, easy to use model, capable of rapidly providing reliability estimates. This effort addressed the needs of these two user types by providing both a detailed model and a short form model.

#### 2.0 REPORT ORGANIZATION AND NOTATION

The remainder of this report is organized as follows:

- Section 3.0 presents the approach taken in this study to meet the stated objectives. It summarizes the methodology used to separate failure rate contributions from individual failure mechanisms and also how the early life and wearout failure rates were quantified. It also discusses the relationship of this effort to related efforts such as the yield enhancement and generic qualification programs.
- Section 4.0 discusses the database that was built for this effort, the manner in which data
  was collected, and profiles of the database regarding the type and complexities of devices
  the data was collected from.
- Section 5.0 is the main section of this report which presents the derivation of failure rate models for each failure mechanism that was modeled. Failure rate contributions were derived and summarized in this section for oxide, metal, hot carriers, contamination, package related failures, electrical overstress, and a miscellaneous category. Section 5.0 also presents a detailed discussion of the relationships between yield, defect density, die area, and device type, and presents the rationale used in this effort for making the model a function of the defect density/area product.
- Section 6.0 presents the complete detailed version of the model, inclusive of all failure rates modeled. Due to the relative complexity of the model, the calculations from it are tedious. Therefore, a computer program was written to facilitate calculations. In this computer program, the user simply enters the desired input variables and can then perform a prediction at a single instant in time or can choose the charting option that will calculate the failure rate as a function of time and plot the resulting values.
- Section 7.0 presents the derivation of each factor in the short form model along with a summarization of the complete short model.

- Section 8.0 discusses modeling considerations given to fault tolerant designs. Since there are too many design possibilities to adequately model fault tolerance with a single factor, there is no factor in the model, but rather guidelines are presented to model its effect based on a detailed knowledge of the device architecture and design. Examples of fault tolerant techniques and guidelines to model them are presented in this section.
- Section 9.0 presents a summary of the 1.0 and 1.2 micron data that was used in the model validation phase of this effort, and a summary of how the predicted values compared to the observed. It also discusses the variation in failure rates observed as a function of the manufacturing process and presents come data on the accuracy that can be expected from the prediction.
- Section 10.0 presents sample calculations for 18 separate combinations of input variables, and gives plots of predicted failure rate as a function of time.
- Section 11.0 discusses briefly how field data, when available, can be used to modify the model.
- · Section 12.0 discusses conclusions and recommendations regarding this modeling effort.

#### NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS

A = Gate Oxide Area as Used in Section 5.1.2.3 and Total Die Area as Used Elsewhere

A<sub>B</sub> = Constant in Black's Equation

 $AE_{OX}$  = Acceleration Due to the Electric Field

A<sub>KF</sub> = Acceleration Factor Due to the Oxide Electric Field

A<sub>HC</sub> = Magnitude of Hot Carrier Degradation

AHE = Avalanche Hot Electron

 $A_n$  = Oxide Area of Chip N

A<sub>C</sub> = Oxide Area of Chip 0 for which Reliability is to be Extracted from Data on Test Structure Oxide with on a A<sub>S</sub>

A<sub>T</sub> = Reference Die Area

A<sub>T</sub> = Acceleration Due to Temperature

ATOM = Temperature Acceleration Factor for Contamination Related Failures

ATHC = Temperature Acceleration Factor for Hot Carrier Degradation

ATMET = Temperature Acceleration for the Metal Failure Rate

ATMIS = Temperature Acceleration Factor for Miscellaneous Failure

AT<sub>OX</sub> = Temperature Acceleration Factor for the Oxide Failure Rate

ATYPEMET = A constant which accounts for the relative differences in metal lengths
between various device types

A<sub>TYPE<sub>ox</sub> = A constant which accounts for the relative differences in oxide area densities between various device types</sub>

AV<sub>OX</sub> = Oxide Electric field acceleration factor

C = Constant

CDIP = Ceramic DIP

CLCC = Ceramic Leadless Chip Carrier

CPGA = Ceramic Pin Grid Array

DC = Duty Cycle, % Operating Time

D<sub>EFF</sub> = Effective Defect Density

DIP = Dual In Line Package

D<sub>n</sub> = Oxide Defect Density of Chip 0 (Used only in Section 5.1.2.3)

 $D_0$  = Oxide Defect Density as used in Section 5.1.2.3, and Critical Defect Density for Feature Size  $X_0$  Elsewhere

D<sub>OOK</sub> = Oxide Defect Density

DoMET = Metal Defect Density

D<sub>r</sub> = Reference Defect Density

D<sub>S</sub> Defect Density of a Test Structure

D(w) = Area Density with Weakness Factor Larger than w

E = Gate Oxide Breakdown Strength

Ea = Activation Energy, Per the Arrhenius Relationship (in Electron Volts, eV)

E<sub>0</sub> = Normalizing Electric Field

EOS = Electrostatic Discharge

E<sub>OX</sub> = Electric Field Strength in the Oxide (MV/cm)

E<sub>REF</sub> = Reference Electric Field

ESD = Electrostatic Discharge

E<sub>S</sub> = Actual Electric Field

FIT = Failure Unit (Failures/10<sup>9</sup> hours)

FO = Fallout Rate (Percentage)

FOR = Reference Fallout Rate

f(t) = Time to Failure Probability Density Function

F(x) = Cumulative Probability Distribution as a Function of x

G = Process Specific Constant

h(t) = Hazard Rate

Id = Drain Current

I<sub>SUB</sub> = Substrate Current

J = Current Density

K = Boltzman's Constant =  $8.65 \times 10^{-5} \left( \frac{\text{eV}}{\text{o}\text{K}} \right)$ 

 $L_{DD}$  = Low Dose Drain

m = Exponent for I<sub>sub</sub> Term in Hot Carrier Model

n = Exponent of Current Density for Black's Equation in Section 5.2 and Exponent for Hot Carried Degradation in Section 5.3

P = Power

PDIP = Plastic DIP

P(f) = Probability of Failure due to EOS or ESD

P(f/c) = Probability of Failure given Contact from an EOS/ESD Source

PGA = Pin Grid Array

PLCC = Plastic Leadless Chip Carrier

PPGA = Plastic Pin Grid Array

P(w) = Probability of containing at least one defect with weakness factor w

QML = Qualified Manufacturers List

Q<sub>N</sub>(t) = Cumulative Failure Density of Chip N

 $Q_0(t)$  = Cumulative Failure Distribution for an Oxide with Defect Density  $D_n$ 

Q<sub>s</sub>(t) = Cumulative Failure Density for a Test Structure

Q(t) = Cumulative Failure Density Function

R = Duty Ratio for Substrate Current

r = Duty Cycle

RH = Relative Humidity

RH<sub>EFF</sub> = Effective Relative Humidity

R(t) = Reliability Function

S = Shape Parameter Used in the Stapper Yield Model

 $S_D$  = Single Drain

 $S_N = Constant$ 

S<sub>V</sub> = Standard Derivation

T = Temperature

t = Time

tan = Time to Breakdown

T<sub>C</sub> = Case Temperature

TDDB = Time Dependent Dielectric Breakdown

T<sub>J</sub> = Junction Temperature

T<sub>0</sub> = Reference Temperature

t<sub>0</sub> = Effective Screening Time

t<sub>50</sub> = Time at which 50% of the Population Fails

tsorer = Roscrence tso Time

 $V_d$  = Drain Voltage

V<sub>GS</sub> = Gate Source Voltage

V<sub>SD</sub> = Source Drain Voltage

V<sub>TH</sub> = ESD Failure Threshold Voltage

X<sub>O</sub> = Reference Feature Size

X<sub>s</sub> = Actual Feature Size

 $Y_N = Constant$ 

β = Constant

ΔH = Activation Energy

θ<sub>JA</sub> = Junction-Ambient Thermal Resistance

θ<sub>IC</sub> = Junction-Case Thermal Resistance

λ = Failure Rate (in Failures per Million hours)

🛵 😊 Báse Pailure rate

λ<sub>BP</sub> = Base Package Failure Rate

λ<sub>c</sub> = EOS/ESD Contact Rate

**३**CON ■ Contamination Failure Rate

λ<sub>EOS</sub> = Electrical Overstress Failure Rate

λ<sub>ESD</sub> = Exemestatic Discharge Failure Rate

λ<sub>MET</sub> = Metal Failure Rate

 $\lambda_{\text{MIS}}$ Miscellaneous Failure Rate  $\lambda_{ox}$ Oxide Failure Rate  $\lambda_{OX}(t)$ Time Dependent Oxide Failure Rate Package Failure Rate **APAC**  $\lambda_{p}$ Predicted Failure Rate  $\lambda_{PH}$ Package Hermeticity Failure Rate  $\lambda(t)$ Failure Rate as a Function of Time  $\Pi_{c}$ Field Data Correction Factor  $\Pi_{CD}$ D'e Complexity Factor  $\Pi_{\rm E}$ **Environment Factor** 

HMFG = Manufacturing Process Correction Factor

IIpT = Package Type Factor

 $\Pi_Q$  = Quality Level Factor

Π<sub>SP</sub> = Package Screening Factor

σ<sub>PH</sub> = Standard Deviation for Henneticity Related Failure Mechanisms

o<sub>HC</sub> = Standard Deviation for the distribution of Hot Carrier Failures

omer = Standard Deviation for the metallization electromigration failure distribution

 $\sigma_{ox}$  = Standard Deviation for the TDDB Failure Distribution

τ = Exponential Time Constant

THC = Hot Carrier Lifetime

#### 3.0 APPROACH

The approach taken in this effort was to analyze each failure mechanism independently and develop a separate failure rate expression for each. This approach assumes that each failure mechanism is independent of each other and one is not the result of the other. While in all cases this is not entirely true, it represents a justifiable approximation when considering the limited prediction accuracy expected from such a model. Figure 3-1 summarizes the methodology used in this study.




FIGURE 3-1:
MODEL DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGY

The first step in this process was to identify as many potential failure mechanisms/modes as possible. These failure mechanisms are listed as follows:

Oxide Failures

Time Dependent Dielectric Breakdown

Metallization Failures

Electromigration

Hot Carriers

Corrosion

Ionic Contamination

Wire Bond Failures

Package Hermeticity Failures

Electrical Overstress (including ESD)

Die Bond Failures

Soft Errors

Latch Up

Next, each of these were studied to determine:

- (1) Prevalence in causing failure of small feature size CMOS
- (2) Time to failure characteristics
- (3) How well they can be screened
- (4) The factors and stresses which influence their failure characteristics

Since there are many more failure mechanisms possible than can offectively be quantified in a single model, it was the objective of this study to choose only those failure mechanisms that drive or dominate the failure rate and model them accordingly.

To accomplish this and to identify time to failure characteristics, a database was developed from screening and life test data of VHSIC-Like devices. The physics of failure characteristics of each mechanism were studied and both the fabrication variables and successes that affect each mechanism were determined.

Next, a failure rate as a function of time was derived for each mechanism based either on empirical data from the database or based on theoretical considerations. These failure rates were then combined into a cohesive nextel.

The basic premise of the approach used in this effort was that die related failure mechanisms are predominantly accelerated by remperature, voltage and current and package related mechanisms are predominantly accelerated by environmental stresses (primarily temperature cycling).

Table 3-1 summarizes the number of observed failures contained in the database as a function of test type and failure class. This data supports the approach being taken of accelerating die related failure mechanisms with temperature and package related mechanisms with temperature cycling.

TABLE 3-1:
DATABASE PROFILE: NUMBER OF OBSERVED FAILURES

		Test Type	
Failure Class	Life Test	Temperature Cycling	Misc. Environmental
Oxide	274	7	0
Metal	62	3	6
Package	24	214	0
Assembly	21	0	0
Contamination	603	5	0
Unknown	789	54	4

Each known failure mechanism was analyzed, determining characteristics of infant mortality, wearout, random failures, or some combination thereof.

Each failure mechanism will therefore have either an early life (decreasing failure rate) term, a wearout failure rate term (based on the lognormal time to failure distribution), a time independent (event related) failure rate term, or a combination of the three. Table 3-2 summarizes each failure mechanism addressed in the detailed model and their associated failure rate term(s).

TABLE 3-2: FAILURE MECHANISM CONTRIBUTION TERMS

Failure	Short Term	Long Term	Time Independent
Mechanism	Decreasing $\lambda$	Wearout λ	λ
Oxide	X	x	Note 1
Metal	X	X	
Hot Carriers	•	X	Note 1
Contamination	X		
Package		X (for non-	X
		hermetic only)	
Electrical			
Overstress		}	X
Miscellaneous	ж		x

Note 1: Very recent information suggests that ESD overstress can adversely affect both oxide wearout and hot carrier degradation rates. A time independent factor might be appropriate, depending on whether further work relates this effect to early life failures.

Each entry in this table represents an additive failure rate in the model and each of these failure rates are described separately in subsequent sections of this report.

The short term decreasing failure rates for oxide, metal, contamination, and miscellaneous failure mechanisms are essentially defect related mechanisms that have the potential of being screened out. For these, the time to failure data in the database developed for this study was utilized to develop empirical failure rate relationships as a function of time.

The long term wearout failure rates are theoretically derived based on various sources including data reported in the literature, specialized test results, and test structure results. These are all based on the lognormal time to failure distribution and will predict an approximate time at which the and of life of that part is approaching. For a well designed part, the failure rate contribution from these mechanisms should be essentially zero in the useful life of the part, indicating that the failure rate is driven by the defect related mechanisms as well as the time independent, event related mechanisms.

The time independent mechanisms are those that are primarily event related, such as electrostatic discharge. The package failure rate is treated in our model as a time independent mechanism, however, there is a time dependent package related contribution in the miscellaneous term. The rationale for this is further discussed in subsequent sections of this report.

In failure mechanisms that exhibit both a short term failure rate and a wearout failure rate, the defect severity distribution plays an important role in the short and long term failure characteristics. This defect severity distribution relates the severity of defects to its prevalence in occurring.

Figure 3-2 represents a hypothetical case illustrating an oxide with various defect severities (from Reference 8). This example relates these severities to the expected time of failure.

Oxide						
Defect Severity	1	2	3	4	5	

- 1. Yield loss at wafer probe
- 2. Burn-In Failure
- 3. Failure during equipment checkout
- 4. Failure during first year of operation
- 5. Failure after 4 years of operation

## FIGURE 3-2: DEFECT SEVERITY EXAMPLE

In the contained model herein, 2, 3 and 4 are modeled with the short term failure rate contribution and 5 is modeled with the term for long term wearout. 1 is yield loss and is not explicitly addressed in the model.

#### This modeling approach has several advantages:

- (1) By separating the failure rates due to each failure mechanism, the model can be more sensitive to stresses which affect each mechanism differently. For example, each mechanism typically will have a unique temperature activation energy, which can be modeled separately, instead of choosing an average activation energy which would result in an oversimplified approximation of the effect of temperature.
- (2) It allows the user to quantitatively ascertain the benefit of screening temperature and duration. Since the predicted failure rate is a function of time, the user can model a typical failure rate improvement by trying various temperatures and durations.
- (3) It gives a better representation of the behavior of the failure rate as a function of time and also provides a realistic estimate of how long the devices can be expected to last in fielded systems.

It would have been very advantageous to this effort if it were possible to identify and rank the significant failure modes and mechanisms. Unfortunately, the number of variables effecting the prevalence of each failure mode and mechanism is very high and therefore this ranking would only be valid for the device whose data was used in deriving the ranking. In other words, one CMOS process may have one particular failure mechanism prevalent, whereas another process may have different mechanisms prevalent. This is due to the many variables controlling the failure mode distribution. To attempt to quantify this variability, a survey was issued to various CMOS VLSI manufacturers in which they were asked to give percentages of failures they observe for each failure mechanism listed. This survey questionnaire is given in Appendix A. Table 3-3 summarizes the seven responses of this survey regarding the failure mode distributions, and indicates a wide variation in the prevalence of the observed failure mechanisms. These results illustrate the difficulty in deriving a model based on expert opinion.

TABLE 3-3: FAILURE MECHANISMS DISTRIBUTIONS

	Survey Responses									
Failure Mode/Mechanism	1	2	3	4	5	6	7			
Electromigration	-	-	_	-	-	13%	x			
Dielectric Breakdown	x	50%	<.1%	98%	-	2%	x			
Soft Errors	-	-	-	-	-	-				
Parametric Drift	x	-	.1%	-	-	38%	х			
Hot Electrons	-	-	-	-	-					
Latch Up	x	10%	.1%	-	x	-	x			
Electrical Overstress	x	20%	2%	x	   -					
Package Related	-	20%	<.1%	-	x	28%	x			
Other	-	-	-	•	x	19%	x			

x = Failure Mode occurs but no percentage given in survey response.

## 3.1 MODELING TIME TO FAILURE CHARACTERISTICS

It was originally intended to quantify a bimodal distribution for each failure mechanism. For example, Figure 3-3 illustrates the bimodal distribution.




FIGURE 3-3: BIMODAL DISTRIBUTION

Where the ratio of the area under each curve are derived from the data contained in the database developed for this effort. For example, if the database indicates that 1% of the population of devices fail in screening tests for a specific failure mechanism, then the area under the first curve will be 1% of the total.

In the case of ionic contamination, screening (or test) effectiveness is very high, and there are no wearout failures expected (i.e., all infant mortality failures), the time to failure distribution in Figure 3-4 will result in the case where 1% of the population fails in screening from contamination. Therefore, this is not the probability density function for the entire part but only for contamination.




FIGURE 3-4: FIRST MODE OF THE BIMODAL DISTRIBUTION

In Figure 3-4 the short term screening failures are expected but no wearout failures are expected due to the characteristics of contamination. If a device has been exposed to screens for an equivalent time of  $t_1$ , then the initial time of field operation would be  $t_1$ . If it has not been screened, then the initial time of field operation would begin at  $t_0$  and 1% of the population (i.e., all contamination failures) would be expected to fail between  $t_0$  and  $t_1$  from contamination.

It became apparent that, while the wearout portion of the distribution could be fairly well defined, the early life defect related portion could not be modeled as an increasing and then decreasing distribution.

Also, although the time to failure characteristics were analyzed, all models were developed in a hazard rate format, instead of time to failure, to be more consistent with conventional reliability prediction methodologies, and to facilitate failure rate predictions.

## 3.1.1 Development Methodology

From the failure mechanisms observed in the database, there are very few observances of die failures occurring from the wearout failure mechanisms (electromigration, TDDB (time dependent dielectric breakdown), Hot Carriers, and moisture related failures in nonhermetic packages). For example, the vast majority of failures in an oxide are not time dependent dielectric breakdown, but rather other early life oxide failure mechanisms, possibly due to defects more severe than those that are manifested as TDDB failures.

To account for these failures, an exponential hazard rate model was chosen and fit to the observed failure rates (as a function of time) for each applicable failure mechanism. For example, the following basic model was used:

$$\lambda(t) = \lambda_b e^{-\tau t}$$

where:

 $\lambda_b$  is the base failure rate (constant)  $\tau$  is the time constant of the exponential t is time

The time to failure data contained in the database was used to derive the observed failure rates, as a function of time and all were normalized to a 25°C temperature by multiplying the actual time by the acceleration due to temperature (A<sub>T</sub>) (see Section 5.1.2-1). This acceleration was between the actual temperature and 25°C. The failure mechanisms for which early life failure rates were derived are; Metal, Oxide, Contamination, and a Miscellaneous category (containing various time dependent assembly and package related mechanisms). Since package related failure mechanisms accelerated by temperature cycling are modeled separately in the package factor, these factors are derived only from high temperature accelerated life test data.

Each observed failure was categorized into one of the following failure classes; oxide, metal, contamination and miscellaneous.

The following failure mechanisms/modes listed under each class summarize the observed failure cause (from life tests) contained in the database for each of these classes.

#### Oxide

Functional failure, threshold voltage shift
Input leakage failure, threshold voltage shift
Functional failure, gate oxide step defect
Access time out of spec, charge loss, oxide defect
Access time out of spec, charge loss, wearout
Nominal march, oxide damage
Nominal march, oxide damage
Page mode failure, oxide damage

#### Metal

Metal masking defect
Functional failure from aluminum corrosion
Functional failure from metal contact defect
Failure parameter from aluminum corrosion
Open metal trace
Open metal trace from aluminum corrosion
Functional metal failure from pattern shifting

#### Contamination

Parameter failure from contamination
Functional failure from contamination
Ionic leakage, bake recoverable
Ionic contamination
Bits failure, ionic contamination from assembly debris

### Miscellaneous (Package, Assembly or Unknown)

Functional failures (unknown mechanism)

Pattern shifting

AC/functional

Masking defect

Column short to VSS

Parametric failure

Diffusion mask defect

Output leakage

Input leakage

Functional, trace, degradation

Input transistor short

Junction short

Pin leakage, bake recoverable

Open

Retention failure

Nominal march

Nominal march, poly defect

Nominal march, marginal room temp. AC

ICC stand by, out of spec, low resistor value

Wire bond failure

The methodology used to develop early life failure rates are as follows:

- (1) The times of failure, for each failure mechanism were extracted from the database.
- (2) These times were converted to an equivalent 25°C time based on the temperature acceleration factor for each particular failure observance.
- (3) An equivalent total number of part hours (at 25°C) for the entire database was extracted for each failure mechanism observance (based on the individual mechanisms temperature acceleration factor) for small time intervals.

(4) A regression analysis was then performed on the failure rates calculated as a function of time, and fit to the following model:

$$\begin{split} \lambda(t) &= \lambda_b \; e^{-t\tau} \\ \text{or } \ln \lambda(t) &= \ln \lambda_b - t\tau \end{split}$$

(5) Values of  $\lambda_b$  and  $\tau$  were then determined.

Figure 3-5 illustrates a hypothetical application of this methodology. For this example, the following failure rates and time intervals were observed.

Time (10 <sup>6</sup> hrs.)	λ
004	.015
.04 - 1.67	.0028




FIGURE 3-5:
HYPOTHETICAL FAILURE RATE AS A FUNCTION OF TIME

A simple regression solution was obtained using the mid point values of time in each interval, and by taking the natural logarithm transformation of the failure rate value. The following relationship was then obtained:

$$\lambda(t) = .011 e^{-2.2 t}$$

The next step was to insure that the cumulative failure rate (integral) was the same for the predicted and observed. This was accomplished by adjusting the  $\tau$  value if required to meet this condition. The  $\lambda_b$  value was kept constant where was a relatively high confidence in it since there was typically a large number of part hours and failures observed in that interval, thus yielding an accurate failure rate in the early time interval. Section 5.1.1 discusses the derivation of the actual oxide failure rate.

The screening test effectiveness has not explicitly been accounted for in the model since empirical test results were used to develop the early life failure rates (which are related to test effectiveness) based on screening and life test results. However, screening effectiveness was implicitly included in the model. It is logical to assume therefore that the test effectiveness for a particular test is approximately constant throughout the industry at the present state of the art and inherent in the model. It was attempted to derive test effectivenesses for various screens. This was abandoned due to the empirical approach taken and the fact that accurately deriving test effectivenesses is extremely difficult, and in many cases impossible.

## 3.1.1.1 Temperature Acceleration Factor

Since the early life failure rate is intended to model defect related failure mechanisms, a given constant percentage of the population is expected to fail in a certain time period under a certain set of circumstances. For example, if the temperature is raised by a level consistent with an acceleration factor of 10, the same percentage of parts should fail in 1/10th the time of the original temperature. That is:

$$\int_{0}^{t} \lambda(t) dt (25^{\circ}C) = \int_{0}^{t} \lambda(t) dt (at T)$$

 $(A_T = acceleration due to temperature T)$ 

and

$$\lambda(t) = \lambda_b A_T e^{-t} A_T t$$

where 
$$\lambda_b =$$
base failure rate

## 3.1.1.2 Effects of Duty Cycle

The defect related mechanisms being modeled in the early life are those that occurred during operating life tests and therefore will typically only be accelerated to failure when the device is in operation. Since the models presented in this report are for operating conditions, they do not include duty cycle as an input. If the effect of duty cycle needs to be accounted for, it can be modeled in the same manner as temperature as follows:

$$\lambda(t) \alpha (DC) \lambda_b e^{-\tau DC t}$$
 ( $\alpha = \text{Proportional to}$ )  
(where (DC) = Duty Cycle)  
( $0 \le DC \le 1$ )


In this case the duty cycle is defined as the percentage of time the device is in its normal operating state. The one factor that does require duty cycle is the failure rate of plastic package types in which case an effective relative humidity has to be calculated as a function of duty cycle.

Therefore, summarizing the effect of both temperature and duty cycle yields:

$$\lambda(t) = \lambda_b A_T (DC) e^{-\tau DC} A_T t$$

## 3.1.1.3 Effects of Screening Time

If a device is burned in or subjected to a high temperature operating screen, one would expect a certain percentage of defective parts to fail. In this model, this effect is accounted for simply by adding an effective screening time (t0) to the time variable (t). An example showing the effects of screening time is presented in Figure 3-6.



 $t_0$  = Effective Screening time = (Actual Screening time)  $A_T$  $A_2$  =  $A_1 e^{-t/t}$ 

FIGURE 3-6:
HYPOTHETICAL EARLY LIFE FAILURE RATE

Therefore, the failure rate equation after an equivalent screening time to becomes:

$$\lambda(t) = \lambda_b e^{-\tau t_0} A_T (DC) e^{-\tau (DC)} A_T t$$

Note that the A<sub>T</sub> may be different for screening and use environments. It should also be noted here that only life test results were used for development of these failure rates, and all environmental test results were used only for the package factor. There were, however, a few time dependent package related mechanisms occurring during life tests, and these are accounted for in the miscellaneous failure rate.

Therefore, using the method outlined herein, Table 3-4 summarizes the parameters derived for  $\lambda_b$ ,  $\tau$ , and activation energy  $(E_a)$ .  $E_a$  is to be used for AT for each failure mechanism.

TABLE 3-4: EARLY LIFE FAILURE RATE PARAMETERS

Failure Mechanism	λ <sub>b</sub> (F/10 <sup>6</sup> hrs.)	$\tau\left(\frac{1}{\text{hrs.}}\right)$	$E_a\left(\frac{eV}{oK}\right)$
Metal	.00102	1.18	.55
Oxide	.0788	<b>7</b> .70	.30
Contamination	.000022	.0028	1.0
Miscellaneous	.010	2.2	.43

The derivation of each of these failure rates is given in subsequent sections of this report which discuss each failure mechanism separately.

Since approximately 58% of all failures were of unknown failure mechanisms (no failure analysis or inconclusive failure analysis) the parameters in Table 3-4 were derived by assuming that the unknown failure mechanisms had the same relative percentages between mechanisms as the known failure mechanism distribution. In this manner all failures were accounted for.

# 3.1.2 Modeling of Wearout Failure i lechanisms

All wearout failure mechanisms in this model have been modeled with a lognormal time to failure distribution. All wearout failure mechanisms modeled in this effort have empirically been shown by many researchers to follow the lognormal distribution. This distribution is given by:

$$f(t) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi} t\sigma} \exp \left[ \frac{(\ln t - \ln t_{50})^2}{2\sigma^2} \right]$$

where t is time,  $t_{50}$  is the time at which 50% of the population fails, and  $\sigma$  is the standard deviation.

Since the prediction model is in the form of a hazard (h(t)) or failure rate, the hazard rate of the lognormal must be used. This is given by:

$$h(t) = \frac{f(t)}{R(t)}$$

Since R(t), the reliability function, involves an integral and becomes complex for the lognormal distribution, the hazard rate cannot be obtained in a closed form solution over all times.

Various statistical simulations were performed to determine if the lognormal distribution could be approximated with other simpler distributions. A pdf (probability density function) was obtained for the extreme value of the lognormal and this truncated distribution was then subjected to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (or K-S) test to determine which, if any distribution fitted this data set. A constant failure rate (exponential pdf), Poisson, or normal distributions clearly did not fit the distribution.

If however, the reliability is relatively high (i.e., greater than .8), the probability density function itself represents a good approximation to the hazard rate, so that if the reliability is greater than .8, there is no more than 20% error in this approximation. The point at which the reliability is .8 for any given mechanism signals that the device population is reaching end of life, and the hazard rate will be dramatically increasing. Therefore, by defining the model to be valid only for those times where the reliability is greater than .8, the closed form probability density function can be used to approximate the hazard rate. Beyond this time, the model is not valid.

Since there are several variables affecting the failure rate of the wearout mechanisms, the end of life time has been defined to be that in which the time is equal to .5  $t_{50}$  or when the failure rate for a single mechanism has reached .1 F/10<sup>6</sup> hrs., whichever is less. The failure rate predictions are therefore invalid beyond these times.

The Figures 3-7 through 3-12 illustrate the lognormal distribution's probability density function, cumulative distribution function, and hazard function for several combinations of means  $(t_{50})$  and standard deviations ( $\sigma$ ). The mean and sigma are given in the upper right hand corner of each graph.


One area of concern in the use of the lognormal distribution is its high sensitivity to variations in sigma. In all distributions defined thus far, a sigma of 1.0 is typical. Although it is evident that this value is fairly well accepted, slight deviations from it can significantly affect the model. To illustrate this, Table 3-5 shows the results of a few failure rate calculations at 10 years. This dependency can also be seen in Figure 3-12 which illustrates the hazard rate at the extreme value of a lognormal distribution with a mean life of  $10^6$  and a sigma which varies from .7 to 1.3.


TABLE 3-5:
HAZARD RATE AS A FUNCTION OF MEAN AND SIGMA

	Sigma					
<sup>t</sup> 50	.5	.9	1.0	1.1	1.5	
10 <sup>6</sup>	6.4x10 <sup>-11</sup>	1.3x10 <sup>-7</sup>	2.3x10 <sup>7</sup>	3.6×10 <sup>-7</sup>	8.1x10 <sup>-7</sup>	
5x10 <sup>6</sup>	$5.6 \times 10^{-20}$	$2.1 \times 10^{-10}$	1.3x10 <sup>-9</sup>	4.8x10 <sup>-9</sup>	8.0x10 <sup>-8</sup>	
107	2.9x10 <sup>-25</sup>	$4.9 \times 10^{-12}$	6.1x10 <sup>-11</sup>	3.9x10 <sup>-10</sup>	2.1x10 <sup>-8</sup>	

From these numbers it can be seen that using a sigma of .9 or 1.1 for a projected  $t_{50}$  of  $10^6$  hours can mean the difference from 130 to 360 FTTS (i.e., Failures/ $10^9$  hours). For longer  $t_{50}$  the relative change may be 1 or 2 orders of magnitude although the actual failure rate values are much smaller. Large uncertainties in the sigma result in very large uncertainties of the failure rate.

While a sigma in the range of 1.0 is reasonable and consistent with theory, the range of sigma reported in published data vary widely. The ideal model would measure how aggressive a manufacturer's design rules and process controls were. For example, if every metal stripe carried the maximum current density and the process was marginal or had wide variations (i.e., step coverage varied from 10% to 60% with design rules specifying 30%), then there would be a considerable electromigration risk. Another design may have just a few stripes where the current density is maximum and never experience electromigration. While it may be possible to develop design analysis software tools which calculate current densities for every line and then sum them in





33

FIGURE 3-9: HAZARD FUNCTION LOGNORMAL




FIGURE 3-11: CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION LOGNORMAL

FIGURE 3-12: HAZARD FUNCTION LOGNORMAL

some manner, it is not likely that such information will ever be released publicly or to the DoD. Some manufacturers may also know that their step coverage and line width vary significantly, but such information is not likely to be released. Both of these factors make significant contributions to the sigma and make it very difficult to include in a general wearout prediction model. By using the default sigmas in the model, a typical failure rate for each mechanism can be obtained, with the understanding that there are wide variations.

The assumption in choosing an average sigma is that the random variations in the process and the statistical variations in measurement are accounted for in the sigma of the lognormal distributions (applicable for the wearout mechanisms only), since the distribution, mean and sigma were based on empirical data.

There was no data available which contradicts the use of the lognormal distribution, even at the extreme low end of the distribution which tends to be where its accuracy decreases. However, this is not a significant effect since the failure rate contribution of the lognormal distribution only becomes significant when the device is approaching its end of useful life, or its wearout period. Therefore, the wearout relationships will only provide an estimate for the end of life and very little information about the failure rate during the useful life of the device.

## 3.2 RELATIONSHIP TO THE GENERIC QUALIFICATION PROGRAM

This reliability prediction medeling effort, since it is for state of the art CMOS technology, should be coordinated with and related to other VHSIC/VHSIC-Like technology efforts such as yield enhancement and generic qualification.

Efforts were made to utilize data resulting from the Yield Enhancement and Generic Qualification efforts as input to the detailed model. Key elements of these programs that were of interest are the test structure testing performed on a regular basis. There are three elements to this testing:

(1) Parametric Monitor (PM) testing of individual transistors, diodes, and capacitors on every wafer. Undoubtedly there could also be a transistor with which to measure substrate current for the hot carriers top equation.

- (2) Technology Characterization Vehicle (TCV) is used for periodic time dependent failure mechanisms for the same mechanisms used in prediction models. Thus, companies involved in Generic Qualification would have acceleration factors that might be used in their own models. It is also expected that fast wafer level tests will be developed and performed on every wafer run for electromigration, TDDB, and hot carriers.
- (3) Standard Evaluation Circuits (SEC) are processed on a regular basis and regularly subjected to life tests. Perhaps, these could serve as the reference chip in the electromigration and TDDB equations.

In addition, the Generic Qualification program instills higher quality throughout the manufacturing process from design to assembly and shipment. Therefore, the short form model to be presented later has a quality factor associated with a manufacturer who can demonstrate this level of quality.

After investigating the potential use of these data sources, it was concluded that designing the model to include specific data from these sources would be very difficult, if not impossible due to the variability between manufacturers in the specific manners in which they obtain the data. For example, the SEC circuit provides much information useful for reliability studies but is not standardized between manufacturers. Therefore, it was concluded that the level of standardization necessary for input to a reliability model has not yet been achieved. In fact, in many cases it would be undesirable to have a very standardized method of determining reliability characteristics. This is due to the fact that there are many variables in the design and fabrication of a circuit and the best manner to test for their reliability characteristics is not always the same and may be unique for a particular process.

Since it is very important to make use of the data from these efforts, IITRI and Honeywell believe that an effective manner in which to accomplish this is to assign a base failure rate (for electromigration, time dependent dielectric breakdown, and hot carrier effects) as a function of a manufacturers ability to prove they have the failure mechanisms under control.

This approach has merit because well designed circuits typically exhibit very low failure rates for these mechanisms when used in typical applications. In fact, there has been very few instances of field failures reported due to these mechanisms. The database developed for this modeling effort supports this view since it also contains very few failures due to these mechanisms. These low failure rates are then reflected in the quality factor for those manufacturers on the QML (Qualified Manufacturers List) for the short form model and in the  $t_{50}$  expressions for the wearout mechanisms in the detailed model. This approach is consistent with the generic qualification effort which allows some flexibility in the methods used by the manufacturer in proving the adequacy of a design.

The detailed model accounts for the manufacturing process capabilities primarily in the defect density factor. Presumably, a manufacturer with good process controls such as those on a QML or QPL (Qualified Products List) will have a lower defect density than one without those controls in place. For this reason the differences between the QML or QPL status of a manufacturing process should inherently be accounted for in the defect density.

The short form model, however, cannot use defect density as an input since most users of the short form model will rarely have access to specific values. Therefore, a default defect density was derived. Additionally, the short form model includes a factor based on the QML or QPL status of the manufacturing process. This factor, discussed further in Section 7.1.4, was based on the observed variation in reliability between manufacturers, presuming that these differences are accounted for in the QML process.

Guidelines for one method of calculating the detect density for both oxide and metal are given in Appendix B. These are calculated separately indicating that if only the oxide defect density is known, it can be used and the default condition for metal defect density can be used.

#### 4.0 DATA COLLECTION AND DATABASE DEVELOPED FOR THIS PROGRAM

#### 4.1 LATABASE

A database was developed to hold and analyze the empirical data collected in this effort. This database has been developed for an IBM PC and contains provisions for entering the following information about the device itself, the stresses it was exposed to, and the results of those stresses:

<u>Device</u>	Stress
Part Number	Power Dissipation
Manufacturer	Test Type
Part Description	Junction Temperature
Package Type	Current Density
Number of Pins	Oxide Voltage
Thermal Resistance	<b>Test Conditions</b>
Technology	Ambient Temperature
Gate Count	
Feature Size	Test Results
Die Dirnensions	
Metal Length	Number Tested
Metal Width	Number Failed
Number of Metal Layers	Time to Failure
Metal Material	Failure Mechanism
Gate Longth	Failure Mode
Oxide Thickness	
Oxide Area	
Metal Defect Density	
Oxide Defect Density	
Yield	
ESD Susceptibility	

The type of test information collected was primarily operating life test, burn in, and various environmental tests. The failure causes, feature size, and die area of a profile of this database is given in the following sections. The detailed data contained in this database is given in Appendix D.

#### 4.1.1 Failure Cause Profile

Since the objective of this modeling effort was to quantify the failure rate of each failure mechanism, knowing the cause of each observed failure was very important. The cause of failure was known for approximately half of all failures.

Table 4-1 illustrates the number of observed failures as a function of the failure cause (failure class) and test type. Each observed failure that had a reported associated failure cause (failure mode, mechanism, or cause) was classified into one of the failure classes listed in this table, thus facilitating failure rate modeling of each failure class.

One data source contributed a large number of failures for which the failure class was not entirely defined. Therefore, Table 4-2 summarizes the same information as Table 4-1 but excludes that data source. As explained in Section 3.0, the unknown data was assumed to have the same relative weightings as the known failures when performing the actual modeling. This modeling was accomplished by increasing the predicted failure rate of each of the known mechanisms by a given percentage. In this manner all failures are accounted for.

TABLE 4-1:
TOTAL NUMBER OF FAILURES OBSERVED AS A FUNCTION
OF TEST TYPE AND FAIL CLASS

Failure Class	Life Test	Temperature Cycling	Environmental	Total
				*
Unknown	789	54	4	847
Assembly	21	0	0	21
Peckage	24	214	0	238
Metal	62	3	6	71
Misc.	44	4	5	53
Oxids	274	7	0	281
Contamination	603	5	0	608
Wearout		0	_0	7
Total	1824	287	15	2126

TABLE 4-2:
NUMBER OF FAILURES OBSERVED AS A FUNCTION
OF TEST TYPE AND FAIL CLASS EXCLUDING ONE
DATA SOURCE

Failure Class	Life Test	Temperature Cycling	Environmenta <sup>1</sup>	Total
Unknown	437	54	4	495
Assembly	21	0	. 0	21
Package	22	214	0	236
Metal	62	3	6	71
Misc.	44	4	5	53
Oxide	111	7	0	118
Contamination	48	5	0	53
Wearout	_7	<u></u> 0	_0	7
Total	752	287	15	1054

## 4.1.2 Feature Size Profile

The distribution of feature sizes present in the database (in those cases where it was known) is given in Figure 4-1. Although devices with feature sizes in the 3-5 micron area were beyond the scope of this study, they were included to make provisions in the database to identify trends as a function of feature size. A weighted (by number of tested devices) average of feature sizes in this database is 2.0 µm.




FIGURE 4-1: FEATURE SIZE PROFILE

# 4.1.3 Die Area Profile

The distribution of die areas present in the database is given in Figure 4-2. The weighted die area by number of devices is .21 cm<sup>2</sup>.




FIGURE 4-2: DIE AREA PROFILE

#### 5.0 FAILURE MECHANISM CHARACTERIZATION

#### 5.1 OXIDE FAILURE RATE

### 5.1.1 Oxide Early Life Failures

The early life failure rate for oxide related failure mechanisms was developed using the methodology outlined in Section 3.0. Table 5-1 summarizes the data used in development of this factor. In this table, the accelerated time interval is the effective time interval (in 10<sup>6</sup> hrs.) at 25°C (using the oxide temperature acceleration factor with an activation energy of .3 eV). The accelerated part hours are the total effective observed oxide part hours at 25°C in each time interval, and the last column is the number of observed oxide failures occurring in each interval.

TABLE 5-1: OXIDE FAILURE DATA

Equivalent Time Interval at 25°C (10 <sup>6</sup> hrs.)	Accelerated Part Hours (10 <sup>6</sup> hrs.)	Number of Failures
0-0.002344	644.832020	3
0.002345-0.008204	1601.110137	13
0.008205-0.016950	1648.146367	1
0.016951-0.024417	1372.043816	19
0.024418-0.048834	4309.957812	229
0.048835-0.049224	6.008332	2
0.049225-0.050446	15.044018	1
0.050447-0.138452	524.665804	2
0.138453-0.193123	35.612394	3

Selecting two discrete ranges for the regression solutions yields the following data in Table 5-2. These ranges were defined based on the quantity of data. For example, there was a large quantity of data from devices that were tested at an equivalent time of .048834, therefore 0-.048834 was one of the ranges chosen. It should be noted here that relatively large ranges of time had to be grouped into each of the two ranges because in many cases sources reported failures occurring within a time interval. For example, if the devices on test were tested only at 500 hours, the failures observed actually occurred prior to 500 hrs., although the exact time is not known.

TABLE 5-2:
OXIDE EARLY LIFE SUMMARIZED FAILURE RATE

Effective	Midpoint	Effective	Number of	Failure
Range		Part hrs. (10 <sup>5</sup> )	Failures	Rate (F/106 hrs.)
0048834	.024417	9576	265	.0277
.048835193123	.12098	582	8	.0137

Regressing on this data and adjusting the time constant to insure that the cumulative failure rates are equivalent for the predicted and observed cases yields:

$$\lambda_{OX}$$
 (t) = .0331 e<sup>-7.7</sup> t

Since failures of unknown causes represented 58% of the data, the failure rate derived here should be multiplied by 2.38 to compensate for the unknown failures. This assumes that the unknown failures have the same relative rate of occurrence between mechanisms as do the known failures. Since the cumulative failure rate is directly proportional to the constant (in this case .0331), this constant should be multiplied by 2.38, yielding the following hazard rate:

$$\lambda_{\rm ox \ early \ life} = .0788 \ e^{-7.7 \ t}$$

Combining the effects of temperature and screening time yields:

$$\lambda_{\text{ox early life}} = .0788 \, \text{e}^{-7.7 \, \text{to}} \, A_{\text{Tox}} \, \text{e}^{-7.7 \, \text{A}_{\text{Tox}} \, \text{t}}$$

There are several factors that already affect the early life oxide failure rate that are not present in this expression. One such factor is the oxide electric field. To be able to include this factor the electric field would need to be known for all devices in the database, since it is an empirical relationship. Unfortunately, the electric field was rarely reported, making it impossible to include this effect. This early life oxide model therefore, as with the other early life failure rates, represents an industry wide average observed hazard rate.

The oxide wearout hazard rate however, has included the effects from factors such as electric field since it is a more theoretically based factor.

#### 5.1.2 Oxide Wearout

Time dependent dielectric breakdown is considered an oxide wearout mechanism and has empirically been shown to follow the lognormal time to failure distribution. Since a lognormal distribution is uniquely defined with a mean  $(t_{50})$  and standard deviation  $(\sigma)$ , the intent of the effort to quantify the oxide wearout failure rate was to quantify the  $t_{50}$  and  $\sigma$  as a function of applicable stress and fabrication variables.

Although many researchers have studied time dependent dielectric breakdown thoroughly, the basic physics of failure is still not completely understood. This fact makes it difficult to derive a general t50 model valid for all manufacturing processes in all situations. As explained in Section 3.0 of this report, however, the wearout mechanisms only provides an indication of an approximate end of life time and contribute very little to the failure rate in the useful life of the device. Therefore, if a manufacturer can prove that the t50 for exide wearout for his particular process is much greater than the life expectancy of a part, this factor can essentially be ignored in the failure rate calculation.

For these reasons, the failure rate for oxide wearout (TDDB) was derived as a function of temperature, electric field in the oxide, oxide area and defect density. These relationships were derived from empirical data from various researchers on oxide reliability. The following sections summarize the development of these factors.

## 5.1.2.1 Temperature Acceleration Factor

The basic temperature acceleration follows the Arrhenius relationship of the following form,

$$A_{T_{OX}} = \exp\left[\frac{-Ea}{K} \left(\frac{1}{T_J} - \frac{1}{T_0}\right)\right]$$

where  $A_{Tox}$  = Temperature Acceleration Factor for Oxide

T = Temperature (in degrees Kelvin)

 $T_0$  = Reference Temperature = 298°K

 $K = Boltzman's Constant = 8.63 \text{ } 10^{-5} \text{ } (ev/^{\circ}K)$ 

T<sub>1</sub> = Average Junction Temperature (°C)

Ea = Activation Energy (eV)

Based on test results contained in the literature, the commonly accepted activation energy is .3 eV, which has also been experienced by Honeywell, and therefore is the nominal value to be used in this model. The temperature acceleration factor for TDDB is therefore the following:

$$A_{T_{OX}} = \exp\left[\frac{-.3}{K}\left(\frac{1}{T_J} - \frac{1}{298}\right)\right]$$

### 5.1.2.2 Electric Field Acceleration Factor

Crook (Reference 27) had originally derived a form for the acceleration factor due to the electric stress applied across an oxide. This form was:

$$A_{EF} \alpha \exp \left[ \frac{E_{REF} - E_{S}}{E_{0}} \right]$$

where EREP = Reference Electric Field = 3MV/cm

Ec - Actual Electric Field

E<sub>0</sub> = Normalizing Electric Field

Domangue (Reference 31) has conducted tests at various electric field stresses (3, 4, and 5 MV/cm) from which an acceleration factor can be obtained. Analysis of his data yields an  $E_0 = 1324$  MV/cm and therefore an acceleration factor can be stated as follows:

$$A_{EF} = \exp\left[\frac{3 - E_S}{.1342}\right]$$

More recent work by Hu (Reference 39) on oxides closer to those types and thicknesses used in VHSIC circuits has shown that the time to breakdown is related to the electric field in the following manner:

$$t_{BD} \propto e^{\frac{B+H}{E_{OX}}}$$

where 
$$B = 240 \text{ MV/cm}$$
  
 $H = 80 \text{ MV/cm}$ 

It can be seen that this acceleration factor has enormous changes for reasonable changes in  $E_{\rm OX}$ . For example, a 5 volt part that has 300 Å and 100 Å oxides ( $E_{\rm OX}$  of 1.67 and 5 MV/cm respectively) would have acceleration factors differing by 56 orders of magnitude.

Hu had used a smaller number, 192, instead of 320 for comparing the 1% cumulative failure points as opposed to the 50% cumulative failure point, arguing that the value should be smaller for defect related breakdown than for near intrinsic breakdown. Since in this model, the 1% cumulative failure point is of much more interest than the 50% point, the constant of 192 will be used in this factor. Therefore, using an exponent of 192 and choosing the AVox term to agree with empirical data at high electric fields yields:

$$A_{V_{OX}} = e^{-192} \left( \frac{1}{E_{OX}} - \frac{1}{2.5} \right)$$

In addition to the electric field, various researchers have also observed a relationship between the acceleration factor and oxide thickness. Derivation of this factor (from Reference 26) based on empirical studies yields:

Acceleration 
$$\alpha$$
 4.2 log  $T_{ox}$  - 6.95

Therefore, the factor that could be used in the oxide model is therefore:

$$A_{\text{Tox}} = \exp \left[ \frac{4.2 \log T_{\text{OXR}} - 6.95}{4.2 \log T_{\text{OX}} - 6.95} \right]$$

where

 $T_{OXR}$  = Reference oxide thickness

T<sub>OX</sub> = Actual oxide thickness

Since the variation in this factor is very small compared to the electric field acceleration factor, it was not included in the model since the uncertainties in the electric field factor are much larger than the oxide thickness factor itself.

Table 5-3 summarizes some of the accessation factors found in the literature.

# 5.1.2.3 Die Area and Defect Density

This section discusses the relationship between die area, defect density, and yield. Although it is included in this section, the discussion of yield effects is not specific to oxide. In this model, there are separate defect densities for oxide and metal, although they use the same default value, which is a function of feature size.

Phillips (Reference 28) has suggested the use of extreme value statistics to derive the area/defect density relationship of gate oxides. In extreme value statistics, the hazard rate can be closely approximated by the exponential function. Thus,

$$h(x) = \frac{1}{1-F(x)} \frac{d F(x)}{dx}$$

TABLE 5-3: ELECTRIC FIELD ACCELERATION FACTOR (A $_{\rm EF}$ ) AND ACTIVATION ENERGY (E $_{\rm a}$ ) IN LITERATURE

Reference	Material	T <sub>OX</sub> (A)	Temp. (C)	A <sub>EF</sub> (1/ (MV/CM))	E <sub>a</sub> (eV)
29	Poly	> 400	25-160	107	.3-25
30	Al	450	85-250	101.5+.5	2.1
31	Poly	390	25-150	102.0	.36
32	Poly	400	•	101.7	.26
33	Poly	100-200	•	104	1.0
34	Poly	100-400	•	105.6	40
35	Poly	100	25-150	101.87-102.0	.3
36	Poly	200	20-250	102.5	.3
37	Poly	60-100	170-250	101.74-101.9	1.0-1.1
38	Poly	110	25-275	101.41	.23

From the data in Reference 28 and from extreme value statistics, for a gate oxide area  $A_1$  with average breakdown  $E_1$ 

$$h_1(E) = \exp(S_N(E-E_1)/S_V-Y_N)$$

and similarly for a gate oxide area  $A_2$  with average breakdown  $E_2$ 

$$h_2(E) = \exp(S_N(E-E_2/S_V-Y_N))$$

Thus;

$$h_1$$
 (E)/ $h_2$  (E) = exp ( $S_N(E_2-E_1)/S_V$ )

It is noted the  $S_N$  and  $Y_N$  are constants that depend only on the sample size and that  $S_V$  is the standard deviation and the same for both distributions (A<sub>1</sub> and A<sub>2</sub>).

It is also clear from the data presented, which is supported by the extreme value statistic theory, that

$$\ln(-\ln(1-F_1)) - \ln(-\ln(1-F_2)) = \ln(A_1/A_2)$$

and

$$S_N(E-E_1)/S_V - S_N(E-E_2)/S_V = in(A_1/A_2)$$

Thus:

$$S_N (E_2 - E_1)/S_V = \ln(A_1/A_2)$$

Arit.

$$h_1(E)/h_2(E) \approx \exp(\ln(A_1/A_2) = A_1/A_2$$

Thus, the ratio of the hazard rates is equal to the ratio of the gate oxide areas in extreme value statistics.

This factor indicates that if reliability data is available on a circuit such as a SEC, the hazard rate could be extrapolated to the entire chip by knowing the gate oxide areas. On, if the average areas of the devices in the database is known, it can be used as the reference area.

The following discussion summarizes another analysis that was conducted to determine the relationship between both area/defect density and hazard rate.

If f(t) is the failure density function, then the cumulative failure density function is given by:

$$Q(t) = \int_{0}^{t} f(t) dt$$

Crook (Reference 27) used another expression for Q(t) which was said to be from Li and Maserjian (Reference 41), which was actually obtained from Price (Reference 42). Price derived the following expression in 1970 from Bose-Einstein statistics, stating that earlier models using Boltzman statistics were inaccurate;

$$Q_S(t) = 1/(1+1/A_SD_S)$$

 $A_S$  is the area,  $D_S$  is the defect density and  $Q_S(t)$  is the cumulative failure density. Price derived this expression for integrated circuit yields. On the assumption that the effective defects are randomly distributed along two dimensions and are thus indistinguishable, Li and Mascrijan found the equation applicable for the effective defect density for time dependent dielectric breakdown. Note that D or  $D_S$  is a function of time. In the discussion that follows the subscript s indicates that these values are for the success test structure from which data is generated in the laboratory.

With the above formula it follows that for a second chip with area  $A_0$  and the same defect density the cumulative failure density is given by:

$$Q_0(t) = 1/(1+(A_s/A_0)(1/Q_s(t)-1))$$

In a similar fashion it can be shown that for a third chip with the same area as the second chip A<sub>0</sub>, but a different defect density a cumulative failure density function is given by:

$$Q_{i1}(t) = 1/(1+(D_0/D_n)(1/Q_0(t)-1))$$

If the last two equations are combined, the resulting equation becomes

$$Q_{ii}(t) = 1/(1+(D_0A_S/D_nA_0(1/Q_S(t)-1))$$

Ŭ,

$$Q_n(t) = 1/(1+(D_SA_S/D_nA_n)(1/Q_S(t)-1))$$

From this expression it is clear that as the defect density and/or the gate oxide area gets large, the cumulative number of failures gets large.

Crook also showed that the hazard rate (the probability that a device will fail in the time (t+dt) if it has already survived until t) is found by differentiating Q(t) and amounts to

$$h_{t_0}(t) = 1/(1-Q_{t_0}(t))$$

From the above discussion a failure rate for time dependent dielectric breakdown of a given chip can be found if all of the following as known:

- the sigma and the t<sub>50</sub> of the TDDB failures of a test structure with a known defect density and area;
- (2) voltage and thermal acceleration factors if the test structure work was performed at accelerated conditions:
- (3) the area and defect density of the given chip.

Unfortunately, the calculations involve the integral of a complicated function. To deal with this problem numerical integration was used to assess the effect of changing the area and defect density. It immediately became clear that for a small number of cumulative failures, the formulas could be greatly simplified. From the last cumulative failure density function expression above, if  $Q_S(t)$  is small, then

$$\begin{aligned} Q_{n} \; (t) &= 1/(D_{S}A_{S}/D_{n}A_{n}) \; (1/Q_{S} \; (t)) \\ &= D_{n}A_{n}Q_{S}(t)/D_{S}A_{S} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the cumulative failure density function is directly proportional to the defect density and the area of the chip. Since the cumulative failure density function is the integral of the failure density function, it follows that the failure density function is directly proportional to the area and defect density. For the first few failures the instantaneous failure rate is equal to the failure density function, and thus it is directly proportional to defect density and area. Thus, in the first approximation to double the chip area (or defect density) is to double the chip failure rate.

In the previous paragraphs some relationships were established between the cumulative failure probability  $Q_n$ , and the number of defects, D, and the chip area, A. These relationships were based on a model developed by Price (Reference 42) using Bose-Einstein statistics. A more general defect model was derived by Stapper (Reference 43). In this model the probability defect density function is related to the gamma distribution. For this model the yield is given by

$$Y = 1/(1+AD_0/S)^S$$

where A is the chip area,  $D_0$  the average defect density, and S a shape parameter. This model assumes that the defects have a given distribution pattern across the wafer. In the limiting case where S approaches 0, the distribution is a delta function, meaning the defect density is constant and all defects are randomly distributed and independent. This condition leads to the Poisson yield estimate

$$Y = e^{-D0A}$$

Also it can be seen that when the S of the Stapper model is 1, the yield model reduces to

$$Y = 1/(1 + AD_0)$$

which was described previously as the Price model, but actually used earlier by Sceds (Reference 44). In this case the defect density distribution is exponential. A comparison of these and two other yield models is shown in Figure 5-1. The Poisson model is the most pessimistic and the Seeds model is the most optimistic. The Stapper model can be adjusted by the shape parameter to cover the area in between. The following derivation is similar to that presented previously with the exception that the more general Stapper model is used.

The cumulative probability of failure plus the yield must add to 1. Thus

$$Q(t) = 1 - Y = 1-1/(1+D_{()}A/S)^{S}$$

If  $Q_n(t)$  is the cumulative failure probability of a circuit with  $D_n$  average defects and  $A_n$  area, and  $Q_0(t)$  is the cumulative failure probability of a different circuit with area  $A_n$  and the same average defects, then

$$D_{n}(t) = \frac{S}{A_{n}} \left[ \frac{1}{[1 - Q_{n}(t)] 1/S} - 1 \right] = D_{0}(t) = \frac{S}{A_{0}} \left[ \frac{1}{[1 - Q_{0}(t)] 1/S} - 1 \right]$$

If the above is solved for  $Q_0$  (t) in terms of  $Q_n$  (t) and the two areas, we get

$$Q_{0}(t) = 1 - \left[1\left[1 + \frac{A_{0}}{A_{n}}\left[\frac{1}{1 - Q_{n}(t)}\right] \frac{1}{1/S} - 1\right]\right]^{S}$$

In a similar fashion

$$Q_{0}(t) = 1 - \left[1 \left[1 + \frac{A_{0}D_{0}}{A_{n}D_{n}} \left[\frac{1}{[1 - Q_{n}(t)] + J/S} - 1\right]\right]^{S}$$

The above equation relates the cumulative failure probability of a given dovice to that of another device as a function of area and defects.

To help understand this relationship a number of graphs were generated. Figures 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4 show the effect of the shape factors for different  $A_0D_0/A_nD_n$  ratios. From these graphs it is clear that when the area defect factor is near unity (that is, the chips have approximately the same areas and defect distributions), the shape factor S has modest effects on the relative failure probability. When the area defect factor is large (that is, the  $Q_0$  evice has a much larger area

FIGURE 5-1: YIELD AS A FUNCTION OF DEFECTS AND AREA FOR DIFFERENT MODELS




FIGURE 5-2: CUM FAILURE PROBABILITY FOR  $A_0D_0/A_nD_n=2$  AND S=.01,.1,1, AND 2




FIGURE 5-3: CUM FAILURE PROBABILITY FOR  $A_oD_o/A_nD_n = 10$  AND S = .01, .1, 1, AND 2




FIGURE 5-4: CUM FAILURE PROBABILITY FOR  $A_0D_0/A_nD_n=100$  AND S=.01,.1,1, AND 2

and/or defect density), then the effect of the shape factor is more pronounced. Stapper indicated that IBM had seen S range from 0.1 to 2.2 depending upon the type of defect, however, it takes substantial quantities of data to establish an S value.

The model presented herein assumes that the areas and defect densities of the devices used to derive these factors (from the database) are similar to those that predictions will be performed on, and therefore that the direct relationship between area/defect density and hazard rate is valid.

Figure 5-5 demonstrates the effect of the area defect factor when S=1. This is the Seeds or Price model. From this graph it can be seen that for cumulative failure probabilities less than 10%, the cumulative failure probability of one device is equal to the defect area factor times the cumulative failure probability of the other device. This demonstrates graphically that for the S=1 model the cumulative failure probability (and thus, the failure rate) is directly proportional to the level of defects and the chip area. Intel (Reference 27) has also presented data to support this theory.

Figure 5-6 shows a slightly different area defect factor effect when S=.01 which is close to the Poisson defect distribution. In this instance the curves deviate from the asymptote at a slightly lower point. Again the cumulative failure probability is directly related to the area defect factor.

The above analysis seems to indicate that for the first few failures, which are the only ones of interest here, the probability of failure is directly proportional to the defect level and to the chip area. This analysis is based on yield theory and has been demonstrated to be consistent with the Phillips model (Reference 28) to be discussed later.

In the previous discussion a general model was presented to relate the cumulative TDDB failures for one device in that for another. The key factors were device area and number of defects. This reliability model was based on the Stapper yield model and includes a curve fitting or shape factor S. The following model analyzes how some published data fits that model.

In 1979 Intel published TDDB data for a number of different sized capacitors (Reference 27). This data showed the cumulative number of failures in a given period of time for populations of different sized capacitors. Figures 5-7 and 5-8 illustrates those data points plotted. The four lines represent four area/defect ratios consistent with Intel's data. The different capacitors they used were all from the same set of wafers so that the defect levels should have been consistent




FIGURE 5-5: CUM FAILURE PROBABILITY FOR S = 1 AND AD = 1, 5, 10 AND 100




FIGURE 5-6: CUM FAILURE PROBABILITY FOR S = .01 AND AD = 1, 5, 10 AND 100




FIGURE 5-7: CUM FAILURE PROBABILITY




FIGURE 5-8: CUM FAILURE PROBABILITY

The data for S=1, representing the Seeds model, seems to show the right trend. Indeed, this was the model that Intel used. To try to have the model better fit the data, two approaches were tried. First, curves for different values of S (from .2 to 10) were generated. Second, part 1 in the graph was changed from first to middle to last data point. The results from that data are summarized in Table 5-4.

TABLE 5-4: STAPPER MODEL WITH VARIOUS S VALUES

Device (x10 <sup>6</sup> μ <sup>2</sup> )	Cum Fails (in 3×10 <sup>©</sup> sec.)	Part 1 Standard S = 1	Part 3 Standard S = 1	Part 5 Standard S=1	Part 3 Standard S = .3	Part 3 Standard S = 4
.7	12%	•	16%	16%	23%	15%
1.55	29%	24%	32%	31%	34%	32%
1.9	. 36%	27%		34%	•	•
2.5	46%	32%	43%	42%	42%	44%
3.0	44%	36%	48%		43%	51%

While in general it can be said that smaller values of S tend to close or narrow the range of the data points, reasonable values of S do not bring the lowest point down enough (Intel's 12% point) without significantly raising the data points for the larger areas. Because the Intel data is not perfect (the largest capacitor actually had fewer failures than the next largest one), it is not likely that any model will fit all the data points well. Thus, the S = 1 model seems like a reasonable one to start with, although there is not enough data to refine that parameter estimate at this time.

Let (Reference 45) has also derived a model based upon the Poisson distribution function for randomly distributed defects. In this model the probability that a sample would contain at least one defect with "weakness factors" larger than the value w was given by;

$$P(w) = 1-c^{-AD(w)}$$

where A is the oxide area and D(w) is the total area density with "weakness factor" larger than w. It was also empirically found that the time to breakdown was related to the weakness factor by;

$$t_{\rm BD} = e^{\frac{G}{E_{\rm OX}}}$$


where  $E_{OX}$  is the electric field in the gate oxide and G is a factor specific to each process. Thus, the above probability can be seen to indicate the cumulative fraction of parts that would fail at a particular time for a particular process under a specific gate bias. By analyzing TDDB data for six different capacitors from  $2x10^{-2}$ cm<sup>2</sup> to  $5x10^{5}$  cm<sup>2</sup> and the above equations, the authors derived an expression for D(w). They were thus able to predict the failure rate and TDDB curve for any oxide area and electric field for their oxides. This relationship is duplicated in Figure 5-9.

Of particular interest are the following:

- (1) The relationship between reliability and stress, area, and defects may be modeled;
- (2) The relationship appears to be consistent with the Poisson distribution function, whereas it was previously presented that Intel's data for reliability as a function of area and defects was consistent with the Seeds model and not the Poisson distribution.
- (3) The defect measurement or "weakness factors" can be found indirectly from a lot of data but cannot be measured directly.

At the Wafer Reliability Workshop at Lake Tahoe, California in October of 1987, there was a consensus that two good models for time dependent dielectric breakdown existed and were supported by convincing data. One was the Berkeley model and the other model was described in a paper by Wolters and Zegers-Van Duynhoven of Phillips Research Laboratories (Reference 28) of which some aspects were previously discussed. This model is described below.

Perhaps the most unique aspect of the Phillips model is the use of extreme value probability instead of the conventional lognormal statistics. It is argued that using the lognormal distribution which is good in the region of the median is inconsistent with the weak link nature of dielectric breakdown - that is, the device will fail at some defect which acts as the weakest spot.



THEORETICAL CURVES OF CUMULATIVE FRACTION OF FAILURE FOR DIFFERENT OXIDE AREAS (4) .001 cm<sup>2</sup>, (b) .01 cm<sup>2</sup>, (c) .02 cm<sup>2</sup>, AND (d) .1 cm<sup>2</sup>. FROM REFERENCE 1

Extreme value statistics are often used when the values of interest are the largest or smallest in the distribution. Mechanical fracture of materials or the electric breakdown of transformer oil (Reference 46) are typical weakest link processes. Gate oxide breakdown depends on intrinsic material properties as well as defects. Indeed, it is the 1%, or .01% failure point that is of more interest than the 50% point.

It is argued that the hazard rate at low values is approximated by an exponential function. This idea was proved by Gumbel ( eference 47) for various distributions including lognormal.

Thus,

$$\frac{1}{1-F(x)} \frac{d F(x)}{C dx} = \exp(x)$$

and


$$\ln (-\ln(1-F(x))) = a \text{ linear function of } x$$

In the above equations F(x) is the cumulative probability of failure at x. x could be the breakdown electric field or the log of time to failure at a constant voltage.

A large distribution or amount of data is required to make the above equations work properly. The author had breakdown data on some 12000 capacitors and grouped them into 30 groups of 400 and made another distribution of the lowest value in each of the 30 groups. When plotted on extreme value probability paper, the grouped distribution resulted in a line parallel to the original distribution (Figure 5-10). Of interest was that the shift between the two curves was about ln (400) which happens to be the log of the ratio of the effective areas of the two groups of capacitors. Thus, the shift corresponds to the increase in probability of finding a defect among the group of 400. This shift is predicted by the "stability postulate" of extreme value statistics and should hold as long as the defects are distributed homogeneously (i.e., Poisson). When defects are clustered, the shift is less.

Since the factor  $\ln (-\ln(1-F))$  scales accordingly to the factor  $\ln(A_2/A_1)$ , it follows that;

$$\ln (-\ln (1-F_2)) - \ln (-\ln (1-F_1)) = \ln (A_2/A_1)$$



BREAKDOWN DISTRIBUTION OF 12000 CAPACITORS (LOWER CURVE) AND THE SMALLEST VALUE OF EACH GROUP OF 400 (UPPER CURVE).

where  $F_1$  and  $F_2$  are the fractions of the parts that have failed with gate oxide areas  $A_1$  and  $A_2$  respectively. From the above it is easy to show that

$$F_2 = 1 - (1 - F_1)^{A_2/A_1}$$


This type of equation, relating  $F_1$  and  $F_2$ , was used earlier to make graphs based upon the Stapper model. Similar graphs are shown in Figure 5-11 and 5-12 with shaping parameter S=1 and 5 respectively. It is seen that Figure 5-12 with S=5 gives a remarkably good fit.

An expression was also derived from the extreme value statistics of the Phillips model to indicate that the ratio of failure (i.e., hazard) rates was equal to the ratio of gate oxide areas. Their data tended to support this relationship. Since this is a simple and easy to work with relationship, other published works were examined to find data to support or reject this model. While many researchers have presented various types of time-to-breakdown data for various conditions, few have moved the next step and presented failure rate data, especially failure rates for devices with different oxide areas. While failure rates can easily be calculated from t<sub>50</sub> and sigma data, the frequent use of high sigmas (greater than 1) in this type of testing can result in failure rates that are extremely sensitive to modest changes in the data.


The researchers at Berkeley have calculated and published failure rate data for devices with different oxide areas (Reference 39). A representation of one of the published graphs is shown in Figure 5-13. From this graph it is easy to see that for reasonable product lifetimes (10 years or less), the failure rate of a chip with 10x the area of another chip, is 10x the failure rate of that chip (assuming similar defect densities). After some years of operation, the relationship would not be as good. Thus, their data and model agree reasonably well with the Phillips model.

The Berkeley failure rate/area relationship is based on the assumption that the defects are not uniformly distributed across the wafer - that is, a Gamma distribution function and the Stapper Yield model with S = .6. Extending the approach used in that report produced the graphs shown in Figures 5-14, 5-15 and 5-16.


Figure 5-14 demonstrates the cumulative failure probability of a chip when the cumulative failure probability of a smaller chip (.0%) of the oxide area) is known and the shaping factor S=.3, .6 and .9. This chart indicates that when the failure probability of the smaller chip is small, the failure probability of the larger chip will be 5x as much (the ratio of the oxide areas). The simple



CUMULATIVE FAILURE PROBABILITY OF 2 DEVICES WHOSE AREA X DEFECT DENSITY HAVE THE RATIO OF 1, 5, 10, AND 100 WITH THE SHAPING PARAMETER S=1. **FIGURE 5-11:** 




CUMULATIVE FAILURE PROBABILITY OF 2 DEVICES WHOSE AREA X DEFECT DENSITY HAVE THE RATIO OF 1, 5, 10, AND 100 WITH THE SHAPING PARAMETER S=5. **FIGURE 5-12:** 



THEORETICAL CURVES OF FAILURE RATE FOR DIFFERENT GATE OXIDE AREAS AT 5V OPERATION. TIME AXIS CHANGES AT DIFFERENT VOLTAGES

FIGURE 5-13:




CUMULATIVE TDDB FAILURE PROBABILITY FOR DEVICE WHEN CUMULATIVE TDDB FAILURE PROBABILITY OF ANOTHER DEVICE WITH 1/5 GATE OXIDE AREA AND SHAPING FACTOR S = .3, .6 AND .9 FIGURE 5-14:


relationship does not hold as well when the failure probability of the smaller chip is more than 10%. Figure 5-15 shows a similar graph where the oxide area of the larger chip is 10x that of smaller one.

In a similar fashion Figure 5-16 demonstrates the case where the area ratio is 50. These charts suggest that if a large number of chips with more than one oxide area are life tested, then for the first few failures the number of failures for chips with different area will be proportional to the area of those chips (for the TDDB mechanism).


Since the exact value of the S factor to use is not clear, Figure 5-17 was generated to show the effect of different S values. It is clear that for larger S values, the area ratio model is a better approximation. However, for S = .01, approaching the Poisson case where S = 0, the model is valid only for smaller cumulative failure probabilities. Table 5-5 demonstrating some of these effects is shown below. In this table, the columns represent the cumulative failure probability, the chip area ratio, the S value, and the cumulative failure probabilities ratio, respectively. Ideally, the 2nd and 4th columns would be the same. It can also be seen from this data that the area ratio model is less consistent for larger area ratios.



CUMULATIVE TDDB FAILURE PROBABILITY FOR DEVICE WHEN CUMULATIVE TDDB FAILURE PROBABILITY OF ANOTHER DEVICE WITH 1/10 CATE OXIDE AREA AND SHAPING FACTOR S = .3, .6 AND .9 FIGURE 5-15:



CUMULATIVE TDDB FAILURE PROBABILITY FOR DEVICE WHEN CUMULATIVE TDDB FAILURE PROBABILITY OF ANOTHER DEVICE WITH 1/50 GATE OXIDE AREA AND SHAPING FACTOR S = .3, .6 AND .9 FIGURE 5-16:



CUMULATIVE TIDDS FAILURE PROBABILITY FOR DEVICE WHEN CUMULATIVE TODB FAILURE PROBABILITY OF ANOTHER DEVICE WITH 1/10 GATE OXIDE AREA AND SHAPING FACTOR S = .01, 1, 5 FIGURE 5-17:

TABLE 5-5:
AREA, S VALUE, AND CUMULATIVE
% FAILURES COMPARISON

CFP <sub>1</sub>	A <sub>2</sub> /A <sub>1</sub>	S	CFP <sub>2</sub> /CFP <sub>1</sub>
1%	5	.6	4.8
10%	5	.6	3.3
.1%	10	.6	10
1%	10	.6	9
10%	10	.6	4.6
10%	10	.01	1.2
10%	10	2	5.7
10%	10	5	6.2
.1%	50	.6	48
1%	50	.6	31
10%	50	.6	6.5

In summary the TDDB portion of the failure rate is modeled as directly proportional to the gate oxide area. For this model, a failure rate must be established for a "standard" or "reference" chip of known area. As stated previously, the average area of the die contained in the database of .21 cm<sup>2</sup> is to be used for this purpose.

# 5.1.2.3.1 Calculating Defect Densities

The previous discussions have analyzed the area/defect density/yield relationships and concluded that the oxide hazard rate is directly proportional to the die area and defect density (D). The most desirable means to calculate the setual value of defect density to be used in the hazard rate expression is to use defect measuring test structures of the actual fabrication process. One way to calculate this defect density is given in Appendix B.

It is not likely that defect density data can be obtained from manufacturers unless required by a certification program such as the Generic Qualification program. For this reason, it is imperative that a default condition be defined if actual defect densities cannot be determined. The following discussion summarizes this default value.

Reference 6 discusses the following effective defect density ( $D_{EFF}$ ):

$$D_{EFF} = D_0 \left( \frac{X_0}{X_S} \right)^2$$

where,  $D_0$  is a critical defect density for a feature size of  $X_0$   $X_0$  is a reference feature size  $X_S$  is the actual feature size

This relationship is based on MIL-STD-209 which states that the defect density increases as the square of decreasing feature size.

Although there is some concern as to this assumption's validity, and various researchers have proposed their own defect density distributions, for the purposes of this model the MIL-STD-209 approach is the most widely recognized and will be used. Therefore, the default value of  $D/D_R$  will be  $(X_0/X_S)^2$ . Since the average feature size in the database from which the failure rate were derived was 2 micron, this value can be used for  $X_0$ . The default defect density is therefore  $(2/X_S)^2$ .

## 5.1.2.3.2 Effective Areas and Device Type Relationships

Since oxide area has been shown to be directly correlated with failure rate, devices exhibiting different packing densities will result in significant differences in reliability. Ideally, the actual gate oxide area would be to as an input into the reliability prediction model. It is impractical, however, to require that it be known since a relatively detailed design analysis of the chip must be done to determine it. To alleviate this need, a relative scaling factor was derived for various component types which is multiplied by the total die area, such that the only area input into the model is the total die area. Since the average die area of devices whose data was used to derive the model is .21 cm<sup>2</sup>, the device type correction factors for metal and oxide to be presented in this section are normalized to typical oxide areas and metal lengths of a .21cm<sup>2</sup> chip.

To derive a relative scaling factor, of particular interest was the difference in physical features (i.e., metal area and gate oxide area) for different circuit types (gate array, RAM, custom chip). For this purpose the Yield Analysis Tool (YAT) was used to determine critical areas for the different chip types. The YAT is a software tool that quantitatively analyzes circuit features on integrated circuit devices. The YAT input is the layout database of the integrated circuit device and a table which describes the circuit features to be analyzed. The histograms output describe the distribution of features sizes, chip maps of the smallest features, total area of selected features, overlap edge length, and overlap area. This tool is generally used for yield projection and, with the appropriate wafer processing, the identification of yield inhibitors.

For the purpose of this analysis YAT data for four different CMOS chips was analyzed for metal 1 length (less than 3 microns wide), metal 2 length, p channel gate area, n channel gate area, and metal 1 space length (the total length of parallel first metal runner less than 3 microns apart). The results of that analysis are summarized in Table 5-6.

TABLE 5-6: FEATURE DENSITY

Feature	Units	Custom Chip 1	Custom Chip 2	SRAM	Gate Array
Metal 1 Metal 2 P gate area N gate area Metal 1 space	cm/cm <sup>2</sup> cm/cm <sup>2</sup> % of total chip % of total chip cm/cm <sup>2</sup>	!	619 317 1.9 1.8 618	289 400 2.2 2.6 743	698 668 2.5 2.6 600

It should be noted that the specific SRAM for which data was available was a 2Kx8 device of modest size (.24cm<sup>2</sup>) that did not efficiently use the pad area and thus may have a more modest density. Also the gate array data includes unused gates.

To better understand some of the differences in Table 5-6, a more detailed analysis was performed on the metal 1 length and the n channel gate oxide area. This detailed data is shown in Tables 5-7 and 5-8 respectively.

TABLE 5-7: METAL 1 COMPARISON

Feature	Units	Custom Chip 1	Custom Chip 2	SRAM	Gate Array
Total Length Average Length %≤1.6 micron wide %≤2.6 micron wide Ave. Length 1.6 micron	cm micron % % micron	667 12.8 48 53 23	8 °7 13.7 56 67 119	210* 4.3 13 29 17	914 7.4 0 74 0
Ave. Length 2.6 micron	micron	12	3,7	11	30

<sup>\*</sup>SRAM is 1/4 size of other chips.

TABLE 5-8:
N-CHANNEL GATE OXIDE COMPARISON

N Gate Oxide	Units	Custom Chip 1	Custom Chip 2	SRAM	Gate Array
Instances <10 microns <sup>2</sup> Instances 50-60 microns <sup>2</sup> Average area Total Instances Total Area	Number Number Microns <sup>2</sup> Number cm <sup>2</sup>	1.5K 2.9K 32 36K .0114	18K 3.7K 35 52K .018	49K* .9\.* 10 54K* .0053*	17K 37K 40 63K .025

<sup>\*</sup>SRAM is 1/4 size of other chips.

This analysis shows that custom chips may not be as densely packaged as SRAMs and gate arrays. The gate array densities listed would generally be reduced by a factor that may approach the percent utilization number. If that were done then all chips would have comparable metal 1 length and the SRAM would have the densest gate oxide percentage and close metal 1 lines. The analysis indicates that the density is design dependent.

A presentation at the 1987 GOMAC conference by engineers from United Technologies Microelectronic Center (Reference 3) tried to correlate failure rate and design complexity. Using life test data from gate array variations, they looked for correlation to traditional measures of complexity such as number of inputs and outputs, die size, and number of transistor pairs, as well as new bench marks such as metal 1 area, metal 2 area, and coincident metal area. UTMC saw poor correlation between the number of I/O's to the normalized failure rate and fair correlation to the number of transistor pairs. They demonstrated good correlation (correlation coefficients of .96 to .99) for the failure rate versus metal 1 area, metal 2 area, and coincident metal area. They point out that the life tests were performed on early 3 micron technology parts where intermetal dielectric integrity was the predominant failure mechanism. They did not show the results of failure rate plots versus gate oxide area, number of vias, and number of contacts. Clearly, the correlation would be dependent on the type of failures observed. The data seemed to indicate that a part with much metal 1 would also have much metal 2, much coincident metal, and much gate oxide area, such that a considerable amount of data would be required to properly sort out the effects.

Since the data in the database (contained in Appendix D) is from a good cross-section of device types (logic, memory, gate arrays, etc.) the failure rate expressions developed are for an "average" device. Therefore, the area ratio A/Ar factor only has to be a relative number between the various device types. Table 5-9 summarizes the relative area factors for Custom/Logic devices and for Memory/Gate Array devices. The Custom/Logic average percent oxide area was obtained by averaging the sum of the P and N gate areas (in Table 5-6) for Custom Chips 1 and 2 (((1.3+1.2) + (1.9+1.8))/2=3.1). Similarly, the average oxide area for Memory/Gate Arrays is the average total (P and N) percent areas for the SRAM and Gate Array. A similar procedure was used to derive the average metal length. For example, the average metal length for Custom/Logic devices is; ((390+291) + (619+317))/2 = 808. The  $A_{TYPE}$  factors were then derived simply by normalizing the factor to 1 for an "average" device. That is; 4.95/3.10 = 1.23/.77.

TABLE 5-9:
RELATIVE OXIDE AREA AND METAL LENGTH
RATIOS FOR VARIOUS DEVICE TYPES

Device Type	Average Gate Oxide Area (% of Chip)	$A_{\mathrm{TYPE}_{\mathrm{OX}}}$	*Average Metal Length	$A_{\mathrm{TYPE}_{\mathrm{MET}}}$
Custom & Logic Devices	3.10	.77	808	.88
Memory Gate Arrays	4.95	1.23	1027	1.12

<sup>\*</sup>Average linear length of first and second layer metal per chip area.

The area of the chip can then be modified with the  $A_{TYPE_{OX}}$  for the oxide failure rate and the  $A_{TYPE_{MET}}$  for the metal failure rate. These are dimensionless factors which indicate for oxide, that memories/gate arrays typically have 1.23/.77 = 1.59 times the oxide per area as do custom and gate arrays.

# 5.1.2.5 Oxide Wearout t<sub>50</sub>

The primary oxide wearout stress related acceleration factor have been determined to be temperature and electric field. Therefore the t<sub>50</sub> of the lognormal can be defined as:

$$t_{50} = \frac{t_{50_{REF}}}{A_{Tox} A_{Vox}}$$

To calculate  $t_{50_{\rm RBF}}$  data in Table 5-10 was extracted from the literature.

TABLE 5-10: DATA USED TO DERIVE t<sub>50</sub> CONSTANT

Area	T <sub>ox</sub>	Temp.	Es	
(106 µm)	(Å)	(°K)	(Mv/cm)	t50 (Observed Hrs.)
1.5	600	298	3	2.8 x 107
75	390	423	4	544
75	390	348	4	4,402
75	390	398	4	27,800
75	390	298	4	880,000
75	390	298	3	1.54 x 109
75	390	298	4	1.74 x 106
75	390	298	5	422

Since electric fields of 5 MV/cm are being used reliably in VHSIC/VHSIC-Like devices, it appears that this data is not representative of these class of devices. Therefore, to derive a  $t_{50REF}$ , empirical  $t_{50}$  data at high electric fields was used. This data, not presented here for proprietary reasons, was from high field accelerated tests performed on VHSIC-Like oxides. Calculating the AV<sub>ON</sub> and AT<sub>OX</sub> terms under the conditions of, that test and solving for  $t_{50REF}$  yields a value of 1.3 x  $t_{50}$  (10<sup>6</sup> hrs.). This yields the following  $t_{50}$  time for TDDB:

$$t_{50_{\text{ox}}} = \frac{1.3 \times 10^{22}}{A_{\text{Vox}} A_{\text{Tox}}}$$

Empirical data from the literature indicates that a sigma of 1 is appropriate for these distributions for oxide under normal operating conditions. However, various investigators have determined that the sigma is directly related to the MTF. (That is, as the MTF goes down, so does the sigma). Unfortunately, there is not enough quantitative data available to define an accurate sigma as a function of MTF. Therefore, unless an accurate sigma is known for a particular process, the value of 1 should be used.

Also, in the t<sub>50</sub> equation to be used in the model, a (QML) factor is added to account for the improved reliability expected from the procedure taken by manufacturers that are on the Qualified Manufacturer List (QML). The rationale for chosing the .5 to 2 values for this factor are given in Section 7.1.4.

This factor is also used in this form in the  $t_{50}$  expressions for metal and Hot Carrier wearout failure rates.

### 5.1.3 Oxide Hazard Rate Summary

It has been shown that the oxide wearout hazard rate is directly proportioned to area and defect density. There is no reason to believe that both the early life and wearout terms will not be accelerated as a function of area/defect density. The form of the oxide failure rate is therefore:

$$\lambda_{\text{ox}} = \frac{A}{A_R} \frac{D_{0\text{ox}}}{D_R} A_{\text{TYPE}_{0\text{x}}} (\lambda_{\text{Early Life}} + \lambda_{\text{Wearout}})$$

where:

 $A_R = .21 \text{ cm}^2$ , the reference chip area

 $D_R = 1$  , the reference defect density

The entire detailed oxide hazard rate is then given as follows:

$$\lambda_{ox} (\text{in F/106}) = \frac{A A_{TYPE_{ox}}}{A_R} \left( \frac{D_{0ox}}{D_R} \right) \left[ (.0788 \text{ c}^{-7.7 \text{ to}}) (A_{T_{ox}}) (e^{-7.7 A_{T_{ox}}t}) \right]$$

$$+\frac{.399}{(t+t_0)\sigma_{ox}}\exp\left(\frac{-.5}{\sigma_{ox}^2}\left(\ln(t+t_0)-\ln t_{50_{ox}}\right)^2\right)$$

A = Total Chip Area

 $A_{\text{TYPE}_{\text{OX}}} = .77 \text{ for Custom and Logic Devices}$ 

= 1.23 for Memories and Gate Arrays

 $A_R = .21 \text{ cm}^2$ 

- $D_{0ox}$  = Defect Density calculated by using the procedure of Appendix B (if unknown, use  $\left(\frac{X_0}{X_S}\right)^2$  where  $X_0$ = 2  $\mu$ m and  $X_S$  is the feature size of the device)
- $D_R = 1 \text{ defect/cm}^2$
- t<sub>0</sub> = Effective Screening time
  - = (Actual Time of Test in  $10^6$  hrs.) \*  $A_{T_{OX}} A_{V_{OX}}$ (where  $A_{T_{OX}}$  and  $A_{V_{OX}}$  are the values during screening)
- A<sub>Tox</sub> = Temperature Acceleration Factor

$$= \exp\left[\frac{-.3}{8.63 \times 10^{-5}} \left(\frac{1}{T_J} - \frac{1}{298}\right)\right]$$

T<sub>1</sub> = Average junction operating temperature

$$= T_C + \theta_{JC} P (in {}^{\circ}K)$$

$$A_{V_{\text{cry}}} = e^{-192\left(\frac{1}{E_{\text{cry}}} - \frac{1}{2.5}\right)}$$

 $E_{ox}$  = The maximum power supply voltage  $(V_{DD})$  divided by the gate oxide thickness (in MV/cm)

$$t_{50_{ox}} = \frac{1.3 \times 10^{22} \text{ (QML)}}{A_{T_{ox}} A_{V_{ox}}} \text{ (in 10}^6 \text{ hrs.)}$$

QML = 2 if on QML, .5 if not.

- $\sigma_{ox}$  = Sigma obtained from test data of oxide failures from the same or similar process. If not available, use a  $\sigma_{ox}$  value of 1.
- = Time (in 10<sup>6</sup> Hours)

### 5.2 METAL FAILURE RATE

## 5.2.1 Metal Early Life Failures

As in the case of oxide, the early life failure rate due to metal was derived using the methodology outlined in Section 3.0. Table 5-11 summarizes the data used in this derivation. Given in this table is the effective time interval (at 25°C), the total accelerated part hours using the temperature acceleration factor with an activation energy of .55 eV, and the total number of metal failures observed in the time interval.

TABLE 5-11: METAL FAILURE DATA

Equivalent Time Interval at 25°C (10 <sup>6</sup> hrs.)	Accelerated Part Hours (10 <sup>6</sup> hrs.)	Number of Failures	
0 - 0.059872	16468.541808	3	
.059873 - 0.209553	40975.894310	6	
.209554 - 0.623669	77953.612970	9	
.623670 - 1.248337	111354.649173	36	

Table 5-12 presents the summarized data used in the derivation of this factor.

TABLE 5-12:
METAL EARLY LIFE SUMMARIZED FAILURE DATA

Effective Range (10 <sup>6</sup> hrs.)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Number of Failures	Failure Rate F/10 <sup>6</sup>
0059872	.029936	16469	3	.000182
.059873623669	.36177	118929	15 <sub>.</sub>	.000126

For the data in this table, the failure data in the range 0.623670 - 1.248337 was excluded since the 36 failures observed were detected only at a single time in that interval and the time of failure was not known. All that was known was that the 36 failures occurred less than 1.248337. This data therefore could not be used to identify failure rate dependency on time.

Deriving the metal factor with a simple regression solution of the above data and adjusting the T to match the observed cumulative failure rate yields:

$$\lambda_{MET}(t) = .00043 e^{-1.18 t}$$

Adjusting the constant .00043 to account for the unknown failures, and adding the accelerations due to temperar are and screening yields the following metal failure rate:

$$\lambda_{MET~E:VIy~Life} = .00102~e^{-1.18~tO}~A_{T_{MET}~e}^{-1.18~A_{T_{MET}}}$$

#### 5.2.2 Meial Wearout

Electromigration is the predominant metal wearout failure mechanism and its probability density function is modeled with a lognormal time to failure distribution. The mean time to failure (150) is often given by Black's equation:

$$t_{50} = A_B J^{-n} \exp \frac{E_0}{KT}$$

To determine the value of A<sub>B</sub> that should be used in this expression, the dataset in Table 5-13 was used.

TABLE 5-13: SUMMARY OF OBSERVED PARAMETER VALUES FROM THE LITERATURE (all Lognormal Distribution)

	1	n	Ea	<b>t5</b> 0	G	Temp.	Reference
Conditions	(A/cm <sup>2</sup> )			Hrs.		(°C)	
A1-Cu-Si Films	10 <sup>5</sup> - 2 x 10 <sup>5</sup>	2	.5		,25	150 - 250	52
Al - Ti - W Stripes w/thermal gradient wo/thermal gradient	2.5 x 10 <sup>6</sup> 2.5 x 10 <sup>6</sup>			••	.52 .34	185 185	53
Constant Current	2 x 10 <sup>6</sup>	2	.43	174 167 465 126 175 120 644 127 175 144 567	.79 .73 1.1 .67 .80 .78 1.04 .84 .80 .77 1.12	125 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 15	54 55
			,4		-	150-250	56
Al Si Alloy films	6.6 x 10 <sup>5</sup>		.54		.2365	< 230	57
Al - Cu - Si Films	1.6x10 <sup>6</sup> -2x10 <sup>4</sup>	2	,5		.25	195 - 250	58
Au - Cu - Altoys	2 x 10 <sup>4</sup>		·	1600 819 525 354 15	1.4 .42 .70 .73 .40	220 220 220 220 220 230	59 .
Al - Poly St Meral			.9			150-220	60
Al - Si Films leakage open		2.3 2,3	 .9± .1 .5	• •		••	51
AI Ti*/AI	2×10 <sup>6</sup> 10 <sup>6</sup> -4×10 <sup>6</sup>	2.06	\$6 ± .04 .53			125-300	62
AV.5% CWIRSI	21104	1.7	.55			125	63
	<10 <sup>3</sup> 10 <sup>3</sup> - 10 <sup>6</sup> .45x10 <sup>3</sup> -2.88x10 <sup>4</sup> 10 <sup>6</sup> - 2x10 <sup>6</sup>	1 1.5 2 4.5	• • •				64
Smell Grain Large Grein Glassed Large Grein	.55 - 2.65(10 <sup>6</sup> ) .52 (10 <sup>6</sup> ) .459(10 <sup>6</sup> )		.48 .84 1.2	• •	•	180 180 180	65
Al	4×104	2			.36	125	66
A)	333/.242 (10 <sup>6</sup> ) .283/.189 268/.179	2 2 2	.511 .525 .529	1039 2318 2672	.7 1 .8	191 173 175	25

Based on this summary of information, representative values of n and the activation energy are 2 and .55 eV respectively. With this information the  $t_{50}$  expression becomes:

$$t_{50} = \frac{A_B \text{ (METAL TYPE)}}{J^2 A_{TMET}}$$

where:

$$A_{\text{TMET}} = \exp \left[ \frac{-.55}{8.63 \times 10^{-5}} \left( \frac{1}{1_{\text{J}}} - \frac{1}{298} \right) \right]$$

AB (METAL TYPE) = "Base" t50 as a function of the metal type used.

Using the data in Table 5-12, the constant A<sub>B</sub> was derived for Aluminum metallization and turns out to be .39 million hours. For Al-Cu metal this constant was calculated to be 14.5 million hours, or 37.5 times the constant for aluminum. Therefore, the (METAL TYPE) factor is:

Towner et al. (Reference 12) concluded from empirical electromigration testing of aluminum conductor lines, that the mean time to failure (150) increases as the inverse square of the duty cycle of pulsed operation. That is:

Wiche:

Since the t50 equation developed was based on constant current conditions, the actual duty cycle should be accounted for. Therefore, when calculating the current density (I) to be used in the t50<sub>MET</sub> equation, the average absolute value should be used.

Also, investigated for the electromigration t<sub>50</sub> model was the use of a testing effectiveness factor. Electromigration field failures are rarely reported and electromigration burn-in failures are even rares, although they have been reported (Reference 67). It is generally thought that if the

screen or burn-in detects any electromigration failures, then there will be many more field failures soon. Without wafer level tests, it is difficult to conceive a screen that is effective for electromigration.

The use of an area/defect density factor was also investigated for metal wearout as it was in the oxide wearout case. Modeling electromigration is not as straight forward as in the oxide case. There have been a number of studies which found the electromigration lifetime related to the line length to some critical length which most likely is related to line width (References 48, 49, 50, 51). The idea here is that the failure of a line is dependent upon the existence of a worst case grain boundary situation, and that a line of a critical length has a high probability of having such a situation and therefore has a certain tendency to fail. A longer line's tendency to fail is not significantly greater. This critical length for near micron lines is probably in the order of 1000 microns (Reference 5). Since VLSI devices have meters of minimum width metal films, this approach suggests that the electromigration failure rate factor is essentially the same for all large chips with a particular metallization process using a particular set of design rules.

For this reason, the area/defect density factor will only accelerate the early life metal failure rate and not the electromigration case. The metal defect density to be used can be calculated as given in Appendix B.

### 5.2.3 Metal Failure Rate Summary

The model form of the metal failure rate is:

$$\lambda_{\text{MET}} = \frac{A}{A_{\text{R}}} \frac{D_{\text{OMET}}}{D_{\text{R}}} A_{\text{TYPEMET}} (\lambda_{\text{MET Early Life}}) + \lambda_{\text{MET Wearout}}$$

The complete detailed metal failure rate is therefore given as follows.

$$\lambda_{MET} = \left[ \begin{array}{c} A & D_{0MET} \\ A_{R} & \overline{D_{R}} \end{array} A_{TYPEMET} (.00102 e^{-1.18 t0}) (A_{TMET}) (e^{-1.18 A_{TMET}t}) \right]$$

+ 
$$\left[\frac{.399}{(t+t_0)\sigma_{MET}} \exp\left(\frac{-.5}{\sigma_{MET}^2} \left(\ln(t+t_0) - \ln t_{50_{MET}}\right)^2\right)\right]$$

A = Total Chip Area (in  $cm^2$ )

A<sub>TYPEMET</sub> = .88 for Custom and Logic Devices

= 1.12 for Memory and Gate Arrays

 $A_p = .21 \text{ cm}^2$ 

 $D_{0MET}$  = Defect Density calculated using the method in Appendix B. (If unknown use  $\left(\frac{X_0}{X_S}\right)^2$  where  $X_0 = 2 \, \mu m$  and  $X_S$  is the feature size of the device)

 $D_R = 1 \text{ defect/cm}^2$ 

A<sub>TMET</sub> = Temperature Acceleration Factor

$$= \exp\left[\frac{-.55}{8.63\times10^{-5}}\left(\frac{1}{T_{J}}-\frac{1}{298}\right)\right]$$

$$T_r = T_{case} + \theta_{JC} P \text{ (in }^{O}K)$$

 $t_0$  = Effective Screening Time (in  $10^6$  hrs.)

=  $A_{TMET}$  (at Screening Temp.) \* (Actual Screening Time (in  $10^6$  hrs)) (to Calculate  $t_0$  use  $A_{TMET}$  based on the junction temp. during screening)

$$t_{50_{MET}} = (QML) \frac{.388 * (Metal Type)}{J^2 A_{T_{MET}}}$$
 (in 10<sup>6</sup> hrs.)

(QML) = 2 if on QML, .5 if not.

Metal Type ≈ 1 for Al

37.5 or Al-Cu

37.5 for Al-Si-Cu

J = The mean absolute value of Metal Current Density (in  $10^6$  Amps/cm<sup>2</sup>)

- $\sigma_{\text{MET}}$  = sigma obtained from test data on electromigration failures from the same or a similar process. If this data is not available use  $\sigma_{\text{MET}} = 1$ .
- time (in 10<sup>6</sup> hrs)

### 5.3 HOT CARRIER DEGRADATION

It is well known that hot carrier effects can degrade MOS transistors with short channel lengths. This degradation (Reference 68) can be expressed as:

# transistor parametric shift = $A_{HC}t^n$

Where t is the stress time, and the power factor of time "n" changes according to hot carriers injection mechanisms (therefore varies according to the device structure) but generally falls in the range of .25 to .75 (Reference 68, 69). The constant term "A<sub>HC</sub>" represents the magnitude of device degradation and is related to the drain voltage (Vd) by:

$$A_{HC} = \beta \exp(-\alpha/Vd)$$

Where " $\beta$ " is some constant of proportionality. By plotting the log of the transistor parametric shift versus the log of time, the constant term " $A_{HC}$ " and the power factor term "n" can both be determined. By plotting the log of A versus 1/Vd the value of " $\alpha$ " (slope) and " $\beta$ " (y-intercept) can be determined at different drain voltages. The first equation above can then be rearranged:

$$t = (transistor parametric shift/A_{HC})^{1/n}$$

With known values of "A<sub>HC</sub>" and "n" the time "t" for a given parametric shift can then be estimated.

Another method of predicting device lifetime used by other investigators is to monitor the device substrate current ( $I_{sub}$ ). Device lifetime " $\tau_{HC}$ " has been shown to be related to the substrate current by the relationship:

$$\tau_{HC} = C^*(I_{sub})^{-m}$$

Where C is a constant dependent on parameters such as drain current, etc., and the power factor "m" fails in the range of 2.7 - 3.2 (Reference 68, 69). Since the substrate current is relatively easy to measure, it has the potential of being used as way of monitoring sensitivity to hot carrier effects on suitable test structures at the wafer level. The degradation due to hot carriers is also a strong function of temperature and frequency, which are related to  $I_{sub}$ . If  $I_{sub}$  can accurately be determined, the effects of temperature and frequency will inherently be accounted for.

Previous analysis has concentrated on measuring the shift in the threshold voltage when the transistor is in the linear or olumic region ( $V_{DD} = 100 \text{mV}$ ), or a shift in the maximum drain current ( $V_{GS}$ ,  $V_{DD} = 5 \text{v}$ ) with the source and drain connections reversed. In either case the transistors must be biased at maximum avalanche hot electron (AHE) stress condition (typically  $V_{GS} = 3.5 \text{v}$ ,  $V_{DS} = 6.4 \text{v}$ ) for a minimum of 8 hours to predict the transistor's sensitivity to hot carrier degradation. A recent strafy found that the above equation holds not only in static stress but also in dynamic stress. Where the device lifetime can be written by:

Where  $I_{sub}$ , peak is the peak value of pulsed substrate current and R is duty ratio for the substrate current pulse.

Also investigated was the possibility of using  $I_{\rm SUD}$  measured at the wafer level on a process monitor test structure as a means of predicting device lifetime due to a hot carrier degradation. A hot carrier test found the low doze drain (LDD) n-channel transistor was less sensitive to hot carrier effects when compared to a single drain (SD) transistor structure. The peak substrate current at  $V_{\rm DD} = 5.5$  volts was measured at room temperature on 20 LDD and 20 SD 10/1.0 n-channel transistors before the hot carrier test. The results were:

	I <sub>sub</sub>	(μΑ)
	Mean	Std Dev.
LIDD SID	3.54 9.97	0.19 0.52

Thus there is a good possibility that substrate current measurements at the wafer level may provide a fast and reliable method to model hot carrier degradation.

A hot carrier degradation model of this type does not address a particular failure mode, and does have different impacts on memory chips and logic devices. This hot carrier model is is rended to indicate how a transistor's parameters degraded. This model form is generally accepted, however, what is difficult is to judge is how that transistor degradation affects circuit performance for a memory, digital or analog application. While a manufacturer could model this, the results are not likely to be shared. The specific application of a transistor is most important. For example a pass transistor, where the current may go backwards from the drain to source, will be affected more than an on/off transistor in an inverter gate.

It is the judgement of the authors at this time that either a product has a hot electron problem or it does not. Thus, the model should be very sensitive to modest changes - i.e., the failure rate may move into the FIT range very quickly if some threshold is exceeded. Otherwise, the failure rate is in the fractional FIT range.

The possibility of using substrate current measurements at the wafer level to provide a fast and reliable method to model hot carrier degradation is intuitively appealing. Other researchers have also written of this goal and the discussion below involves some measurements that have been taken to investigate this matter.

The data in Table 5-14 shows  $I_{\rm Sub}$ ,  $I_{\rm dd}$  @  $I_{\rm Sub}$ , and the gate voltage, all with  $V_{\rm DD} = 5.5$  volts at 3 temperatures. All six 10/1 transistors experienced the hot carrier test at 5.5 volts. Note that the Vg values at which  $I_{\rm Sub}$  occurs changes, indicating the hot carrier damage affects the maximum electric field in the channel. The 300/1.2 transistors were not stressed. For both transistors sites, the  $I_{\rm Sub}/I_{\rm DD}$  ratio of the single drain (SD) device was approximately 2x higher at all temperatures. From the data we should be able to (1) correlate projected life times to room temperature  $I_{\rm Sub}$  data, and (2) determine the temperature dependence of  $I_{\rm Sub}$ .

As previously shown the device lifetime "t" due to hot carrier degradation has been modeled as:

$$\tau = C^*I_{sub}^{-m}$$

Where C is a constant dependent mainly on the transistor's response to drain bias conditions,  $I_{sub}$  is the substrate current, and the power factor term "m" is equal to  $\phi_{it}/\phi_i$ , where  $\phi_{it}$  is the critical energy to create an interface trap, and  $\phi_i$  is the impact ionization energy. However, this model does not account for the dependence of substrate current generation on drain current, which can be modeled as (Reference 69):

$$I_{sub} = C^*I_{d}^* \exp(-\phi_i/q^* \lambda E_m)$$

Where C is a constant,  $I_d$  is the drain current,  $\lambda$  is the mean free path for electrons, and  $E_m$  is the maximum electric field in the channel. Therefore, a better expression for modeling device lifetime would be (Reference 72):

$$\tau = A/I_d*(I_{sub}/I_d)^{-m}$$

 $\begin{array}{c} \text{TABLE-5-14:} \\ \text{I}_{\text{SUB}} \text{ VS. TEMPERATURE} \end{array}$ 

PARTY I NEADS NAMER : SIZE		1 Ido	)   (uA)   Vg     Sub/Idd		ì
63-10-3   10/1 63-10-9   16/1 63-10-13   10/1	780   5.6  3.   580   4.6  2.   700   5.4  3.   610   4.5  2.	37 7.18E-03 GATE 96 17.93E-03   61 03 17.71E-03   77	LEAKAGE	GATE LEAKAGE   760   8.3   960   9.66	3.09  1.0%-02   3.26  1.01E-02   3.12  1.03E-02
LDD(ANE; Vdd = 5.5v)	•	0 1.520-03	AV9 = 0.53E-03	1	AVG = 1.04E-02
63-2-3   10/1 63-2-6   10/1 63-2-11   10/1 63-2-12   10/1	1 1310  21.9  3.   1460  26.9   4   1660  26.7  4.   1760  27.3  4.	16 11.705-02   139	9   31.6   4.1  2.006-02 0   34.3  4.19  1.926-02	1 1930   47.2   2140   52.3	4.01  2.225-02   4.16  2.585-02   4.27  2.445-02   4.31  2.495-02
50(AME: VOD = 5.3v)	AV	6 s .726+C3 !	AVG # 1.868-02	t	AVG  2.432-02
63-10-5   300/1.2 13-10-6   300/1.2	111560 197.3 12.1	67 17.35E-03 123A1 34 17.35E-03 12212	LEARAGE	114990 (125.8)	
LDO	I IAW	\$ *7.00E-03 }	20-32E.0 • 6VA	!	AVG # 1.04E-02
C3-2-3 390/1.2 C3-2-1 390/1.3 C3-2-11 390/1.3 C3-2-12 390/1.2	113760   291 12. 113850   981 12.	+6  1.676-(2  1601 +3  1.636-42  1516 +3  1.722-43  144 +43  1.436-45  1456	2 1 29 12.65 11.96E-02 3 1 202 12.63 11.95E-02	119040   443   119770   422	2.76   2.106-02   2.76   12.225-02   2.79   12.136-02   2.8   12.146-02
<b>50</b>	I I IAW	0 * 1.79G+01 1	1 AVG 4 1.906-02	1 1	AVG + 2.15E-02 :

In 1987 a hot carrier test was performed at Honeywell on discrete 10/1.0 and 10/1.2 um n-channel transistors with a  $L_{DD}$  drain structure, and  $250\text{\AA}$  gate oxide. The transistors were biased for maximum avalanche hot electron current with  $V_D = 6.0$  and 7.5 volts at  $77^{\circ}$ K. Due to processing differences between test structures from 3 wafers, there were substantial differences in substrate current for same size transistors.

As mentioned previously, there is disagreement as to what should be the failure criteria for a discrete transistor. For the purpose of this test the lifetime was defined as a 10% decrease in the integral of  $I_d$  as  $V_{SD}$  is swept from 0 to 5.5 volts with  $V_{GS} = 5.5$  volts. This criteria (which we call "area under the curve") was chosen since it monitors the transistor's response in both the linear and saturation regions of operation.

Figure 5-18 is a log normal plot of the cumulative failures versus time for 19 parts from the test. From this plot it is apparent the hot carrier failure mechanism follows a lognormal distribution, and the presence of a "sport" population is evident. The sigma for this test is approximately 1.1. Figure 5-19 is a plot of times the drain current versus the log of ratio of I<sub>sub</sub> divided by I<sub>d</sub>. The power factor "m" is equal to 2.5, which is in good agreement with published values. The following listing summarizes published values for this exponent:

Author	Affiliation	Year	Power Factor	Reference
Takeda et al	Hitachi	1983	3.2 - 3.4	68
Hu et al	Cal Berkely	1985	2.9	69
Tzou et al	AMD	1985	2.7	73
Horiuchi et al	NEC	1986	2.5	71
Weber	Siemens	1986	2.9	87
Krieger et al	VLSI	1988	2.9	84
Tran	AT&T	1987	2.9 - 3.2	85
Chen et al	AT&T	1987	3.1	86
Duvniny et al	T.I.	1987	2.8	87
Bellens et al	IMEC	1988	2.7	88
Weber	Siemans	1988	2.9	89




FIGURE 5-18: LOGNORMAL PLOT OF FAILURES DUE TO HOT CARRIER DEGRADATION VS. TIME

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


FIGURE 5-19: PLOT OF LOG OF T \*I<sub>d</sub> VS. THE LOG OF I<sub>SUB</sub>/I<sub>d</sub>

Is is important to note that the model should account for temperature effects. One research effort (Reference 73) found that the constant term A in the previous equation changes with temperature according to the equation:

$$A_{HC} = A_0 \exp(-.039 \text{ eV/kT})$$

Where k is Planck's constant. The drain current  $I_d$  and the substrate current  $I_{sub}$  also change at different rates as a functior—I temperature; in general, our data indicates  $I_{sub}$  increases more at lower temperatures than  $I_d$ . Using this methodology to predict lifetime, the data summarized below indicates the impact temperature has on device Li time due to hot carrier degradation.

Parameter	77°K	298°K
constant term "A <sub>HC</sub> "	4x10 <sup>-8</sup>	3x10 <sup>-6*</sup>
drain current Id	3.11mA	2.20mA
substrate current I <sub>sub</sub>	3.44µА	0.75μΑ
power factor term "m"	2.5	2.5*
lifetime	3.8 hours	8,000 hours

<sup>=</sup> assumed or calculated values.

Based on this data, a t50 for the lognormal relationship can be defined as follows:

$$t_{50} = \frac{C}{A_{T_{HC}} I_d} \left(\frac{I_{sub}}{I_d}\right)^{-2.5}$$

Where C is a constant derived to match empirical data. Deriving C from the above data yields a value of 3.74x10<sup>-5</sup>.

If actual values of I<sub>d</sub> and I<sub>sub</sub> are not known, there must be provisions in the model for default values. Based on the measured values presented previously, the following default currents can be used for 10/1.2 (width/length in microns) N-channel transistors:

$$I_d = 3.5 e^{-.0069} TJ (mA)$$

$$I_{SUD} = .0058 e^{-.00157 TJ}$$
 (mA)

Hot carrier degradation is strictly a wearout mechanism and therefore should contain no contribution to the early life failure rate. Also, since this phenomena effects all transistors, it is not area or defect density dependent. Therefore, the final failure rate contribution from hot carriers is the following:

$$\lambda_{\rm NC} = \frac{.399}{10_{\rm NC}} \exp\left[\frac{-.5}{0_{\rm NC}} 2 \left(\ln\left(t + t_0\right) - \ln t_{50_{\rm HC}}\right)^2\right]$$

$$^{1}50_{NC} = \frac{3.74 \times 10^{-5}}{A_{T_{NC}} I_{d}} \left(\frac{I_{SUb}}{I_{d}}\right)^{-2.5}$$

$$A_{THC} = \exp\left[\frac{.039}{8.63 \times 10^{-5}} \left(\frac{1}{17+273} - \frac{1}{298}\right)\right]$$

$$T_J = \text{Average justion temperature}$$
  
=  $T_C + \theta_{KC} P$  (in °K)

 $I_{sub} = Drain Current at Operating Temperature. If unknown use <math display="block">I_{sub} = .0058 * -.00157 T_{J} \text{ (mA)}$ 

 $L_{ij} = 3.5 \text{ c}$  -.00689  $T_{ij}$  (mA)

Green with the second from that days. If not available use 1.1

0 = A<sub>THC</sub> (at Screening Temp.) • (Test Duration)

t = time (in  $10^6$  less.)

#### 5.4 CONTAMINATION

Although the physics of failure characteristics of contamination and methods of control are fairly well understood, many failures due to contamination appeared in the data collected for this program. Due to this observance, a failure rate for contamination was derived and included in the model. Here, the contamination failure class is defined as any type of contamination, ionic or other.

The prevalence of contamination related failures tend to be highly dependent on the particular fabrication processes and thus the failure rate model contained herein is an industry wide representative value, and can vary widely from manufacturer to manufacturer. Contamination is strictly an early life mechanism and contains no wearout contribution. Like hot carriers, contamination failures are not area or defect density related and therefore do not have these terms in the failure rate equation. They are typically easily screened due to their high activation energy and temperature acceleration.

Table 5-15 summarizes the data used in the derivation of the contamination failure rate. In this table the first column is the equivalent time interval at 25°C obtained by multiplying the actual time by the acceleration due to temperature, using an activation energy of 1.0 eV. A value of 1.0 eV is videly accepted in the semiconductor industry. The second column is the equivalent number of total part hours in the interval using the same acceleration due to temperature, and the last column lists the number of failures in that time interval.

TABLE 5-15: CONTAMINATION DATA

Equivalent Time	Accelerated	Number
Interval at 25°C (in 10 <sup>6</sup> hrs.)	Part Hours	of Failures
0 - 20.431619 20.431620 - 71.510666 71.510667 - 212.829365 212.829366 - 228.845835 228.845836 - 425.658727 425.658728 - 2724.355183 2724.255184 - 6994.508872	5619901.501721 14006588.472287 27088162.036146 3064959.151818 35348454.984858 20233992.578138 6635426.324593	1 1 2 2 595 1

Table 5-16 presents the summarized data used. The first five data points from Table 5-15 were combined for the first entry in Table 5-16 and the sixth and seventh were combined for the second in Table 5-16. Regressing on these two datapoints yields the following failure rate:

$$\lambda_{\text{CON}} = 9.36 \times 10^{-6} \, \text{c}^{-.0028} \, \text{t}$$

TABLE 5-16: SUMMARIZED CONTAMINATION DATA

Time Interval (10 <sup>6</sup> hrs.)	Midpoint	Part Hours (10 <sup>6</sup> hrs.)	Number Failures	Failure Rate (F/10 <sup>6</sup> hrs.)
0 - 425.658727	212.0	85,128,066	601	7.1x10 <sup>-6</sup>
425.658728 - 6994.598872	3709	26,869,418	2	7.4x10 <sup>-8</sup>

Accounting for the unknown failures and accelerations due to temperature, duty cycle and screening time, the data in Table 5-16 yields the following equation:

$$\lambda_{\text{CON}} = .000022 \, e^{-.0028 \, t_0} \, A_{\text{T}_{\text{CON}}} \, e^{-.0028 \, A_{\text{T}_{\text{CON}}} \, t}$$

A<sub>TCON</sub> <sup>w</sup> Temperature Acceleration Factor

$$= \exp\left[\frac{-1.9}{8.63\times10^{-5}}\left(\frac{1}{11+273}-\frac{1}{298}\right)\right]$$

$$T_f = \text{Iunculus sensus sensus}$$

$$= T_c + \theta_{K^*} P \text{ (in °K)}$$

- 60 Elfective Screening Time
  - $\sim$   $A_{T_{COI}}$  (at screening junction temperature) \* (2-rual screening time in  $10^6$  hrs.)
- $t = time (in 10^{6} lurs.)$

#### 5.5 PACKAGE RELATED FAILURE RATE

To develop a model for package related failures (i.e., package, lead, die bond, interconnects, etc.) the assumption was made that environmental stresses (i.e., temperature cycling, thermal shock, vibration, mechanical shock) accelerate package related failure mechanisms to a much higher degree than die related failure mechanisms. Since these environmental stresses are event related, they can be modeled with an exponential time to failure distribution and therefore a constant failure rate can be derived. The data presented previously in the database profile supports this approach.

#### 5.5.1 Screening Factor

Since there is no field experience data available, the approach used to develop field failure rates for VHSIC/VHSIC-Like package styles was to derive a failure rate for lower complexity package types for which field experience is available and multiply that failure rate by the ratio of fallout rates observed between VHSIC package types and MSI/LSI package types for which field experience is available.

Many package defects can be screened effectively and therefore a strong relationship between reliability and query should be expected. The approach used in the package failure rate development was therefore to make this failure rate a function of quality (screening level) and environment. The premise of this factor is that the post screened percent defective in a given population is equal to the initial percent defective minus the percent fallout after the population is exposed to a screen (or screening sequence), and the field failure rate expected from a particular package style is directly proportional to the fallout rate observed for that package when exposed to environmental testing.

The following screening level categories and associated observed fallout percentage were used to derive the package factor (Reference 76).

None	0%
Burn-in	.36%
Environmental Series	1.37%
Burn-in/Environmental Series	1.66%

These are general categories and are representative of data from a variety of sources and test conditions. They are typically, but not limited to MIL-STD-883 tests. In this context Burn-in is normally a high temperature (125°C), short duration (160 hours) test designed to identify defective parts. Environmental tests are intended to be representative of various environmental screens such as; temperature cycling, shock/vibration, humidity, etc. As an example Quality Level B devices are subjected to both burn in and environmental tests.

These broad categories were chosen because fallout rate data for specific screens loses its statistical significance. Additionally, many tests are performed in a series, making it impossible to identify the fallout rate of each one.

Assuming that the test effectiveness for package related mechanisms is directly proportional to the fallout rate percentage for a particular test or series of tests, and that the test effectiveness for a burn-in with environmental series is in the 30-10% to range (or approximately 90%), the test effectiveness along with a relative failure rate correction factor for package screening, are summarized in Table 5-17. This yields a 10:1 ratio in the expected package failure rate between Class B and D devices.

TABLE 5-17:
PACKAGE TEST EFFECTIVENESS AND SCREENING FACTOR

Screening Level	Class	Test Effectiveness	$\Pi_{\mathrm{SP}}$
NYour	-	n	10
None	D	U	10
Bum-in	*	20	8
Environmental Series		72	2.8
Burn-in with Environmental Series	В	90	1

Once the test effectiveness has been derived, the package failure rate can be defined as follows:

$$\lambda_{\text{package}} = \lambda_{\text{BP}} \frac{RO}{FO_{R}} \Pi_{\text{SP}} \Pi_{E}$$

where:

 $\lambda_{\rm BP}$  = base package failure rate

FO<sub>R</sub> = reference fellout rate for MSI/LSI

FO = observed fallout rate for VHSIC/VHSIC like packages

 $\Pi_{\rm E}$  = environmental factor

 $\Pi_{SP}$  = package screening factor

The 10:1 ratio of package failure rates is applicable for the environments where it would be expected that most of the defective parts would be accelerated to failure. In a benign environment, it would not be expected that defective parts would be accelerated to failure and therefore there would be less benefit to screening parts used in benign environments. However, without data to the contrary, and since the package failure rate is normalized to unscreened devices used in benign environments, a worst case failure rate ratio between quality levels for  $G_B$  is also 10:1, and treated as an independent factor from environment.

#### 5.5.2 Environment Factor

 $\lambda_{\rm BP}$  can now be derived from empirical field failure rate data and failure mode distributions (percent of failures due to the package). To accomplish this, Reliability Analysis Center data (Reference 75) on MSI/LSI devices was used to calculate an average IC failure rates for these combinations of screen class and environment. These failure rates are summarized in Table 5-18.

TABLE 5-18:
AVERAGE \( \lambda \) AS FUNCTION OF ENVIRONMENT

Screen Class	Envire- nent	Failure Rate
Bum-in/Environment (B)	A <sub>IF</sub>	.285
Bum-in/Environment (B)	AUF	.441
None (D)	$G_{\mathrm{B}}$	.372

These environments and screen classes were chosen since there existed good quality data in these categories and also to provide a good mix of vibration and temperature cycling stresses. The exact stresses in each environment can not be specifically identified and therefore the environments must be qualitatively defined as in the current MIL-HDBK-217 models.

Next, failure mode distributions were used to identify the percentage of failures due to package related failure mechanisms. For this the following data extracted from Reference 75 was used:

	% P	ackage
Device Category	Hermetic	Nonhermetic
Digital	60.9	47.2
Linear & Interface	19.9	23.7
Memory	5.3	20.3
VLSI	7.1	14.3

From this, it was determined that 25% of IC failures are typically due to the packages, indicating that the base failure rate would be 25% of the above listed numbers. These package failure rates are given in Table 5-19.

Using the package failure rates in Table 5-19 in conjunction with the quality factors ( $\Pi_{SP}$ ) given in Table 5-17, the relative environmental factors for  $A_{IS}$ ,  $A_{UP}$ , and  $G_{B}$  environments can be defined. This was accomplished by making the product of  $\Pi_{SP}$  and  $\Pi_{E}$  proportional to the package failure rate. These relative environment factors are presented in Table 5-20, normalizing  $G_{B}$  to one.

TABLE 5-19:
PACKAGE FAILURE RATE AS FUNCTION OF
ENVIRONMENT AND SCREEN CLASS

Environment	Class	Package Failure Rate
A	В	.071
A <sub>DF</sub>	В	.110
G <sub>R</sub>	D	.093
1		,

These ratios betwen  $G_B$ ,  $A_{IF}$ , and  $A_{UF}$  environments factors are relatively consistent with the environmental factors currently in MIL-HDBK-217E. Therefore, assuming the relative  $\Pi_E$ 's between environments in 217E are valid, the values for all environments are defined in Section 5.5.8.

TABLE 5-20: ENVIRONMENT FACTOR

Environment		$n_{\rm E}$	
A		8.15	
A.JF		12.5	
$G_{\mathbf{g}}$	,	1	

### 5.5.3 Package Type Factor $(\Pi_{PT})$

The values in Table 5-20 correspond to the lower complexity devices from which they were derived. They now can be modified to the higher complexity VHSIC/VHSIC-Like device packages via the fallout rate ratio  $\frac{FO}{FO_0}$ .

For a typical MIL-STD-883 Class B screening sequence for a DIP package, RAC data (Reference 76) indicates a typical fallout percent of 1.66% of which 25% of these failures are due to package related mechanisms. The reference fallout rate can therefore be defined as follows:

$$FO_R$$
 (package) = (1.66%) (.25) = .415%

To modify these failure rates to VLSI/VHSIC, the package fallout rates in Table 5-21 were derived from the VHSIC/VHSIC-like database (Appendix D) for devices subjected to environmental testing consistent with a Class B screen. For example, .79 was derived by observing the percentage of nonhermetic chip carriers that failed from a combination of burn-in and environmental testing. The column labeled "total" is a weighted average and was derived by observing the total fallout rate (i.e., devices failed/devices tested) for both hermetic and plastic parts for each package type. Similarly, the row labeled "total" was obtained by calculating the total fallout rate for both hermetic and nonhermetic packages.

The fact that the  $FO_R$  listed above is very close to the total fallout rates in Table 5-21, although coincidental, indicates that there is good agreement between these two separate methods of obtaining fallout rate, and lends a degree of confidence in these results.

TABLE 5-21:
OBSERVED VHSIC/VHSIC-LIKE PACKAGE FALLOUT RATE

	Nonhermetic	Hermetic	Total
Chip Carriers Pin Grid Array DIP Total	.79% .69% <u>.18%</u> .41%	1.4% .33% <u>.30%</u> .61	1.03% .49% .22%

Since there is not a significant difference in the hermetic vs. nonhermetic fallout rates, there will be no distinction between these for the base failure rates although a failure rate term will be added for the nonhermetic effects of plastic packages. Using the totals for the three packages types for FO, the ratios can be defined as in Table 5-22, along with the package type factor (normalizing DIP's to a value of 1). For example, the FO/FO<sub>R</sub> factor for DIP's is .22/.415 = .53.

TABLE 5-22: PACKAGE TYPE FACTOR

Туре	FO/FO <sub>R</sub>	$\Pi_{\mathrm{PT}}$
Chip Carriers	2.48	4.67
Pin Grid Array	1.18	2.23
DIP	.53	1

# 5.5.4 Package Base Follow Rate

The package failure rate can therefore be summarized as:

$$\lambda_{PAC} \simeq \lambda_{BP} \Pi_E \Pi_{SP} \Pi_{PT}$$

where:  $\Pi_{E}$  = Environmental Factor

 $\Pi_{SP}$  = Package Screening Factor

 $\Pi_{PT}$  = Package Type Factor

$\Pi_{\mathbf{E}}$	3
$G_{B}$	1.0
A <sub>IF</sub>	8.15
A <sub>UF</sub>	12.5

II <sub>SP</sub>				
No Screening	10			
Burn-In	8			
Env. Series	2.8			
Burn-In/Env. Series	1			

$\Pi_{ extsf{PT}}$			
DIP	1		
PGA	2.23		
Chip Carrier	4.68		

Since the relative values of the environmental factor, screening factor, and package type factor have been previously derived, the base package failure rate was derived by setting the observed package failure rate equal to the predicted for a known case and solving for  $\lambda_{\rm BP}$ . Since there is high confidence in the  $A_{\rm IF}$ . Class B observed failure rates for DIPs were the ones used. This failure rate is .285, of which 25% is due to the package, yielding an observed failure rate of .071 F/10<sup>6</sup> hrs. Since the FO/FO<sub>R</sub> factor for DIPs is .53 (Table 5-22), and the  $\Pi_{\rm PT}$  factor was normalized to 1 for DIPs, the failure rate ( $\lambda_{\rm PAC}$ ) for DIPs is (.071) (.53) = .037 (F/10<sup>6</sup>). The value of .53 is due to increased reliability of DIP packages from the time the observed field data was collected to the time the fallout rate data collected for this effort was obtained. Therefore,

$$.037 = \lambda_{\mathrm{BP}} \Pi_{\mathrm{E}} \Pi_{\mathrm{SP}} \Pi_{\mathrm{PT}}$$

$$\lambda_{\rm BP} = \frac{.037}{\Pi_{\rm E}\Pi_{\rm SP}\Pi_{\rm PT}} = \frac{.037}{(8.15)(1)(1)} = .0046$$

It has been shown in past studies that the package failure rate is also a function of package complexity, of which number of pins is one measure. From Reference 9 the following relationships were obtained for the package failure rate of DIPs up to 64 pins.

$$\lambda_{\text{package}} = \Pi_{\text{E}} \Pi_{\text{O}} [.00044 + .00042 (\# \text{pins})]$$
 Hermetic DIPs

$$\lambda_{\text{package}} = \Pi_{\text{E}} \Pi_{\text{Q}} [.0035 + .00009 (\# \text{pins})]$$
 Nonhermetic DIPs

The data used to derive these numbers were predominantly from commercial quality devices in a ground benign application with  $\Pi_E = .38$  and  $\Pi_Q = 17.5$  (hermetic) and  $\Pi_Q = 35$  (for nonhermetic).

Therefore, using these relationships to derive the  $\lambda_{package}$  yields;

$$\lambda_{PAC}$$
 (Hermetic) = .00293 + .00279 (# Pins)

$$\lambda_{PAC}$$
 (Nonhermetic) = .0465 + .00120 (# Pins)

If these relationships are extrapolated to the pin counts of VHSIC type devices, the package failure rate and the number of pins would be directly proportional. That is, a 200 pin package would have twice the failure rate as a 100 pin package. This is not intuitively appealing since there are many package related failure mechanisms that are not complexity dependent. Failure mechanisms relating to the lead, lead/scal interface, and wire bonds can be considered complexity dependent since they are essentially independent of each other in a reliability sence. Conversely, the die bond is considered complexity independent since there is only one, which is independent of the lead/wire bond assembly. Data from Reference 75, which provides failure mode data on a wide variety of part types, indicates that this assumption is a reasonable approximation for a general use reliability model. To alleviate this situation in lieu of enough empirical data to precisel, define this relationship, the assumption was made that the complexity dependent and complexity independent package failure rates are equal at the average complexity value in the VHSIC database (120 pins). Therefore, this yields the following base package failure rate to be used in this model is:

$$\lambda_{\rm RD} = .0024 + 1.85 \times 10^{-5}$$
 (# Pins)

## 5.5.5 Junction Temperature Calculation

In calculating the junction temperature, the average junction temperature should be used. The standard method of accomplishing this is adding the case temperature to the temperature rise due to power dissipation;

$$T_J = T_C + \theta_{JC} P$$

where:

 $T_C$  = Case Temperature

 $\theta_{JC}$  = Junction-CaseThermal Resistance

P = Worst Case Actual Power

To calculate  $T_J$ , the actual  $\theta_{JC}$  of the device being predicted should be used. If it is not known, however, the following alternate method using  $\theta_{IA}$  can be used;

$$T_J = T_A + \theta_{JA} P$$

where  $\theta_{JA}$  is the junction to ambient thermal resistance. Table 5-23 summarizes  $\theta_{JA}$ 's values which were derived by various manufacturers and represent typical values. (Note: There are very wide variations in these values).

TABLE 5-23:
JUNCTION - AMBIENT THERMAL RESISTANCE VALUES

 $\theta_{JA}$  (°C/W)

Language and the same of	, IA ,						
# PINS	PLCC	CLCC	PPGA	· CPGA	CDIP	PDIP	
24	92	42	<u>-</u>	-	50	50	
28	65	40	-	•	50	50	
40	6£	40	-	•	43	43	
44	61	40	-	-	42	42	
48	58	38	-	-	38	38	
52	<b>5</b> 6	38	-	•	38	38	
64	50	37	-	•	30	30	
68	46	36	90	<b>3</b> 6	•	-	
84	44	35	81	34	-	-	
120	39	34	81	34	-	•	
124	39	34	75	31	•	-	
144	37	33.	68	30	•	*	
180	36	31	57	29	•	**	
200	36	30	50	29	•	•	
200	36	30	48	29	•		

### 5.5.6 Effects of Nonhermetic Paris

Although there was not a significant difference in fallout rates observed between plastic encapsulated and hermetic devices, there is reason to believe that the long term failure rate for nonhermetic devices, under high humidity and high temperature conditions would be worse than hermetic packages due to moisture penetration and corrosion. To account for this effect the literature was reviewed for models relating failure rate and variables such as relative humidity, temperature and power dissipation. Numerous models have been proposed (References 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 22), but the one used in this model to account for nonhermetic package types is given in Reference 10, where the effects of ambient relative humidity, temperature, and the effective chip humidity have been modeled.

The time to failure distribution for the corrosion associated with moisture is modeled with a lognormal distribution and, per Reference 10, has a mean life of:

$$t_{50} = A \cdot e^{\frac{\Delta H}{KT}} e^{\frac{296}{RH_{EFF}}}$$

where  $\Delta H$  is the activation energy (.2 eV) and  $RH_{EFF}$  is the effective relative humidity.

If the duty cycle is not 1.00, the average effective  $RH_{EFF}$  must be used in the  $t_{50}$  equation. Calculating this average value as a function of the junction and ambient RH's yields:

$$RH_{EFF} = DC RH_{EFF} (op) + (1 - DC) RH_{EFF} (dor)$$

where;

DC = duty cycle (% operating time)

RH = relative humidity of the environment

RH<sub>EFE</sub> (op) = operating effective RH

RH<sub>EFF</sub> (dor) = dormant effective RH

$$RH_{EFF} = DC (RH) e^{5230} (\frac{1}{T_{J1}} - \frac{1}{T_A}) + (1 - DC) RH e^{(\frac{1}{T_{J2}} - \frac{1}{T_A})}$$

T<sub>A</sub> = normalizing temperature

T<sub>11</sub> = operating junction temperature

 $T_{J2}$  = nonoperating junction temperature  $(T_{J2} \Rightarrow T_A)$ 

$$RH_{EFF} = (DC) (RH) e^{5230 (\frac{1}{T_J} - \frac{1}{T_A})} + (1 - DC) (RH)$$

$$(T_J = T_A + \theta_{JA} P)$$

Normalizing the temperature factor to 25°C and calculating the A constant according to the t50 values from Reference 10, yields the following t50 expression of the lognormal distribution:

$$t_{50} = .000086 e^{\frac{.2}{8.63 \times 105} (\frac{1}{T_A} - \frac{1}{298})} e^{\frac{2.96}{RH_{EFF}}}$$

where  $t_{50}$  is in  $10^6$  hrs. and  $(0 < RH_{EFF} < 1)$ .

It is well understood that there are typically large differences between manufacturers (and even large variations within manufacturers) regarding the quality and reliability of the plastic encapsulate material. However, as with the other wearout mechanisms modeled, the lognormal expression provides an estimate of the time at which the failure rate can be expected to increase and the end of life may be approaching.

### 5.5.7 Verifying Package Failure Rates with Temperature Cycling Data

Since the data collected for this effort indicates that package related failures are primarily accelerated by temperature, an exercise was undertaken to correlate the package failure rate with the number of temperature cycles the device has been exposed to. Although the results from this exercise will not be used in the final model, it was useful to observe the degree of correlation which existed in the reconstruction which existed in the reconstruction.

To accomplish this, instead of time being the independent variable, the number of temperature cycles was used and the method of modeling the early life failure rate mechanisms outlined in Section 3.0 was used. Also, instead of temperature and duty cycle being the acceleration factors, the temperature cycling rate was used.

For example, if the failure rate as a function of time (given in Figure 5-20) is derived based on temperature cycling tests then, as in the early life time dependent mechanisms case (metal, oxide, etc.), where the time acceleration factor is given by the temperature acceleration factor (Arrhenius), the failure rate for package related failures will be a function of number of cycles instead of time. To accomplish this the temperature cycling rates in Figure 5-21 for the Bay of an A-7C aircraft (from Reference 4) were used along with the duty cycle data of Table 5-24 (also from Reference 4) to derive a typical cycling rate.




FIGURE 5-20:
HYPOTHETICAL FAILURE RATE AS A FUNCTION OF
NUMBER OF CYCLES

TABLE 5-24:
AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION DATA

Aircraft	FHRS/	Landings/	Sorties	FHRS/
Туре	Sortie	Month	Month	Month
A7D	1.53	14.95	14.97	22.91
YA7D	1.41	22.81	14.17	20.20
*A7	1.53	14.98	14.96	22.89
A10A	1.83	17.23	17.21	31.31
*A10	1.83	17.23	17.21	31.31
		·		
A37B	1.30	17.20	14.36	18.64
0A37B	1.36	19.63	8.91	11.74
*A37	1.30	17.78	13.28	17.28
B52G	6.79	12.72	4.66	31.64
B52H	7.29	10.89	4.32	31.11
*B52	7.00	7.73	2.60	20.50
FB111A	3.30	12.78	6.58	21.84
*FB111	3.30	12.78	6.58	21.84
C5A	4.96	36.43	11.44	<b>56</b> .61
*C5	4.96	36.43	11.44	56.61
C130A	2.23	32.04	12.27	27.31
C130B	2.28	39.58	15.22	34.52
C130D	1.85	27.79	14.83	26.94
C130E	2.34	51.80	21.89	51.09
C130H	. 2.54	52.59	24.33	61.06
*C130	2.44	42.25	17.45	42.44

<sup>\*</sup>Indicates AN/ARN-118 RIW data.

TABLE 5-24:
AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION DATA (CONT'D)

Aircraft Type	FHRS/ Sortie	Landings/ Month	Sorties Month	FHRS/ Month
C141A	3.46	55.66	25.10	86.83
N0141A	2.48	20.92	6.61	16.59
Y0141B	1.60	18.17	9.00	14.18
*C141	3.46	54.28	24.34	84.05
KC135A	4.13	19.59	6.51	26.85
NKC135A	2.76	15.73	5.76	15.98
KC1350	4.60	17.89	6.68	30.68
*C135	4.36	19.90	6.86	29.85
F4C	1.30	14.27	11.40	14.86
RF4C	1.53	17.27	13.43	20.64
F4D	1.30	16.75	13.44	19.54
F4E	1.29	17.50	15.14	19.54
F4G	1.33	15.04	14.68	19.40
*F4	1.34	16.66	13.7€	18.48
F5E	0.97	25.60	25.50	24.59
*F5	0.98	28.34	25.02	24.49
Г15A	1.30	15.05	15.00	19.54
F15B	1.36	31.15	17.36	23.63
F15C	1.42	15.91	15.54	21.90
F15D	1.40	13.41	12.85	17.73
*F15	1.32	17.31	15.45	20.45
F16A	1.26	15.28	14.74	18.6
	F16B	1.24	28.52	14.04
17.43				
*F16	1.26	20.95	14.46	18.20

TABLE 5-24:
AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION DATA (CONT'D)

Aircraft Type	FHRS/ Sortie	Landings/ Month	Sorties Month	FHRS/ Month
F111A	2.32	11.75	6.95	16.10
EF111A	3.21	9.25	9.25	28.68
F111D	2.24	11.97	8.07	18.07
FillE	2.49	8.08	7.27	17.88
F111F	2.49	8.28	7.27	18.13
*F111	2.36	10 73	7.37	17.48
T37B	1.27	84.72	23.97	30.51
*T37	1.27	84.72	23.97	30.51
T38A	1.22	77.48	22.87	28.00
*T38	1.21	73.84	27.89	27.57

<sup>\*</sup>Indicates AN/ARN-118 RIW data.

This cycling rate data yielded of Figure 5-21 an approximate mission cycling rate of:

From the aircraft utilization data, a typical fighter will have a duty cycle of:

$$DC = .027$$




FIGURE \$-21: A-TO BAY TEMPERATURE)
(HAY TEMPERATURE)

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Next, a relationship was derived between the number of temperature cycles and failure rate. The same method used to develop the other early life failure rates was used (outlined in Section 3.0). Table 5-25 summarizes the data used. The first column lists the number of cycles interval at which the population of devices were tested for failure, the second column lists the total number of part cycles in that interval and the last column lists the number of observed failures in that interval. Table 5-26 summarizes the data used to derive this relationship.

TABLE 5-25:
PACKAGE DATA AS A FUNCTION
OF TEMPERATURE CYCLING

Cycles (10 <sup>6</sup> Cycles)	Part Cycles	Number Failed
0 - 0.000100	0.762800	2
.000101 - 0.000300	1.451700	31
.000301 - 0.000500	1.379606	90
.000501 - 0.001000	3.190000	91

TABLE 5-26: PACKAGE SUMMARY DATA

# Cycles Range (10 <sup>6</sup> cycles)	Midpoint (10 <sup>6</sup> )	Part Cycles (10 <sup>6</sup> )	Failures	Failure Rate (F/10 <sup>6</sup> Cycles)
0000500	.000250	3.5941	123	34.2
.000500001000	.900750	3.1900	91	28.2

Regressing on this data yields the following relationship:

 $\lambda$  (# cycles) = 37 e<sup>-365</sup> (\* cycles) (where # cycles is in  $10^6$  cycles) In the case of the package failure rate, a temperature acceleration factor is not applicable, rather it is the number of temperature cycles the device has been exposed to that is important. Therefore, the temperature acceleration factor can be replaced by a duty cycle which is the percentage of time the device is being cycled at a rate of .9 cyc./hr. As opposed to the other models for  $\lambda_{\rm ox}$   $\lambda_{\rm MET}$ , etc., in this model the package failure rate is a worst case value that improves with a decreasing duty cycle. Although it is recognized that failures due to temperature cycling are primarily wearout related, the model was fit to data from a wide variety of devices, which tend to "smooth out" the failure rate function.

Adding the effects of screening and duty cycle, and converting number of cycles to time (using .9 cycles per hour) yields the following:

$$\lambda_{PAC} = 37 \left( \frac{F}{10^6 \text{ cyc.}} \right) .9 \left( \frac{\text{cyc.}}{\text{hr.}} \right) (DC) e^{.9 \text{ t (DC)}} e^{.365} (\text{# cycles})$$

where:

F = Number of Failures

 $\frac{\text{cyc}}{\text{he}}$  = Cycles per hour

DC = Duty Cycle

For a typical duty cycle factor of .027, the initial failure rate would be .90. This failure rate is somewhat pessimistic because the temperature extremes observed in the test data from which it was derived is greater than the actual temperature extremes associated with an uninhabited fighter environment. The lower failure rate yielded from the package factor presented previously were developed from actual field data, representative of a lower temperature extreme cycling situation. Decreasing the temperature extremes could easily decrease the failure rate by an order of magnitude. Also, the data used to derive this relationship is from a combination of DIPs, Pin Grid Arrays, and Chip Carriers, the mixture of which is inherently less reliable than the DIP data used previously. However, this exercise did previde an expected worst case failure rate which compares favorably with the psekage failure rate equation that will be used in this model.

# 5.5.8 Package Failure Rate Model Summary

A summary of the package failure rate is therefore given as follows and the values for these factors in the following tables.

$$\lambda_{PAC} = (.0024 \div 1.85 \times 10^{-5} \text{ (#Pins)}) \pi_{E} \pi_{SP} \pi_{PT} + \lambda_{PH}$$

# Application Environment Factors $(\Pi_{\rm E})$

Environment	П <sub>Е</sub>	Environment	пЕ
GE	.52	A <sub>IB</sub> A <sub>IA</sub> A <sub>IF</sub> AUC AUT AUB AUA AUF SSF MFF MFA ML CL	6.8
GMS	.88		5.4
GF	3.4		8.1
GM	5.7		4.0
MP	5.2		5.4
NSB	5.4		10
NS	5.4		8.1
NU	7.7		12
NH	8.0		1.2
NUU	8.6		5.3
ARW	12		15
AIC	3.4		17
AIT	4.0		300

# Package Screening Factor ( $\Pi_{SP}$ )

Screen Level	Screen Class	$\Pi_{\mathbb{SP}}$
No Samonia		10
No Screening	ע	10
Burn-In	•	8.0
Environmental	-	2.8
Burn-In/Environmental	В	1.0

Package Type Factor  $(\Pi_{PT})$ 

Package Type	$\pi_{ ext{PT}}$
DIP	1.0
Pin Grid Array	2.2
Chip Carrier	4.7

$$\lambda_{\rm PH} = \frac{199}{100_{\rm PH}} \exp\left[\frac{-5}{\sigma_{\rm PH}^2}\left(\ln(t) + \ln(t_{50_{\rm PH}})\right)^2\right]$$
 for nonhermetic packages

$$t_{50_{\text{PHS}}} = 86 \exp\left[\frac{1}{8.63 \times 10^{-5}} \left(\frac{1}{\text{T_A}} - \frac{1}{298}\right)\right] \exp\left[\frac{2.96}{\text{RH}_{\text{EFF}}}\right]$$

$$T_A = Ambient Temp.$$

$$RH_{EFF} = (DC)(RH) e^{5230} \left(\frac{1}{T_3} - \frac{1}{T_A}\right) + (1-DC)(RH)$$

(for example, for 50% Relative Humidity, use RH = .50)

#### 5.6 ELECTRICAL OVERSTRESS FAILURE RATE

The occurrence of a catastrophic electrical overstress (EOS) event is an event related failure mechanism since it is the result of an externally supplied voltage or current. Since it is event related and not an inherent reliability failure mechanism, it is independent of time and dependent only on the probability of an EOS event, the magnitude of the overstressing voltage or current, and the susceptibility of the device to damage. It can therefore be modeled as a constant failure rate as a function of susceptibility level.

Although there are many types of EOS sources, each with their own characteristics, the best source of susceptibility information (and in most cases the only source) is the tests specified in MIL-STD-883, Method 3015. Although this is only one measure of the EOS susceptibility of a device, it is the most readily available and therefore will be used as an input into the model. The assumption in using this approach is that the EOS and ESD susceptibility levels are highly correlated.

Although it is also recognized that the electrical environment in which the device is deployed is a primary factor in the EOS failure rate, it cannot be used in the model since users of the model often have no control of the final environment and do not know the EOS characteristics of it. In some cases, the relative EOS severity between environments can be defined. For example, there appears to be more EOS failures from devices in avionics equipment, where power quality is always a concern. However, to quantify the magnitude of severity levels as a function of environment would be unduly complex and is beyond the scope of this study. Therefore the objective in deriving an EOS factor is that a "typical" EOS failure rate be derived only as a function of the ESD susceptibility of the device. By modeling the EOS failure rate in this manner, it is essentially being treated as an environmental stress.

The basic premise for this factor is the following relationship:

P(f) = P(f/c)P(c)

where:

P(f) is the probability of field failure due to Electrostatic Discharge or Electrical Overstress

P(f/c) is the probability of failure given that the device has been contacted by the EOS/ESD source

P(c) is the probability of contacting the device with the EOS/ESD source

To derive the probability of failure due to an EOS/ESD event, an EOS/ESD modal failure rate was developed by deriving a representative failure rate for integrated circuits (for a variety of device types and environments) and multiplying this failure rate by the percentage of failures observed to occur as a result of electrical overstress. These values were derived from the Reliability Analysis Center's data, which indicates that a total of 7948 failures were observed in a total of 16116 million part hours (yielding a failure rate of .493). Also from the RAC failure analysis database (Reference 75), 8.5 percent of all failures in the database were due to EOS/ESD, indicating that an EOS/ESD modal failure rate of .0419 (F/10<sup>5</sup>). Therefore, under typical conditions in one year of operation, the probability of failure (P(f)) due to EOS/ESD is:

$$P(f) = 1 - e^{-\lambda}_{ESD}^{t} = .000367$$

To derive a probability of failure given the device has been contacted with an EOS/ESD pulse P(f/c), data (from Reference 77) was used which identifies the failure voltage distribution for all microcircuits. This distribution is lognormal with a mean of approximately 2200 volts. The population from which this distribution was obtained and the population from which the EOS/ESD modal failure rate was calculated should be very similar since they are representative of a good cross-section of device types, technologies, and operational environments.

From data available in the literature (Reference 1) the voltage distributions given in Table 5-27 were defined for the stressing voltage as a function of the level of ESD protection in a given area (based on a normal distribution). The average listed in the table is the distribution used to represent the voltages present in the environment of the devices from which the EOS/ESD modal failure rate was derived.

TABLE 5-27: ESD SOURCE VOLTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS

	ESD Protected	ESD Unprotected	Average
Mean	1175	8000	4600
Std. Deviation	375	1750	2000

It is reasonable to assume that the stress voltage distribution is not normally distributed as previously presumed (Reference 1) but rather lognormally or exponentially distributed. As illustrated in Figure 5-22, an exponential distribution is intuitively appealing since the probability of having a given voltage present in a particular situation increases with decreasing voltage.




FIGURE 5-22: STRESS VOLTAGE DISTRIBUTION

Assuming the exponential distribution and using the mean voltage for the normal of 4500 V and  $e^{-\frac{1}{\lambda}}$  yields a  $\theta$  of .0002 and the following stress voltage distribution:

$$pdf (V_{STRESS} = .0002 e^{-.0002} V$$

Calculating the contact rate:

$$P(f/c) P(c) = P(f)$$

for 
$$t = .00876 (x10^6 \text{ hrs.})$$

$$P(f) = 1 - e^{-\lambda EOS t} = 1 - .999633 = .000367$$

(from empirical data  $\lambda_{EOS} = .0419$  @ t = .00876 x  $10^6$  hrs.)

$$P(f/c) = \frac{P(f)}{F(f/c)}$$

Assuming a mean threshold voltage of 2200 volts:

$$P(f/c) = 1 - \frac{2200 \text{ V}}{0}.0002 \text{ c}^{-.0002 \text{ VTH}} \text{ dV}$$
  
= .644

where:

(in general P(f/c) = 1-
$$\left[1 - e^{-.0002 \text{ V}_{TH}}\right] = -e^{-.0002 \text{ V}_{TH}}$$
)

$$P(c) = \frac{P(f)}{P(f/c)} = \frac{.000367}{.644} = .00057$$

$$P(c) = 1 - e^{-\lambda_C t}$$

$$\lambda_{c} = \frac{-\ln(1-P(c))}{t} = .065 \frac{\text{contacts}}{10^{6} \text{ hrs.}}$$

$$e^{-\lambda_{EOS} t} = \frac{1}{t} (-\ln(1-P(f/c))(.00057))$$

$$P(f/c) = -e^{-.0002} V_{TH}$$

Therefore,

$$\lambda_{EOS} = \frac{-\ln (1 - .00057 e^{-.0002 V_{TH}})}{.00876}$$
 (F/10<sup>6</sup> hrs.)

A graph relating  $\lambda_{EOS}$  to ESD susceptibility level is given in Figure 5-23.




FIGURE 5-23:  $\lambda_{EOS}$  AS A FUNCTION OF SUSCEPTIBILITY

#### 5.7 MISCELLANEOUS FAILURE RATE

A miscellaneous failure mechanism category was defined since there were various failure causes in the database which could not be categorized into one of the previously defined early life failure mechanisms. Rather than separating each of these miscellaneous mechanisms into a separate failure rate which would make the model more complex, they were summarized into one category which includes various failure mechanisms relating to the assembly and time dependent package failures causes. This miscellaneous failure rate is intended to be stricktly an emperical relationship used only to allow the predicted failure rates to be as close to the observed data as possible.

The package related failure rate derived previously was based only on failures induced by temperature cycling. There were a small percentage of package failures that occurred as a result of accelerated operational life testing. These failures, since they occurred during life tests are considered time dependent and are included in this miscellaneous category.

To derive this factor, the method (outlined in Section 3.0) used for the other early life failure rates was used. Since it was not a single muchanism being modeled an equivalent activation energy had to be derived. This was accomplished by weighting the acceleration due to temperature for each mechanism in accordance with the number of failures for that mechanism (Reference 7). Figure 5-24 illustrates this concept.




FIGURE 5-34: HYPOTNETICAL MIXTURE OF LAILURE RATES

Since the database contains primarily 125°C life test data, the number of failures at 25°C was projected for each failure mechanism based on the observed number of failures at 125°C. The equivalent activation energy was then calculated based on the weighted and combined individual accelerations. This activation energy was found to be .423 eV, and will be the one used to calculate the equivalent part hours for derivation of the miscellaneous early life failure rate. To derive this factor, the data in Table 5-28 was used. The summarized data used in derivation of this factor is given in Table 7-29:

TABLE 5-28: FAILURE DATA FOR MISCELLANEOUS FAILURE RATE

Effective Time	Effective	Number of
Interval (10 <sup>6</sup> hrs.)	Part Hours (106 hrs.)	Failures
0 - 0.011543	3175.006037	2
.011544 - 0.020183	2372.378700	1
.020184 - 0.040402	5501.966794	42
.040403 - 0.066083	4944.568256	1
.066084 - 0.070642	868.808198	1
.070643 - 0.082514	2198.587890	2
.082515 - 0.112394	5498.847131	l
.112395 - 0.120244	1430.374353	6
.120245 - 0.210243	15242.040931	15
.210244 - 0.240488	5036.427332	4
.240489 - 0.242412	29.643048	5
.242413 - 0.355239	1255.910793	1
.355240 - 0.393352	458.155979	ı
.393353 - 0.420487	271.892485	1
.420488 - 1.510862	200.857977	4

TABLE 5-29: SUMMARIZED MISCELLANEOUS FAILURE DATA

Effective Time Interval (10 <sup>6</sup> hrs.)	Midpoint (10 <sup>6</sup> )	Part Hours (10 <sup>6</sup> )	Number of Failures	Failure Rate (F/10 <sup>6</sup> hrs.)
0040402	.020201	11049	45	.00407
.040403 - 1.510862	.73520	37434	42	.00112

This data yielded the following relationship:

$$\lambda_{MIS} = .0042 e^{-2.2 t}$$

Accounting for unknown failures and adding the effects of acceleration due to temperature and screening yields:

$$\lambda_{MIS} = (.01 e^{-2.2 t_0}) (A_{TMIS}) (e^{-2.2 A_{TMIS}t})$$

where

A<sub>TMIS</sub> = Temperature Acceleration Factor

$$= \exp\left[\frac{-.423}{8.63 \times 10^{-5}} \left(\frac{1}{T_{J}} - \frac{1}{298}\right)\right]$$

t<sub>o</sub> = Effective Screening Time

= A<sub>TMIS</sub> (at Screening Temp.) \* Actual Screening Time (in 10<sup>6</sup> hours)

t = time (in  $10^6$  hrs.)

# 6.0 DETAILED MODEL SUMMARY

This section summarizes the detailed model in its entirety. Table 6-1 summarizes the input parameters of the detailed model and their default values. The default values are either averages of the values contained in the database or "typical" values.

TABLE 6-1: INPUT PARAMETERS

VARIABLE	<u>UNITS</u>	DEFAULT
Die Area	$cm^2$	.21 cm <sup>2</sup>
Device Type		*
1) Custom and Logic		
2) Memory and Gate Array		
Defect Density	Def/cm <sup>2</sup>	1
Feature Size	Micron	2
Power (Actual) (P)	Watt	*
Theta-JA $(\theta_{JA})$	<sup>o</sup> C/watt	(See Table 5-23)
Theta-JC (θ <sub>IA</sub> )	°С	•
Ambient Temperature (TA)	°С	*
Screening Duration	10 <sup>6</sup> hours	*
Screening Temperature	oС	*
Screening Power Dissipated	watt	*
Current Density in Metal (J) Electric Field in Oxide (E <sub>OX</sub> )	10 <sup>6</sup> Å /cm <sup>2</sup> MV/cm	.5 2
Substrate Current (I <sub>sub</sub> )	mA	.0058 e00689 T <sub>J</sub>
Drain Current (I <sub>d</sub> )	mA	3.5 e00157 T <sub>J</sub>
Proven Mfg. Process (on QML?)		*
1) yes		
2) No		
Sigma Oxide (σ <sub>OX</sub> )	-	1
Sigma Metal ( $\sigma_{MET}$ )	•	.5
Sigma Hot Carriers (o <sub>HC</sub> )	-	1.1
Package Type	•	*
Pin Count (NP)	-	*
Environmental Screens Applied	139	*

# TABLE 6-1: INPUT PARAMETERS (CONT'D)

VARIABLE	<u>UNITS</u>	<u>DEFAULT</u>
Application Environment	·	
1) None		
2) Burn-In		
3) Environmental		
4) Burn-In/Environmental		
ESD Susceptibility (V <sub>TH</sub> )	Volts	1000V
Duty Cycle (DC)	-	1
Correction Factor $(\pi_c)$		1

<sup>\*</sup> Needed as an input to detailed model

## VHSIC/VHSIC-LIKE FAILURE RATE MODEL

$$\lambda_{\rm P}(t) \qquad = \qquad \left[\lambda_{\rm OX}(t) + \lambda_{\rm MET}(t) + \lambda_{\rm HC}(t) + \lambda_{\rm CON}(t) + \lambda_{\rm PAC} + \lambda_{\rm ESD} + \lambda_{\rm MIS}(t)\right] \pi_{\rm C}$$

 $\lambda_{p}(t)$  = Predicted Failure Rate as a Function of Time

 $\lambda_{OX}(t)$  = Oxide Failure Rate

 $\lambda_{MET}(t)$  = Metallization Failure Rate

 $\lambda_{HC}(t)$  = Hot Carrier Failure Rate

 $\lambda_{CON}(t)$  = Contamination Failure Rate

 $\lambda_{PAC}$  = Package Failure Rate

 $\lambda_{ESD}$  = EOS/ESD Failure Rate

 $\lambda_{MIS}(t)$  = Miscellaneous Failure Rate

 $\pi_{\mathbf{C}}$  = Field Correction Factor = 1

The Field Correction Factor  $(\pi_C)$  is currently 1 but may change in the future when field failure rates become available.

The equations for each of the above failure mechanism failure rates are on the following pages.

# OXIDE FAILURE RATE EQUATION

$$\lambda_{\text{OX}} (\text{in F/10}^6) = \frac{A A_{\text{TYPEOX}}}{A_{\text{R}}} \left( \frac{D_{0_{\text{OX}}}}{D_{\text{R}}} \right) \left[ (.0788 \, \text{e}^{-7.7 \, \text{t0}}) (A_{\text{ToX}}) (e^{-7.7 \, \text{AT}_{\text{OX}} t}) \right]$$

$$+\frac{.399}{(t+t_0)\sigma_{0x}} \exp\left(\frac{-.5}{\sigma_{0x}^2} \left(\ln (t+t_0) - \ln t_{50_0 x}\right)^2\right)\right]$$

A = Total Chip Area (in cm<sup>2</sup>) (typical values for this area range approximately from .1 to 1cm<sup>2</sup>)

 $A_{TYPE_{OX}} = .77$  for Custom and Logic Devices

= 1.23 for Memories and Gate Arrays

 $A_R = .21 \text{ cm}^2$ 

D<sub>0</sub> = Defect Density (If unknown, use  $\left(\frac{X_0}{X_s}\right)^2$  where  $X_0 = 2 \mu m$  and  $X_s$  is the feature size of the device)

 $D_R = 1 \text{ Defect/cm}^2$ 

t<sub>0</sub> = Effective Screening Time

= (Actual Time of Test (in  $10^6$  hrs.)) \* (A<sub>Tox</sub> (at junction screening temp.) (in °K))\* (A<sub>Vox</sub> (at screening voltage))

## OXIDE FAILURE RATE EQUATION (CONTINUED)

 $A_{Tox}$  = Temperature Acceleration Factor

$$= \exp\left[\frac{-.3}{8.63 \times 10^{-5}} \left(\frac{1}{T_{J}} - \frac{1}{298}\right)\right]$$

where 
$$T_J = T_C + \theta_{JC}P$$
 (in °K)

$$A_{Vox} = e^{-192} \left( \frac{1}{E_{ox}} - \frac{1}{2.5} \right)$$

 $E_{OX}$  = Maximum Power Supply Voltage  $V_{DD}$ , divided by the gate oxide thickness (in MV/cm)

$$t_{50_{OX}} = \frac{1.3 \times 10^{22} \text{ (QML)}}{A_{T_{OX}} A_{V_{OX}}} \text{ (in } 10^6 \text{ hrs.)}$$

(QML) = 2 if on QML, .5 if not.

 $\sigma_{OX}$  = Sigma obtained from test data of oxide failures from the same or similar process. If not available, use a  $\sigma_{OX}$  value of 1.

t = Time (in  $10^6$  Hours)

# METAL FAILURE RATE EQUATION

$$\lambda_{MET} = \left[ \frac{A A_{TYPE_{MET}}}{A_{R}} \frac{D_{0MET}}{D_{R}} (.00102 e^{-1.18 t_{0}}) (A_{T_{MET}}) (e^{-1.18 A_{T_{MET}}t}) \right]$$

$$+ \left[ \frac{.399}{(t+t_0)\sigma_{MET}} \exp \left( \frac{-.5}{\sigma_{MET}^2} \left( \ln (t+t_0) - \ln t_{50_{MET}} \right)^2 \right) \right]$$

A = Total Chip Area (in cm<sup>2</sup>) (typical values for this area range approximately from .1 to  $1 \text{ cm}^2$ )

 $A_{TYPE_{MFT}} = .88$  for Custom and Logic Devices

= 1.12 for Memory and Gate Arrays

 $A_R = .21 \text{ cm}^2$ 

 $D_{0MET}$  = Defect Density as Calculated in Appendix B (If unknown use  $(\frac{X_0}{X_S})^2$  where  $X_0 = 2 \mu m$  and  $X_S$  is the feature size of the device)

 $D_R = 1 \text{ Defect/cm}^2$ 

 $A_{T_{MET}}$  = Temperature Acceleration Factor

$$= \exp\left[\frac{-.55}{8.63 \times 10^{-5}} \left(\frac{1}{T_{J}} - \frac{1}{298}\right)\right]$$

$$T_J = T_{CASE} + \theta_{JC}P$$
 (in °K)

 $t_0$  = Effective Screening Time (in  $10^6$  hrs.)

= A<sub>TMET</sub> (at Screening Temp. (in °K)) \* (Actual Screening Time (in 10<sup>6</sup> hrs)) (to Calculate t<sub>0</sub> use A<sub>TMET</sub> based on the junction temperature during screening)

## METAL FAILURE RATE EQUATION (CONTINUED)

$$t_{50_{MET}} = (QML) \frac{.388 * (Metal Type)}{J^2 A_{T_{MET}}}$$
 (in 106 hrs.)

(QML) = 2 if on QML, .5 if not.

Metal Type = 1 for Al

37.5 for Al-Cu or for Al-Si-Cu

- J = The mean absolute value of Metal Current Density (in 10<sup>6</sup> Amps/cm<sup>2</sup>)
- $\sigma_{MET}$  = sigma obtained from test data on electromigration failures from the same or a similar process. If this data is not available use  $\sigma_{MET} = 1$
- t = time (in  $10^6$  hrs.)

#### HOT CARRIER FAILURE RATE EQUATION

$$\lambda_{HC} = \frac{.399}{t\sigma_{HC}} \exp\left[\frac{-.5}{\sigma_{HC}^2} \left(\ln(t+t_0) - \ln t_{50}_{HC}\right)^2\right]$$

$$t_{50_{HC}} = \frac{(QML)3.74 \times 10^{-5}}{A_{T_{HC}} I_d} \left(\frac{I_{sub}}{I_d}\right)^{-2.5}$$

(QML) = 2 if on QML, .5 if not

$$A_{THC} = \exp\left[\frac{.039}{8.63 \times 10^{-5}} \left(\frac{1}{T_J} - \frac{1}{298}\right)\right]$$

where  $T_J = T_C + \theta_{JC}P$  (in °K)

 $I_{ci}$  = Drain Current at Operating Temperature. If unknown use  $I_{ci} = .0058~e^{-.00157}~T_{J}~(in~^{o}K)~(mA)$ 

 $I_{sub}$  = Substrate Current at Operating Temperature. If unknown use  $I_{sub} = 3.5 \text{ e}^{-.00689} \text{ T}_{J} \text{ (in °K) (mA)}$ 

- σ<sub>HC</sub> = sigma derived from test data, if not available use 1.1
- ATHC (at Screening Temp.(in °K)) (Test Duration in 106 hours)
- t = time (in 10<sup>6</sup> hrs.)

# **CONTAMINATION FAILURE RATE EQUATION**

$$\lambda_{CON}$$
 = .000022 e -.0028 t<sub>0</sub>  $A_{T_{CON}}$  e -.0028  $A_{T_{CON}}$  t

A<sub>TCON</sub> = Temperature Acceleration Factor

$$= \exp \left[ \frac{-1.0}{8.63 \times 10^{-5}} \left( \frac{1}{T_{J}} - \frac{1}{298} \right) \right]$$

where 
$$T_J = T_C + \theta_{JC}P$$
 (in °K)

- to = Effective Screening Time
  - =  $A_{T_{COR}}$  (at screening junction temperature (in °K)) \* (actual screening time in  $10^6$  hrs.)
- t = time (in 10<sup>6</sup> hrs.)

# PACKAGE FAILURE RATE EQUATION

 $\lambda_{PAC} = (.0024 + 1.85 \times 10^{-5} \text{ (#Pins)}) \pi_{E} \pi_{SP} \pi_{PT} + \lambda_{PH}$ 

# Application Environment Factors ( $\Pi_{\rm E}$ )

Environment	пе	Environment	пЕ
G <sub>E</sub> G <sub>MS</sub> G <sub>F</sub> G <sub>M</sub> Mp NSB NS NU NH NU ARW AIC	.52 .88 3 4 5.7 5.2 5.4 7.7 8.0 8.6 12 3.4	AIB AIA AIF AUC AUT AUB AUA AUF SSF MEF MFA ML	6.8 5.4 8.1 4.0 5.4 10 8.1 12 1.2 5.3 15
A <sub>IT</sub>	4.0	$c_{ m L}$	300

# Package Screening Factor ( $\Pi_{SP}$ )

Screen	Quality Level*	$\Pi_{\mathrm{SP}}$
No Screening	D	10
Bum-In		8.0
Environmental	•	2.8
Bum-In/Environmental		1.0

<sup>\*</sup>Quality level as defined in Table 5.1.2.7-1 of MIL-HLBK-217.

## PACKAGE (CONTINUED)

# Package Type Factor $(\Pi_{PT})$

1.0
2.2
4.7

λ<sub>PH</sub> = Package Hermeticity Factor

 $\lambda_{\rm ph} = 0$  for Hermetic Packages

$$\lambda_{\rm PH} = \frac{.399}{t\sigma_{\rm PH}} \exp\left[\frac{...5}{\sigma_{\rm PH}^2} \left(\ln(t) - \ln(t_{\rm 50pH})\right)^2\right]$$
 for nonhermonic packages

$$t_{50_{\text{PH}}} = 86 \exp \left[ \frac{.2}{8.63 \times 10^{-5}} \left( \frac{1}{T_{\text{A}}} - \frac{1}{298} \right) \right] \exp \left[ \frac{2.96}{RH_{\text{EFF}}} \right]$$

TA = Ambient Temp. (in °K)

$$RH_{off} = (DC)(RH) e^{5230} \left(\frac{1}{T_j} \cdot \frac{1}{T_A}\right) + (1-DC)(RH)$$

where 
$$T_1 = T_C + \theta_{1C} P$$
 (in °K)

(for example, for 50% Relative Humidity, use in = .50)

( = time (in 10<sup>6</sup> hrs.)

# **EOS/ESD FAILURE RATE EQUATION**

$$\lambda_{EOS} = \frac{-\ln (1 - .00057 e^{-.0002 V_{TH}})}{.00876}$$

V<sub>TH</sub> = ESD Threshold of the device using a 100 pF, 1500 ohm discharge model

# MISCELLANEOUS FAILURE RATE EQUATION

$$\lambda_{MIS}$$
 = (.01 e<sup>-2.2 to</sup>) (A<sub>TMIS</sub>) (e<sup>-2.2 A<sub>TMIS</sub> t</sup>)

 $A_{TMIS}$  = Temperature Acceleration Factor

$$= \exp\left[\frac{-.423}{8.63 \times 10^{-5}} \left(\frac{1}{T_{\rm J}} - \frac{1}{298}\right)\right]$$

where 
$$T_J = T_C + \theta_{JC}P$$
 (in °K)

- to = Effective Screening Time
  - = A<sub>TMIS</sub> (at Screening Temp. (in °K)) \* Actual Screening Time (in 10<sup>6</sup> hours)
- t = time (in  $10^6$  hrs.)

#### 7.0 SHORT FORM MODEL

#### 7.1 DERIVATION METHODOLOGY

The detailed model presented previously is intended to model VHSIC CMOS failure rates as accurately as possible. As discussed in the introduction of this report, it is recognized that there is a need for a much simplified model, both in the data required for calculation and in the complexity of the calculations themselves.

To accomplish this, a short form model was derived from the detailed version. The following model form was chosen which has additive failure rates for die related failure mechanisms, package related failure mechanisms, and electrical overstress; each multiplied by the appropriate correction factors:

$$\lambda_{\rm P} = \lambda_{\rm BD} \pi_{\rm MFG} \pi_{\rm T} \pi_{\rm SD} \pi_{\rm CD} + \lambda_{\rm BP} \pi_{\rm E} \pi_{\rm SP} \pi_{\rm PT} + \lambda_{\rm EOS}$$

where:

 $\lambda_{BD}$  is the base failure rate for the die

 $\pi_{MFG}$  is the correction factor based on the manufacturing process

 $\pi_{T}$  is the die temperature factor

 $\pi_{SD}$  is the die screening factor

 $\pi_{CD}$  is the die complexity factor

 $\lambda_{\mathrm{BP}}$  is the package base failure rate

 $\pi_{\mathrm{B}}$  is the unvironment factor

π<sub>SP</sub> is the package screening factor

π<sub>PT</sub> is the package type factor

 $\lambda_{\rm EOS}$  is the failure rate due to electrical overstress

The derivation of each of these factors is summarized as follows.

#### 7.1.1 Temperature Factor

To develop a temperature acceleration factor for the short form model, an average "equivalent" activation energy had to be derived, recognizing that a single activation energy is an approximation and only applicable for a single failure mechanism. To accomplish this, the detailed model was exercised for a variety of conditions and various temperatures and an average activation energy calculated from the resulting failure rate ratios at various temperatures. As with the individual failure mechanisms, the following temperature acceleration factor form was used:

$$\pi_{\mathrm{T}} = e^{\frac{-Ea}{K} \left( \frac{1}{T_1} - \frac{1}{T_2} \right)}$$

where:

Ea is the equivalent activation energy

K is the Boltman's Constant

T<sub>1</sub> is the junction temperature

T<sub>2</sub> is a reference temperature

Calculating an average Ea yielded a value of .33 eV. Therefore, normalizing the acceleration factor to 298 degrees Kelvin, the temperature acceleration factor becomes:

$$\frac{-.33}{\pi_{\rm T} = e} \frac{\frac{-.33}{8.63 \times 10^{-5}} \left(\frac{1}{\rm T_{\rm J}} - \frac{1}{298}\right)$$

# 7.1.2 Die Sereening Factor

The overall effects of burn-in can also be determined from the detailed model by knowing the curation and the junction temperature of the burn-in. Since the detailed model has a decreasing failure rate for the defect related early life failure mechanisms, the effects of burn-in can easily be determined by exercising the model for various burn-in lengths and temperatures. The failure rate improvement after the burn-in can then be determined. The lengths and temperatures chosen were those of Class D, B and S (per MIL-HDBK-217) quality level devices. For these devices, the following relative burn in factors were derived (normalizing Class D (no burn-in) to 1.

TABLE 7-1: DIE SCREENING FACTOR

Class	$\pi_{\mathrm{SD}}^*$
D	1
В	.94
S	.85

\*QML parts will initially be exposed to Class B screening as a baseline. Further refinement of this factor will be made as data becomes available.

# 7.1.3 Die Complexity Factor

The die complexity factor in the detailed model was a function of die area and defect density. The area acceleration factor was (Area (in cm<sup>2</sup>))/.21, and the default defect density value to be used in the short form model is:

$$D = \left(\frac{2}{X_S}\right)^2$$

where:

 $X_S = feature size$ 

The die complexity factor ( $\Pi_{CD}$ ) is therefore,

$$\Pi_{\text{CD}} = \frac{A}{.21} \left(\frac{2}{X_{\text{S}}}\right)^2$$

where

 $A = Area in cm^2$ 

X<sub>S</sub> = Feature size in microns

which yields the relative complexity factors in Table 7-2, as a function of chip area and feature size.

TABLE 7-2: DIE COMPLEXITY FACTOR

		Chip A	Area (cm <sup>2</sup> )	مبيها المناب	7, april 7, 74, 10, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15
Size (Microns)	.1-2	.24	.4-1.0	1.0-2	2-3
1.00	2.8	5.7	13	28	47
1.25	1.9	3.9	9.0	19	32
1.50	1.3	2.5	5.9	13	21
2.00	.71	1.4	3.3	7.1	12
2.50	.45	.92	2.1	4.6	7.6
3.00	.31	.63	1.5	3.1	5.2

However, since only the metal and oxide failure rates are accelerated with the feature size/die area factor, the factors in Table 7.1-2 must be decreased accordingly. From the life test data presented in Table 4-2 (excluding unknown, assembly and package failures), 64% of die failures are due to metal and oxide (173 failures out of 272) and therefore the actual  $\pi_{\rm C}$  should be:

$$\pi_{\rm C} = \left[\frac{A}{.21} \left(\frac{2}{X_{\rm S}}\right)^2 (.64)\right] + .36$$

which yields the  $\pi_C$  values in Table 7-3.

TABLE 7-3: SHORT FORM MODEL DIE COMPLEXITY FACTOR

17 m m bu comu	Chip Area (cm <sup>2</sup> )					
Feature Size (Microns)	.1-2	.24	.4-1.0	1.0-2	2-3	
1.00	2.1	4.0	3.7	18	30	
1.25	1.6	2.8	6.1	12	21	
1.50	1.2	2.0	4.1	8.7	14	
2.00	.81	1.3	2.5	4.9	8.0	
2.50	.65	.95	1.7	3.3	8.2	
3.00	.56	.76	1.3	2.3	3.7	

#### 7.1.4 Manufacturing Process

Since the detailed model assumes that the differences in manufacturing processes are accounted for in the defect density term and since the short form model will always use the default condition for defect density,  $\left(\frac{2}{X_2}\right)^2$ , there must be a way to incorporate the effects of the level of control in a manufacturing process into the short form model. The rationale for including the effect of the manufacturing process is that companies on the Qualified Manufacturers List (QML) or the Qualified Products List (QPL) must have demonstrated to the qualifying activity that its technology has low failure rates for time dependent dielectric breakdown, electromigration and hot carrier degradation. Non QML manufacturing lines generally do not demonstrate these low failure rates in such a thorough manner to outside organizations.

To incorporate the effects of manufacturing process control, the 1.0 and 1.2 micron failure rate data was used and a defect density required to make the observed and predicted failure rates the same was calculated. The mean of these calculated defect densities was then taken for each manufacturer, and a 8.5:1 ratio was observed from the best to worst manufacturer. Therefore, assuming this range in defect densities based on the level of process control, the following categories can be defined along with their associated defect densities:

Manufacturing Process	D
QML or QPL	.33
Non QML or QPL	2.5

For the summarized model, these numbers must be scaled in accordance with the following, since only 64% of all die related failures are typically due to exide or metal. Table 7-4 presents the final factors.

$$\pi_{MFG} = (.64) D + .36$$

TABLE 7-4:  $\pi_{MFG}$  VALUES

Manufacturing Process	$\pi_{MFG}$
QML or QPL	.55
Non QML or QPL	2.0

## 7.1.5 Package Failure Rate

Since the detailed model package failure rate is not a function of time and it is relatively simple to use, it can essentially be used as is in the short form model. One part of the package failure rate model that was time dependent and cannot be used is the treatment of plastic packages. Since the short form model cannot be time dependent, another approach was be taken to account for long term reliability degradation due to nonhermetic effects. To accomplish this, the fallout rate of the various package types was modified by adding to them a typical fallout rate for plastic devices exposed to temperature/humidity tests. A typical fallout rate for this test is .4%.

In previous sections of this report, the fallout rates listed in Table 7-5 were presented as a function of package type:

TABLE 7-5:
PACKAGE TYPE FALLOUT RATES

FO (%)
1.03
.49
.22

Data in Table 5-21, which presents early life fallout rate differences between plastic and hermetic parts, can not be used to derive their relative failure rates since that data is representative of screen tests used to detect package defects. The Pi factor being developed for plastic packages here is intended to be representative of its expected <u>long term</u> reliability.

Therefore, to account for plastic encapsulation, .4 can be added to the fallout rates in Table 7-5 to account for long term nonhermetic reliability effects. Therefore, the fallout rates listed in table 7-6 were used. Based on these fallout rates, a  $\pi_{PT}$  can be derived in the same manner as in the detailed model and these values are summarized in Table 7-7.

TABLE 7-6: FALLOUT RATE AS A FUNCTION OF PACKAGE HERMETICITY

	FO Rate								
Package Type	Hermetic	Nonhermetic							
Chip Carrier	1.03	1.43							
Pin Grid Array	.49	.89							
DÍP	.22	.62							

TABLE 7-7: SHORT FORM PACKAGE TYPE FACTOR

	трт							
Package Type	Hennetic	Nonhermetic						
Chip Carrier	4.68	6.50						
Pin Grid Amay	2.23	4.05						
DIP	1	2.82						

A summary of the short form model package failure rate therefore is as follows:

 $\lambda_{\mathrm{BP}}$  = Package Base Failure Rate

 $= .0024 + (1.85 \times 10^{-5})$  (# Pins)

# Application Environment Factors ( $\Pi_E$ )

Environment	$\Pi_{\mathbf{E}}$	Environment	$\Pi_{\mathbf{E}}$
$G_{\mathrm{E}}$	.52	$A_{ m IB}$	6.8
G <sub>MS</sub>	.88	AĭA	5.4
G <sub>F</sub>	3.4	A <sub>IF</sub>	8.1
$G_{\mathbf{M}}$	5.7	A <sub>UC</sub>	4.0
Mp	5.2	A <sub>UT</sub>	5.4
NSB	5.4	A <sub>UB</sub>	10
NS	5.4	A <sub>UA</sub>	8.1
NU	7.7	A <sub>UF</sub>	12
NH	8.0	SSF	1.2
NUU	8.6	Mgg	5.3
ARW	12	MFA	15
AIC	3.4	ML	17
ATT	4.0	$c_{\mathbf{L}}$	300

Facinge Screening Factor (II<sub>SD</sub>)

Screen Level	Class	#sp*
Nose	D	10
Bura-la	•	8.0
Environmental	•	2.8
Bum-In/Environmental	В	1.0

<sup>\*</sup>QML Parts will initially be exposed to Class B screening as a baseline. Further refinement of this factor will be made as data becomes available.

Package Type Correction Factor ( $\Pi_{PT}$ )

	Γ	PT
Package Type	Hermetic	Nonhermetic
DIP	1.0	2.8
Pin Grid Array	2.2	4.0
Chip Carrier	4.7	6.5

## 7.1.6 Die Base Failure Rate

To derive a die base failure rate  $\lambda_{BP}$  for the short form model, the following procedure was used:

- (1) A prediction was performed with the detailed model for a variety of temperatures, screen durations, die areas, and feature sizes.
- (2) The twenty year average failure rate was calculated for each of these combinations  $\lambda_p$ .
- (3) A base failure rate was calculated for each combination to make the prediction failure rate in the short form model equal to the 20 year average predicted from the detailed model:

$$\lambda_{BD} = \frac{\lambda_{p} \cdot \lambda_{PAC}}{\pi_{TYPE} \pi_{T} \pi_{SD} \pi_{CD} \pi_{MFG}}$$

(4) The geometric mean of these base failure rates was taken.

The data used in calculation of these base failure rates are summarized in Table 7-8 and yielded a  $\lambda_{\rm RD}$  value of .025 F/10<sup>5</sup> hrs.

DATA USED BY CALCULATING SHORT FORM DIE BASE FAILURE RATE

		-									_			_		_		-	-	-	الجمعي															
				λ <sub>B</sub> Ď			.103	710:	.074	0.0 0.0 0.0	920	191	810.	810.	.021	850		908	900	16)	90.5	.000 Geometric Mean = .025														
				#CD			.56	4.1	30	A	30	.56	4.	30	ş. :	Ş	.56	-	30	.56	4.1 25.1	7														
				12 <sup>2</sup>			-		,,	. 3	8		(ma (		ş. 5	6		_	-	94	\$ 5	K.														
	,	Summarized	Model Factors	7.		Ea 2.33	(888		halle co		-	6.32	6.32	6.32	6.52	6.32	25.1	25.1	25.1	25.1	25.	3														
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				JAAK			180	-									-		7																	
	Detailed Model Ap (20 Year (Average)					151.	A57	2.73	200	2.64	781.	895	10.4	001.	2,05	274	×2,	5.13	253	718																
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			DIE	DE	UE	DIE	DIE	DIE	DIE	DIE		South Fort	# 125°C (160°ks. (Class B)		None	2	None 160		160 hr.	Hone	200	2000	160 14	160 hr.	Mone	None	None	3								
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(P = O to that TA = Ts)

As described in the detailed model, the failure rate is a function of the device type and separates the failure rate due to oxide and metal. The A<sub>TYPE</sub> correction factors for Metal and Oxide therefore should be weighted (in accordance with the number of failures expected for each) and combined. For custom and logic devices:

$$A_{\text{TYPE}} = .64 (.77) + .36 (.88)$$

$$= .81$$
(64% oxide)

For memories and gate arrays:

$$A_{\text{TYPE}} = .64 (1.23) + .36 (1.12)$$
  
= 1.19

Since this A<sub>TYPE</sub> factor only effects the oxide & metal failure rate the actual factor should be (since 6.4% of all failures are due to oxide or matal):

$$A_{TYPEACTUAL} = A_{TYPE} (.64) + .36$$

Therefore for custom and logic devices  $A_{\rm TYPE}$  .88 and for memories and gate arrays,  $A_{\rm TYPE} = 1.12$ .

Combining this device type correction factor with the base failure rate results in the following base failure rate as a function of device type:

$\lambda_{\mathrm{BD}}$
.02
.03

# 7.1.7 Short Fram Model Summery

The complete short form model is presented on the following pages in a format intended to be replacement pages for MIL-HDBK-217.

# $\lambda_{P} = \lambda_{BD}\Pi_{MFG}\Pi_{SD}\Pi_{CD} + \lambda_{BP}\Pi_{E}\Pi_{SP}\Pi_{PT} + \lambda_{EOS}$

where:

 $\lambda_{\rm P}$  is the Device Predicted Failure Rate in F/10<sup>6</sup> Hours.

 $\lambda_{BD}$  is the Die Base Failure Rate:

For Logic and Custom Devices,  $\lambda_{RD} = .02$ 

For Memories and Gate Arrays,  $\lambda_{BD} = .03$ 

II<sub>MFG</sub> is the Manufacturing Process Correction Factor, Table 1.

III is the Temperature Acceleration Factor, Table 2.

 $\Pi_{SD}$  is the Die Screening Correction Factor, Table 3.

II<sub>CD</sub> is the Die Complexity Corrective Factor, Table 4, based on the Area (in cm<sup>2</sup>) and the Feature Size (in Microms) of the Die.

λ<sub>BP</sub> is the Package Base Failure Rate:

 $\lambda_{\rm BD} = .0024 + (1.85 \times 10^{-5}) \text{ (NP)}$ 

where NP - Number of Package Pins

II is the Environment Factor, Table 5.

HSP is the Package Screening Factor, Table 6.

Tipy is the Package Type Correction Factor, Table 7.

λΕΟS is the Failure Rate due to Electrical Overstress, Table 8, based on the Electrostatic Discharge Susceptibility of the Part, in Volts.

TABLE 1:  $\Pi_{\mbox{MFG}}\mbox{, MANUFACTURING PROCESS CORRECTION FACTOR}$ 

Manufacturing Process	$\Pi_{ ext{MFG}}$
QML or QPL Non QML or Non QPL	.55 2.0
Hou Givin or Hou Gi n	2.0

TABLE 2:
TEMPERATURE ACCELERATION FACTOR (SEE NOTE BELOW)

T <sub>J</sub> (°C)	$\Pi_{\mathbf{T}}$	T <sub>J</sub> (°C)	$\Pi_{\mathbf{T}}$	T <sub>J</sub> (°C)	$\Pi_{\mathrm{T}}$	T <sub>J</sub> (°C)	$\Pi_{\mathrm{T}}$
25	1	51	2.80	77	6.73	103	14.32
27	1.09	53	3.01	79	7.16	105	15.12
29	1.18	55	3.23	81	7.61	110	17.25
31	1.29	57	3.47	83	8.09	120	22.24
33	1.40	59	3.72	85	8.59	125	25.13
35	1.52	61	3.99	87	9.11	135	31.81
37	1.63	63	4.27	89	9.67	145	39.80
39	1.78	65	4.56	91	10.24	150	44.35
41	1.92	67	4.88	93	10.85	155	49.29
43	2.08	59	5.21	95	11.48	165	60.44
45	2.24	71	5.56	97	12.15	175	73.44
47	2.42	73	5.93	99	12.84		
49	2.60	75	6.32	101	13.57		

Note:  $\Pi_{T} = \exp\left[-3824\left(\frac{1}{T_{J}} - \frac{1}{298}\right)\right]$ 

where:

T<sub>J</sub> is the worst case junction temperature (°K). T<sub>J</sub> is estimated using the following expression:

$$T_{J} = T_{C} + \theta_{JC} P + 273$$

where:

 $T_C$  is case temperature (°C).

- θ<sub>JC</sub> is junction to case thermal resistance (°C)/watt) for a device soldered into a printed circuit board. If θ<sub>JC</sub> is not available, use a value contained in a specification for the closest equivalent device or use the table on Page 5.1.2.7-5.
- P is the worst case power realized in a system application. If the applied power is not available, use the maximum power dissipation from the device specification or from the specification for the closest equivalent device.

If T<sub>C</sub> cannot be determined, use the following:

ENVIRO. T <sub>C</sub> (°C)	G <sub>B</sub>	G <sub>MS</sub>	G <sub>M</sub> 50	M <sub>F</sub>	N <sub>SB</sub>	N <sub>S</sub> 45	N <sub>U</sub> 80	N <sub>H</sub> 45	N <sub>UU</sub> 25	A <sub>RW</sub>	A <sub>IC</sub>		A <sub>IB</sub> 60
enviro. T <sub>C</sub> (°C)		A <sub>IF</sub>	A <sub>UT</sub> 95	A <sub>UB</sub> 95	A <sub>UA</sub> 95	A <sub>UF</sub> 95		M <sub>FF</sub>	M <sub>FA</sub>	U <sub>SL</sub> 40	M <sub>3</sub>	-	C <sub>L</sub> , 45

TABLE 3:  $\Pi_{\text{SD}}$ , DIE SCREENING CORRECTION FACTOR

Quality Level	Π <sub>SD</sub> *		
D.	1.0		
В	.94		
S	.85		

<sup>\*</sup>QML parts will initially be exposed to Class B screening as a baseline. Further refinement of this factor will be made as data becomes available.

TABLE 4: II<sub>CD</sub>, DIE COMPLEXITY CORRECTION FACTOR

Die Area (cm <sup>2</sup>	)				
Feature Size	.12	.24	.4-1.0	1.0-2.0	2.0-3.0
1.00 Micron	2.1	4.0	8.7	18	30
1.25	1.6	2.8	6.1	12	21
1.50	1.2	2.0	4.1	8.7	14
2.00	.81	1.3	2.5	4.9	8.0
2,50	.65	.95	1.7	3.3	5.2
3.00	.56	.76	1.3	2.3	3.7

TABLE 5:  $\Pi_{\rm E}$ , APPLICATION ENVIRONMENT FACTORS

ENVIRONMENT	$\Pi_{ extsf{E}}$	ENVIRONMENT	ПЕ
$G_{\mathbf{B}}$	.52	A <sub>IB</sub>	6.8
$^{ m G}_{ m B}$	.88	A <sub>IA</sub>	5.4
$G_{\overline{F}}$	3.4	A <sub>IF</sub>	8.1
$G_{\mathbf{M}}$	5.7	A <sub>UC</sub>	4.0
$M_{ m P}$	5.2	A <sub>UT</sub>	5.4
$N_{SB}$	5.4	A <sub>UB</sub>	10
$N_{\mathbf{S}}$	5.4	A <sub>UA</sub>	8.1
$N_{\mathbf{U}}$	7.7	AUF	12
$N_{\mathbf{H}}$	8.0	SF	1.2
$N_{UU}$	8.6	M <sub>FF</sub>	5.3
$A_{RW}$	12	$M_{FA}$	15
$A_{IC}$	3.4	ML	17
$A_{\Gamma\Gamma}$	4.0	$c_L$	300
,			

TABLE 6:  $\Pi_{SP}$ , PACKAGE SCREENING FACTOR

Quality Level	$\Pi_{\mathrm{SP}^*}$
D	10
В	1.0

<sup>\*</sup>QML parts will initially be exposed to Class B screening as a baseline. Further refinement of this factor will be made as data becomes available.

TABLE 7:  $\Pi_{\mbox{\footnotesize{pT}}}, \mbox{\footnotesize{PACKAGE TYPE CORRECTION FACTOR}}$ 

	PT
Hermetic	Nonhermetic
1.0	2.8
2.2	4.0
4.7	6.5
	Hermetic 1.0 2.2

TABLE 5.1.2.12-8:  $\lambda_{EOS}$ , ELECTRICAL OVERSTRESS FAILURE RATE

V <sub>TH</sub> (ESD Susceptibility (Volts))*	λ <sub>EOS</sub>
Ò- 1000	.057
1000 - 2000	.048
2000 - 4000	.040
4000 - 16000	.034
>16000	.025

<sup>\*</sup>Voltage ranges which will cause the part to fail. If unknown, use 0-1000 volts.

#### 8.0 FAULT TOLERANT RELIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS

#### 8.1 INTRODUCTION

VHSIC and VHSIC-Like Chip designs often use system style architecture to handle a multitude of functions such as CPU, RAM, ROM and I/O. To model a system that contains a large quantity of VHSIC and VHSIC-Like chips, with a straight series reliability model, would be inaccurate if the chip design employs such fault tolerant mechanisms as redundancy and error detection and correction (EDAC).

To complete this VHSIC/VHSIC-Like reliability modelling effort, a wide variety of fault tolerant techniques used in chip designs were reviewed and general modelling techniques were derived to account for these redundancy effects. An attempt was made to account for redundancy techniques in the model by including a pi factor similar to the other factor used. This approach was abandoned however since it was determined that such a factor would be an oversimplification of the actual process. Therefore, to model these effects accurately, each individual design must be analyzed separately and modeled accordingly. The following discussion summarizes the techniques that can be used to model these effects. These techniques are based on the following, basic assumptions;

- (1) The die substrate failure rate is directly proportional to the die area, (i.e., 25% of the area contributes 25% of the failure rate).
- (2) All die failures are independent.

With these assumptions the modelling techniques are classified into two basic categories, redundancy and EDAC. Section 8.2 contains the redundancy models and Section 8.3 contains the EDAC model. Section 8.4 contains guidelines for the application of the models to VHSIC/VHSIC-Like designs.

#### 8.2 THE RELIABILITY OF REDUNDANT DESIGNS

The reliability of VHSIC devices can be enhanced by the use of redundant circuit elements at critical locations within the chip. Redundancy involves the use of two or more signal paths throughout the system by the addition of parallel elements. It is noted that in general the addition of redundant circuit elements reduces the basic series reliability while at the same time increasing mission reliability.

Depending upon the specific application there are many approaches to redundancy. Redundancy is classified into two major classes; they are:

- (1) Active Redundancy External components are not required to perform the function of detection, decision and switching when an element or path within the chip fails.
- (2) Standby Redundancy External elements are required to detect, make a decision and switch to another element or path within the device as a replacement for a failed element or path.

An overview of the techniques modeled in this report is given in Figure 8-1.




FIGURE 8-1: REDUNDANCY TECHNIQUES

The following sections contain a short synopsis of each of the techniques mentioned in Figure 8-1. It is important to note that they use a simple probability, that is, the reliability is modeled in terms of the number of successful paths through the circuit subtracting out the successes that are counted more than once. For example, if there are two successful events that could occur (Path A and Path B) and they are independent, then the probability of successful operation is:

$$P(AUB) = P(A) + P(B) - P(A)P(B)$$

where:

P(AUB) = The probability of either Event A or Event B occurring

P(A) = The probability of Event A occurring

P(B) The probability of Tvent B occurring

## 8.2.1 Simple Parallel Redundancy

Simple parallel redundancy (SPR) is one of the most widely used active redundancy techniques. If any functional element fails open then another identical path exists through the redundant elements. The concept is visualized in Figure 8-2.




FIGURE 8-2: SIMPLE PARALLEL REDUNDANCY

All elements are usually identical, but they may be different. The probability model for this case is:

$$R(t) = 1 - (1 - e^{\lambda t})^n$$

where:

 $R(t) \equiv Reliability at time t$ 

 $\lambda = \text{Failure rate of the corresponding chip area}$ 

n = Number of redundant elements

If the elements are different, then the reliability of each element must be calculated separately. The advantages of SPR are simplicity, a significant gain in reliability from nonredundant device design and its applicability to both analog and digital circuitry. The disadvantages are the issues of load sharing, problems with voltage sensitivity across redundant elements and electrical overstress propagation.

## 8.2.2 <u>Duplex Parallel Redundancy</u>

Duplex parallel redundancy (DPR) is used in redundant logic applications. It is primarily used in computer applications where redundant digital outputs are monitored by an error detection device such as a parity checker. If an error is detected the faulty output is disabled and the system function is never interrupted. Figure 8-3 is an illustration of a DPR application.




FIGURE 8-3: DUPLEX REDUNDANCY

In Figure 8-3 Elements A and B represent redundant logic,  $S_A$  and  $S_B$  are the switches to disable the L-jic of A or B if they should be found faulty, ED is the error detection element and DL is the diagnostic logic element. If logic elements A and B are identical the reliability model would be as follows:

$$R(t) = P_{ED} P_{DL} (2 R_E R_S)^2 (2 R_{out} - R^2_{out})]$$

### where:

R(t) = Reliability at time t

P<sub>ED</sub> = Probability of error detection

P<sub>DL</sub> = Probability of the diagnostic logic

R<sub>E</sub> Reliability of the redundant logic (A, B)

 $R_S$  = Reliability of the identical switches,  $S_A$  and  $S_B$ 

R<sub>Out</sub> 

■ Reliability of the output circuitry

 $R_{out} = P_{G01} + P_{G02} R_{GA} - P_{G01} P_{G02} R_{GA}$ 

#### where:

PG01 Probability first input to OR gate gets through

PG02 = Probability second input to OR gate gets through

RGA Reliability of the and gate

The advantages of employing the DPR techniques are:

- (1) Application to duplex, active redundant modes or separate elements.
- (2) Will maintain system function up to n-1 failures.
- (3) Protects against both open and short failure modes.
- (4) Faulty units can be reported to the next higher level of assembly without disrupting operation.

The disadvantages of DPR are increased complexity due to additional detection and sensing circuitry, increased storage capability required for redundant data elements and additional diagnostic routines.

# 8.2.3 Bimodal Parallel Redundancy

Bimodel Parallel Redundancy (BPR) is an active redundancy technique that combines both series and parallel success paths. This technique prevents system level failures by protecting against shorts and opens. Direct shorts across the chip due to a single element shorting is provided by a redundant element in series. An open across the device is prevented by the parallel elements. Figure 8-4 and 8-5 contain the block diagrams for the two major types of BPR.




FIGURE 8-4:
BIMODAL PARALLEL/SERIES REDUNDANCY




FIGURE 8-5: BIMODAL SERIES/PARALLEL/REDUNDANCY

The parallel/series techniques is useful when the primary expected failure mode is open. The series/parallel technique is useful when the primary expected failure mode is short. The reliability calculation for the parallel/series case (assuming identical functional blocks) is:

$$R(t) = (2R_A - R_A^2)(2R_B - R_B^2)$$

where:

R(t) = Reliability at time t

 $R_A = Reliability of the A Elements$ 

R<sub>B</sub> = Reliability of the B Elements

The reliability calculation for the series/parallel case (assuming identical functional blocks) is:

$$R(t) = 2R_A R_B - (R_A R_B)^2$$

where:

R(t) = Reliability at time t

RA Reliability of the A elements

RB = Reliability of the B elements

The major advantage of the BPR techniques that have been described is that it provides a significant gain in reliability at the chip level (and therefore system level) for short mission times. Another advantage is that it can provide greater protection against particular failure modes. Its major disadvantages are that it is difficult to design at the chip level and for long mission times it can actually be less reliable than a non redundant design.

# 8.2.4 Majority Voting Redundancy

Majority voting redundancy (MVR) can be implemented in two ways; the straight MVR technique and an enhanced adaptive majority logic technique. The idea behind the basic MVR is that decision logic can be built into the SPR model by inputting signals from the parallel elements to a voting element to compare each signal with the remaining signals. Valid decisions are made only if the number of useful elements exceeds the number of failed elements.

The adaptive majority logic technique uses the basic MVR, but utilizes a comparator and switching network to switch out or inhibit failed redundant elements. This enhancement reduces the possibility of a majority of bad elements determining the vote. Figure 8-6 and 8-7 contain the block diagrams for the two MVR techniques.




FIGURE 8-6: MAJORITY VOTING REDUNDANCY




FIGURE 8-7:
MVR WITH ADAPTIVE ELEMENTS

The MVR reliability model assuming all redundant elements are identical is:

$$R(t) = \left[\sum_{i=0}^{n} \left(\frac{2n+1}{i}\right) (1-e^{\lambda A t}) e^{-\lambda A t} (2n+1-i)\right] e^{-\lambda MVRt}$$

where:

 $R(t) \equiv Reliability at time t$ 

 $\lambda_A$  = Failure rate of a single redundant elements

 $\lambda_{MVR}$  = Failure rate of the voting element

n = The number of redundant elements minus the minimum number of elements required

The model can be added to so that it can be applied to the adaptive MVR technique. The reliability of the comparator and sensing circuitry must be added as well. Since there are so many possible implementations of this technique the derivation of specific model is left to the user.

The advantages of using the MVR techniques are that it:


- (1) Can be implemented to provide indication of faulty signals.
- (2) Can provide significant gains in reliability for short missions.

The disadvantages are that to be effective it requires the voting element to have a much greater reliability than the redundant elements and that in some cases for long mission times it can produce a lower reliability.

# 8.2.5 Gate Connector Redundancy

Gate connector redundancy (GCR) is a voting type of redundancy similar to MVR. It is primarily used in digital circuitry where redundant elements require a vote, but not as significant a voting mechanism as those used in MVR. Outputs of the redundant elements are fed to switch-like gates which perform the voting function.

The gates contain no cells whose failure would caus—redundant circuit elements to fail. Figure 8-8 contains the block diagram for the GCR technique.



# FIGURE 8-8: GATE CONNECTOR REDUNDANCY

The reliability model for this technique is as follows:

$$R(t) = R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 + R_1 R_2 R_3 Q_4 + R_1 R_2 Q_3 R_4 + R_1 Q_2 R_3 R_4 + Q_1 R_2 R_3 R_4$$

where:

R(t) Reliability at time t

R<sub>1</sub> Reliability of path through A<sub>1</sub>

$$R_1 = R_A R_G^2$$
  
 $Q_1 = 1 - R_1$  (Q = Unreliability)

 $R_2 = Reliability of path through A_2$ 

$$R_2 = R_A R_G^3$$

$$Q_2 = 1 - R_2$$

 $R_3 \equiv \text{Reliability of path through } A_3$ 

$$R_3 = R_A R_G$$

$$Q_3 = 1-R_3$$

 $R_4 \equiv Reliability of path through A_4$ 

$$R_4 = R_A R_G^4$$

$$Q_4 = 1 - R_4$$

The gate connector technique is usually only used when the gates used to provide the voting function have extremely high reliabilities. The advantages and disadvantages of GCR are the same as MVR.

## 8.2.6 Standby Redundancy

Standby redundancy techniques include implementation for both operation and nonoperating modes. Standby techniques do not employ any load sharing. As soon as a faulty element is detected then another element is switched in its place. Operating standby redundancy (OSR) allows the redundant elements to remain active while nonoperating standby redundancy (NSR) allows the redundant elements to remain inactive. At the time of this writing only OSR techniques are employed as it is not possible to activate or power only portions of a monolithic substrate. OSR is illustrated in Figure 8-9.




FIGURE 8-9:
OPERATING STANDBY REDUNDANCY

The  $A_i$  are the redundant elements, the  $D_i$  are the sensors which detect failures and  $S_1$  is the switch. The reliability model for OSR is as follows:

$$R(t) = e^{-\lambda} A t \begin{bmatrix} \sum_{r=0}^{n-1} (\lambda_{A}t)^{r} \\ \frac{1}{r!} \end{bmatrix}$$

where:

R(t) = Reliability at time t

 $\lambda_A$   $\simeq$  Failure rate of the active element and detector

n Number of active elements

The advantages of OSR are that it is applicable to both analog and digital circuitry and it is effective in protecting against failure due to intermittent failure modes. Its disadvantages are the increased delay time due to sensing and switching functions, increased complexity and limitations on maximal reliability gains due to the failure modes of the sensing and switching devices.

#### 8.3 ERROR DETECTION AND CORRECTION RELIABILITY MODELING

VHSIC and VHSIC-like devices sometimes utilize error detection and correction (EDAC) circuitry to improve the reliability of Random Access Memory (RAM). EDAC uses error correction codes (ECCs) such as the Hamming, Golay and Binary Coded Hexidecimal (BCH) to add redundancy to the stored data elements. When the data is written to a memory location a code value is calculated and stored with it. When the data is read the code is retrieved with it and the value of the code is regenerated. If the two values are not equal the entire stored word is used to generate a new (and hopefully) correct word. Though there are many types of ECCs this study considered only single error correction/double error detection (SEC/DEC) codes. This type of EDAC is implemented as shown in Figure 8-10.




FIGURE 8-10: EDAC BLOCK DIAGRAM

After reviewing a multitude of EDAC reliability assessment models it became apparent that as reported in "Large Scale Memory Error Detection and Correction Study," (Reference 79), the models can become quite complex. As reported in that study the Levine and Meyers EDAC model is an excellent approximation that is relatively easy to use. The model is presented as follows with one natural extension for chip level application.

$$R_{ECC}(t) \equiv (R_{RAM}^{m} + mR_{RAM}^{m-1} (1-R_{RAM}))R_{EDAC}$$

 $R_{ECC}(t)$  = Reliability of RAM at time t

 $R_{RAM}$  = Reliability of the RAM as a function of the substrate failure rate:

$$R_{RAM} = \exp(1-\lambda_{RAM} t)$$

 $R_{EDAC}$  = Reliability of the additional substrate used to implement EDAC:

$$R_{EDAC} = \exp(-\lambda_{EDAC} t)$$

m = Total number of data bits, <math>m = n+k, n = data, k = code

The failure rates for the RAM and EDAC functions are determined by the percentage of substrate area they occupy. If the RAM takes up 50% of the substrate then it experiences 50% of the substrate failure rate.

For multiple ECCs there are models that can be applied for which the reader is referenced to RADC-TR-87-92 for more detail.

## 8.4 SUBSTRATE LEVEL RELIABILITY MODELING GUIDELINES

The reliability models described in Sections 8.2 and 8.3 should be applied with guidelines put forth in this section. The system level techniques that are applied below the chip level have a major difference. Instead of summing piece-part failure rates, a percentage of the substrate failure rate is used. That percentage is equal to the percentage of substrate real-estate that each respective function occupies. Figure 8-11 illustrates this concept.

i	AM 2%	CPU 30%
	E D A C	I/O 15%
		ROM 15%

FIGURE 8-11: SUBSTRATE REAL ESTATE PERCENTAGES

Given that the reliability of the RAM has been improved by the EDAC circuitry and that they together take 50% of the substrate area, the reliability of the RAM would be calculated using 50% of the predicted substrate failure rate.

In summary, the reliability modeling of VHSIC and VHSIC-like device follows the following sequence:

- (1) Obtain all the required information on the device, its design and its application.
- (2) Calculate the failure rate of the substrate and its packaging.

- (3) Determine if the architecture of the device includes any redundancy or EDAC.
- (4) If it does not, add the die, package, and EOS failure rates and the calculation is complete. If it does, proceed to step (5).
- (5) Select the appropriate model for the type of redundancy employed.
- (6) Calculate the percent of substrate that the redundancy implementation consumes.
- (7) Calculate the reliability of the redundant items and the nonredundant items.
- (8) Calculate the chip level reliability as follows:

$$R(t) = R_{RI} R_{NRI} R_{PKG}$$

where:

R(t) = Reliability at time t

R<sub>RI</sub> = Reliability of the redundant items

R<sub>NRI</sub> = Reliability of the nonredundant items

RpkG Reliability of the package

The chip level reliability is viewed as illustrated in Figure 8-12.




FIGURE 8-12: CHIP LEVEL RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAM

If there is no redundancy employed 100% of the substrate failure rate is used to calculate the chip level reliability.

## 9.0 MODEL VALIDATION

All data collected in this (continued in Appendix D)effort was used in derivation of the model parameters. Although the majority of this data was not from 1.25 micron VHSIC technology, but rather 2.0 micron average, it was necessary to use it all to insure statistically sound parameters.

The methodology used therefore was to validate and refine the model based on the 1.0 and 1.25 micron data that was available. Table 9-1 summarizes the results of this validation effort. All data available for these devices was accelerated life test data taken at 125°C, 150°C or 200°C ambient temperatures.

Table 9-1 lists the number of actual part hours, the number of devices tested, the number of failures, the observed failure rate, the duration of the test, the predicted average (over the test duration) failure rate using the detailed model and the predicted/observed failure rate ratio. The predicted values were obtained by using a ground benign environment with a duty cycle of 1.00.

The mean and standard deviation of the  $\log\left(\frac{\lambda p}{\lambda_0}\right)$  values yields -.056 and .43, respectively. Since the mean of the logged values is -.056, the actual mean of  $\left(\frac{\lambda p}{\lambda_0}\right)$  is .88, indicating that the model on the average is 12% optimistic. However, the zero failure data was not used in this analysis, which would tend to cause somewhat pessimistic observed failure rate values. The zero failure data accounted for 11.5 percent of the total observed part hours and therefore the observed failure rates should be approximately 11.5% lower than the values used in this analysis since only data with observed failures were used. It should also be noted here that a 12 percent deviation is very small compared to the natural failure rate variability.

TABLE 9-1:
MODEL VALIDATION DATA

Part Hours	#Tested	#Failed	λ Observed F/10 <sup>6</sup> hrs.	Test Duration hrs.	$\lambda_{ m P}$	$\frac{\lambda_{P}}{\lambda_{O}}$
24,900 18,000 17,000 15,600 21,100 22,600 20,100 34,600 18,000 27,500 32,500 78,600 25,100 40,900 54,000	155 113 107 97 132 141 126 216 112 172 203 491 157 255 54	1 1 2 0 0 3 1 0 1 1 0 3 0	40 55 117 0-64 0-47 133 50 0-29 56 36 31 38 0-40 24 74	168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168	50.4 48.4 43.9 59.4 37.9 27.8 10.0 24.5 11.0 20.5 21.0 21.0 13.6 23.0 81.9	1.26 .88 .37 .37 .37 .21 .20 .20 .20 .57 .68 .55 .55
2,660,000	54	11	4	168	19.8	4.95

TABLE 9-1: MODEL VALIDATION DATA (CONT'D)

Part Hours	# Tested	#Failed	λ Observed F/10 <sup>6</sup> hrs.	Test Duration hrs.	$\lambda_{ m P}$	$\frac{\lambda_{\mathrm{P}}}{\lambda_{\mathrm{O}}}$
39,312 710,000 218,000 497,000 29,064 191,000 706,000 47,712 349,000 48,048 49,500 46,240 182,090 3,555 1,232 2,076	234 510 218 497 173 191 706 284 698 286 99 80 315 42 18 34	3 20 4 3 1 2 7 0 0 1 0 2 0 0	76 28 18 6 34 10 10 0-21 0-3 21 0-20 43 0-5 0-281 0-812 0-482	168 1,000 1,000 1,000 168 1,000 168 500 168 500 580 580 580 684 68	37.4 30.4 30.4 30.4 37.4 30.4 37.4 34.4 37.4 34.4 9.1 9.1 9.1 91.9 98.4	.49 1.09 1.69 5.07 1.1 3.04 3.04 3.04 1.78 1.78 1.78 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21


The conclusion of this exercise is that the detailed model accurately predicts the failure rate as it stands and does not need to be modified.

There appears to be a relatively large variance in observed reliabilities between manufacturers but relatively little for a particular manufacturer. For example, Figures 9-1 and Figure 9-2 from (Reference 14) illustrate the variability that can be expected from a well controlled product line in which a variance of a factor of approximately two is observed. The data from the VHSIC database indicates that an order of magnitude variation is not untypical, especially between manufacturers. Several factors can account for this, particularly the fact that the actual defect densities were not known for this data, and probably varied significantly between manufacturers. This further illustrates me significance of defect density as an indicator of reliability.

Another exercise was undertaken in which it was assumed that the observed failure differences between manufacturers was attributable to differences in defect density. In this analysis a defect density was calculated for each failure rate which made the observed equal the predicted failure rate. A mean of these defect densities were then calculated for each manufacturer and ranged from .3 to 2.57 defects /cm<sup>2</sup>. The failure rate prediction was then performed again with this "customized" defect density, and the log of the predicted/observed ratio was calculated. The standard deviation of these values was in this case .27 as opposed to .43 as in the case of the "uncustomized" defect densities.

A summary of the standard deviations of the  $(\log \frac{\lambda_P}{\lambda_O})$  values for a typical regression model (Reference 78), the detailed model with D=1, and the detailed model with customized defect density are given in Table 9-2.

MOTOROLA MICROPROCESSOR PRODUCT GROUP HIGH TEMPERATURE OPERATING LIFE 1984 - 1985 TOTALS FIGURE 9-1:



MOTOROLA MICROPROCESSOR FRODUCT GROUP TEMPERATURE CYCLE 1984 - 1985 TOTALS

TABLE 9-2: STANDARD DEVIATION SUMMARY

Model Type	σ
Regression Model	.47
Detailed Model (D=1)	.43
Detailed Model (Custom D)	.27

An analysis like this was not performed on the short form model since it was intended only to be used for field failure rate predictions and extrapolating it to high temperature operating life conditions is questionable. It is believed however, that its precision should be comparable to a typical regression model, since these two model types have similar forms and complexities.

#### 10.0 SAMPLE CALCULATIONS

This section of the report presents various sample calculations using the detailed model with various input variables. The failure rate graphs in this section were generated by a computer program that was written to perform predictions using the detailed model. The first illustration in each figure is the input screen in which the user specifies the input variables to be used. A description of each of these fields taken from the users manual to this program is given i Appendix C. The second illustrates the calculated failure rate as a function of time and plots these values. The dashed lines represent (from top to bottom) the highest predicted value, declinear predicted value and the lowest predicted value, all for a 20 year period. The first twelve years of operation only are plotted.

The input variables that were varied for these predictions were Die Area, Feature Size, Temperature, Duty Cycle, and Screening Duration. Table 10-1 summarizes the values of each of these variables for each example.


It can be seen in most of these failure rate plots that the failure rate is almost always continuously decreasing throughout the useful life of the device, and that it takes a very long time to reach the constant failure rate portion of the curve. This is specially true in benign, low temperature applications where many defects are not accelerated to failure in the early life of the device. Conversely, the model indicates in high temperature applications, that the failure rate is initially very high but decreases rapidly due to the fact that defects are being removed at a high rate.

It is also apparent in this model that die area and feature size heavily influence the predicted failure rate, as well as defect density.


TABLE 10-1: EXAMPLE PREDICTIONS INPUT VARIABLES

Example Number	Die Area (cm <sup>2</sup> )	Feature Size (Micron)	Duty Cycle	Ambient Temperature (°C)	Screening Duration (hrs.)
_	10	1 00	FO	<b>50</b>	1/0
1	.10	1.25	.50	50	168
2	.50	1.25	.50	50	168
3	1.00	1.25	.50	50	168
4	.20	1.00	1.00	25	168
5	.20	1.00	.50	25	168
6	.20	1.00	1.00	25	168
7	.20	1.00	1.00	75	168
8	.20	1.00	1.00	125	168
9.	.50	1.00	1.00	25	168
10	.50	1.00	1.00	75	168
11	.50	1.00	1.00	125	168
12	1.00	1.00	1.00	25	168
13	1.00	2.00	1.00	2.5	168
14	1.00	3.00	1.00	25	168
15	.50	3.00	1.00	25	168
16	.20	3.00	1.00	25	168
17	.20	3.00	1.00	25	500
18	.20	3.00	1.00	25	1000


Complexity & Unit Dev Type Die	Package Pins  Ri 223  Area Theta Ja  Ri 223  Ri 124  R	Factor Oxide TDDB Metal EM Hot C Cont Pack ESD Misc Time Lambda	Value  0.010785 1.3218405347E-15 0.001522 0.024540 3.5837777503E-24 0.00260 0.113872 0.053286 0.012643 0.262800 0.216907
Subst I Drain I Dty Cyc substance in the control of	Instant lime  Instant Lambda  Accepted		e failure rate: 0.274513 y to view chart.





Complexity & Unit Dev Type Die	Package Pins  RI 223  Area Theta Ja  REPRES  SD Met Type  RECE R2	Factor Oxide TDDB Metal EM Hot C Cont Pack ESD Misc	Value  0.053924 6.6092026733E-15 0.007610 0.024540 3.5837777503E-24 0.000260 0.113872 0.053286 0.012643
Imp Act Pur Curr Den Elct	Fld Env Rimd	Tine Lambda	9. 262800 9. 266133
Subst I Drain I Dty Cyc  Subst I Drain I Dty Cyc  Subst I Drain I Dty Cyc  Instant Time		_	e failure rate: 0.567195
	Instant Lambda	Any ke	y to view chart.





Complexity & Unit Dev Type Die	Package Pins  Ri 222  Area Theta Ja  Rivers  SD Met Type  Rivers  Rive	Factor Value  Oxide 0.197847 TDDB 1.3218495347E-14 Metal 0.015220 EM 0.024540 Hot C 3.5837777503E-24 Cont 0.090260 Pack 0.113872 ESD 0.053286 Misc 0.12643  Time 0.262800 Lambda 0.327667
Subst I Drain I Dty Cyc Subst I Drain I Dty Cyc Substrated Substrate  o Oxide o Metal o Hot Carr	Instant line Instant Lambda	Average failure rate: 0.933048 Any key to view chart.
















Complexity & Unit Dev Type Die	Package Pins  Ri 223  Area Theta Ja  Ri R24R23  SD Met Type  R223 R2	Factor Oxide TDDB Metal EM Hot C Cont Pack ESD Misc Time Lambda	Value  0.018971 1.9441410446E-14 0.004718 1.0851259788E-18 8.4182293786E-21 0.002133 0.11372 0.253286 0.006201 0.262800 0.197181
Subst I Drain I Dty Cyc  Instant Time  Subst I Drain I Dty Cyc  Instant Lambda  Coccecci		Average failure rate: 0.431460 Any key to view chart.	
































EXAMPLE 13







Complexity & Unit Dev Type Die	Package Pins  Ri (A)  Area Theta Ja  A EXERCI  ESD Met Type  EXERCI  EXERC  EXER	Factor Oxide TDDB Metal EM Hot C Cont Pack ESD Misc Time Lambda	Value  0.010539 1.0800783581E-14 0.002621 1.0851259788E-18 8.4182293786E-21 0.00623 0.113872 0.113872 0.053286 0.006201 0.262800 0.186653
	Instant Iime Checkers Instant Lambda		e failure rate: 3.320542 y to view chart.




ISXANPACIS 1 2	Package Pins Ki 243 Area Theta Ja	Factor Oxide TDDB Metal EM	Value  0.005270  5.4003917905E-15  0.001311  1.0851259788E-18
Scrn Duration Temp Pur  Ed Extracted Pro Curr Den Elet	Fld Env RHmd	Hot C Cont Pack ESD Misc Time Lambda	8. 4182293786E-21 9. 909133 9. 113872 9. 953286 9. 906201 9. 262899 9. 189073
Subst I Drain I Dty Cyc Subst I Drain I Dty Cyc Substituted Substitute  s Oxide s Metal s Hot Carr	Instant Time  Instant Lambda	_	e failure rate: 0.251219 y to view chart.





EXAMPLE 16






EXAMPACITY 2	Package Pins Rd 223 Area Theta Ja	Factor Value  Oxide 0.001975  TDDB 2.7015794139E-15  Metal 0.000452  EM 2.5286245249E-16
Scrn Duration Temp Pur  Control 125 1252  The Act Pur Curr Den Elet	Fld Env RHmd	Hot C 8.4726084907E-21 Cont 0.000133 Pack 0.113872 ESD 0.053286 Misc 0.006192 Time 0.262800 Lambda 0.175910
Subst I Drain I Dty Cyc BEERTACCO BEERTACCO  F Oxide & Metal & Hot Carr  FROM BEERTACCO BEERTACCO  FOR STATE BEERT	Instant Time  Instant Lambda  Accepted	Average failure rate: 0.207784 Any key to view chart.







#### 11.0 MODIFICATIONS TO THE MODEL

The detailed model contained in this report is an industry wide representation of state-of-the-art VLSI/VHSIC CMOS reliability. It is recognized, however, that the best reliability predictions are accomplished based on empirical reliability data from a specific fabrication process. This empirical data is ideally field failure rate experience but can also be life test results.

As mentioned in the presentation of the detailed model, there is a correction factor  $\pi_c$ , which can be used to modify the model as more empirical data does become available. At the writing of this report,  $\pi_C$  is one (1) by definition since all data available was used in the derivation of the model and therefore on average, the observed data equals the predicted data.

The  $\pi_C$  factor can therefore be used for the following purposes:

- (1) To modify the model as VHSIC field experience data becomes available.
- (2) To modify the model for a particular fabrication process based on the availability of high quality life tests.

The second purpose above should only be used in the absence of defect density data when the default value  $(X_0/X_S)^2$  is used. Additionally, either of these methods should only be used when there is statistically significant amounts of high quality data available.

The method of calculating  $\pi_C$  is a straightforward geometric mean of observed/predicted ratios:

$$\pi_{\mathbf{C}} = \begin{bmatrix} n & \left(\frac{\lambda_{\mathbf{O}}}{\lambda_{\mathbf{P}}}\right) \end{bmatrix} \frac{1}{n}$$

where:  $\lambda_0 = \text{observed failure rate}$ 

 $\lambda_{\rm p}$  = predicted failure rate

n = number of failure rate observances

The predicted failure rate should be an average value over the time interval the observed data was taken. All other inputs should be as close to the actual values of the test as possible.

A manufacturer should also be given the opportunity to adjust the failure rates for the individual failure mechanisms in the event adequate data on specific failure mechanisms exists. This should be done only if there is a large quantity of failures which have been failure analyzed to determine the cause of failure. If this option is chosen, all failures must be accounted for and categorized into one of the mechanisms in the present model. To accomplish this, the methodology described previously in this report for modeling the early life oxide, metal, contamination, and miscellaneous failure mechanisms should be used.

#### 12.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 12.1 CONCLUSIONS

A reliability prediction model has been developed for CMOS VHSIC/VHSIC-Like devices from analysis and failure rate modeling of specific failure machanisms. To quantify the failure rates of each of these mechanisms, a database was built which contains life test and environmental test results. Since this database was built from many manufacturers data, the failure rate predictions are industry wide representative values, and will vary from manufacturer to manufacturer. This effort concluded that the best way to account for these differences is to use actual defect densities. It is believed that the use of actual defect densities, if properly measured, will result in predicted reliability values which are more precise and accurate than conventional regression type prediction models.

Derived from the detailed model, a simpler "short form" model was developed with the understanding that systems engineers often need a quick reliability prediction tool with easily accessible input parameters.

This effort was the first in support of the MIL-HDBK-217 VLSI integrated circuit reliability prediction models that deviated from the traditional statistical analysis of field data. A combination of physics of failure information, life test results, screening results, and test structure data was used to achieve the study objectives. These objectives were not only to develop a reliability model for VHSIC/VHSIC-Like CMOS devices, but also to develop a methodology that, if successful, can be effectively used in a timely manner to develop reliability prediction models for emerging microcircuit technologies.

The authors believe that the detailed model presented in this report is generally more accurate and more sensitive to the fabrication and stress variables that truly effect device reliability. The tradeoff for this improvement is the complexity of the failure rate equations themselves, which if done by hand can be very time consuming. For this reason, it is desirable to computerize the prediction model, thus avoiding tedious calculations. The short for model developed, although easier to use, is expected to yield less precise predictions. Although less accurate than the detailed model, data has been presented indicating that the short form model precision is approximately equivalent to traditional regression analysis models.

#### 12.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

ITTRI/Honeywell recommends that the model contained herein (the detailed version, short form, or both) be incorporated into MIL-HDBK-217. The authors believe that this model currently represents the best available general purpose, small feature size CMOS device reliability prediction methodology. It is also recommended that users collect the data necessary for use of the detailed model, since it is more accurate than the short form model. Also, by exercising the detailed model with actual data, feedback can be obtained to determine if this modeling approach can be accurately extended  $\omega$  other technologies, and for future device types.

It is also recommended that more attention be given to collecting accurate field failure rate information for these device types as part of a government sponsored program. This data should then be submitted to a central repository of data such as the Reliability Analysis Center, so that it would be available for MIL-HDBK-217 model development efforts.

There are also many logical follow on studies to this effect which would enhance the knowledge base of VLSI/VHSIC reliability characterization. The most obvious possibly is to collect, when available, field failure rate and cause data and refine the model accordingly. In addition to field reliability data, life test and screening data should continue to be collected and analyzed so that a comprehensive database can be built.

Another very useful effort would be the extension of the methodology developed herein to bipolar VHSIC and VLSI technologies since much of the modeling done in this model could be applied to bipolar devices.

One goal of this effort was to relate failure rate prediction to efforts such as the Generic Qualification Program. Although a certain degree of success was attained toward this goal, it was ultimately concluded that there is currently a lack of standardization throughout the industry in quantifiable parameters that could be used in a reliability model. Since there are various standardization efforts inderway in this area, the results of these efforts should be investigated for use as reliability indicators. Furthermore, a very useful related effort would be to define standard methodologies for the quantification of reliability characteristics.

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# APPENDIX A: SURVEY LETTER AND FORM

COMMITMENT TO EXCELLENCE

IIT Research Institute Beeches Technical Campus Rte. 26N Rome, New York 13440 315/336-2359

April 16, 1987

Mr. Jeff Katz Director of Marketing ASIC Products Intel Corporation 3065 Bowers Avenue Mail Stop: SCI-5 Santa Cara, CA 95051

Dear Mr. Katz:

IIT Research Institute (IITRI) has recently initiated a study under contract to Rome Air Development Center (RADC Contract Number F30602-86-C-0261) to develop VHSIC and VHSIC-like CMOS reliability prediction models. Since meaningful amount of empirical field reliability data are not expected to be available for use in model development, these prediction methodologies will be based primarily on information available during circuit fabrication such as test structures, yield, and screening information.

The intent of this study is to correlate this information with field reliability performance for each failure mechanism of interest and to combine these mechanisms into a useable prediction model form, ultimately for inclusion in MIL-HDBK-217, "Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment".

To achieve the goals of this program and to develop prediction models valuable to users, IITRI needs information on a wide variety of part types and fabrication lines. We are currently seeking data and information from organizations involved in VHSIC/VHSIC-like fabrication in the following areas; field failure rates, life test results, screening data, yield data, and test structures data. Any information your organization can provide in these areas will greatly assist us in achieving our goals.

Any information submitted to IITRI for use in this effort will be kept strictly proprietary, without traceability to data submittors.

We feel it will be very important to the electronics industry to have accurate reliability prediction models for VLSI and VHSIC devices, and that we can provide good models if cooperation is obtained from the semiconductor industry. Please fill out the attached survey form and send back to IITRI, at which time one of our representatives will call to further pursue these matters.

If there are any questions, please call Alex Recchio at (315) 336-2359. IITRI very much appreciates your cooperation in completing the enclosed survey and looks forward to your participation in this effort.

Sincerely,

William K. Denson Project Engineer

Alex Recchio

Senior Data Specialist

WKD/AJR:jev

Attachment

### VLSI/VHSIC RELIABILITY SURVEY

Nan	ne:
Title	
Org	anization:
Div	ision:
Add	ress:
Pho	ne Number:
(1)	Does your organization manufacture or use MOS VLSI or VHSIC circuits?
	If so, please outline their characteristics
	Device type (Memory, Microprocessor, etc.)
	Feature size (Gate Length, Metal Width)
	Complexity (Approx. Number of Gates, Transistors)
	Packaging (Type, Number of Pins)
(2)	Please check below the type(s) of data that your organization has on the above device(s):
	Field Failure Rates
	Life Test Results
	Screening Data (of any Type)
	Failure Analysis Data

	Percentage
Electromigration	
Dielectric Breakdown	
Soft Errors	·
Parametric Drift	
Hot Electrons	
Latch Up	
Electrical Overstress	
Package Related	·
Quality control monitor data (test monitors, etc.)	
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#### APPENDIX B:

## OXIDE AND METAL DEFECT DENSITY CALCULATIONS

As an option to using  $(X_0/X_s)^2$  in the metal and oxide factors, defect density factors can be used as follows:

$$F_{\text{met}} = \left(\frac{D_{\text{o met}}}{D_{\text{r met}}}\right)$$

and

$$F_{ox} = \left(\frac{D_{o ox}}{D_{r ox}}\right)$$

where

D<sub>0 met</sub> = The defect density measured with an interdigitated meander test structure as described in the metal defect monitor test method below.

$$D_{r \, \text{mot}} = \frac{(-\ln 0.90)}{A \, f_{\text{mot}}}$$

F<sub>met</sub> = 0.15, the fraction c. actual minimum-pitch metal length out of the total rainimum-pitch metal length possible on the chip.

D<sub>O OX</sub> = The defect density measured with a capacitor test structure as described in the gate exide monitor test method below.

$$D_{r ox} = \frac{(-\ln 0.90)}{A f_{ox}}$$

Fox = 0.01, the fraction of actual gate oxide area to total area of the chip.

#### Metal Defect Monitor Test Method

It is assumed that the defects are random. First metal layer defect density,  $D_{\rm O\ met}$ , is established with an interdigitated meander, shown in Figure 1. The meander is laid out with the minimum first metal line width and space dimensions allowed for the device in question. The minimum serpentine length should be:

$$L_{mc} = \frac{f_{met} A_{max}}{2 P_{met}}$$

where  $A_{max}$  is the die area of the maximum size device to be manufactured in the same technology, and  $P_{met}$  is the minimum pitch allowed by the layout rules for the first metal layer. Data from a minimum of 50 randomly selected test structure sizes must be used.

Three types of test measurements are performed on these structures. First, for the contact test, two-probe resistance measurements are made between nodes 1 and 8, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. Second, four-probe resistance measurements are made on the serpentine with current forced at nodes 2 and 7 in Figure 1, and voltage sensed at nodes 3 and 6. Third, for the bridging test, leakage between adjacent metal lines is measured by forcing a voltage at the node formed by connecting together nodes 1, 4, 5, and 8 in Figure 1 and measuring a leakage with a current meter connected between ground and the node formed by connecting together nodes 2, 3, 6 and 7 in Figure 1. The pass range for the two-probe resistance measurements is between 0.5x nominal calculated resistance and 1.5x nominal calculated resistance. The pass range for the serpentine measurement is between 0.5x nominal calculated serpentine resistance and 1.5x nominal resistance. The pass range for the leakage resistance between adjacent metal lines is between 10 times the nominal resistance of the serpentine and 1.0E18 ohms.

Yields are calculated in the following way. For contact yield,

$$Y_{c} = \frac{N_{cp}}{N_{cp} + N_{cf}}$$

where  $N_{cp}$  is the number of sites that pass the contact test, and  $N_{cf}$  is the number of sites that fail the contact test. If  $Y_c$  is less than 0.5 (50%) then the test must be performed again. For serpentine and bridging yield,

$$Y_{sb} = \frac{N_{sb p}}{N_{sb p} + N_{sb f}}$$

where of the sites that pass the contact test,  $N_{sbp}$  is the number of sites that pass the serpential and the bridging tests, and  $N_{sbf}$  is the number of sites that fail either the serpentine or the bridging tests.

The defect density is calculated from the yield with the following equation:

$$D_{o met} = \frac{(-\ln Y_{gb})}{f_{met} A_{max}}$$

## Gate Oxide Defect Monitor Test Method

It is assumed that the defects are random. Gate oxide defect density,  $D_{OOX}$ , is established with a capacitor test structure, shown in Figure 2. The gate oxide area should be:

$$A_{OX} = f_{OX} A_{DEEX}$$

where A<sub>rmax</sub> is the die area of the maximum size device to be manufactured in the same technology as the device in question. Data from a minimum of 50 randomly selected test structure sites must be used.

Two types of test measurements are performed on these structures. First, for the contact test, two-probe resistance measurements are made between nodes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Second, for the leakage test, leakage between gate and the n- or p- channel silicon is measured by forcing a voltage (V<sub>DD</sub>) at the node formed by connecting together nodes 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Figure 2 and measuring a leakage with a current meter connected between ground and the node formed by connecting together nodes 5 and 6 in Figure 2. The pass range for the two-probe resistance measurements is between 0.5 X nominal calculated resistance and 1.5 x nominal calculated resistance. The pass range for the leakage resistance the gate and silicon is between 1.0E-10 ohms and 1.0E18 ohms.

Yields are calculated in the following way. For contact yield,

$$Y_C = \frac{N_{CP}}{N_{CP} + N_{CF}}$$

where  $N_{CP}$  is the number of sites that pass the contact test, and  $N_{CF}$  is the number of sites that fail the contact test. If  $Y_{C}$  is less than 0.5 (50%) then the test must be performed again. For oxide leakage yield,

$$Y_{Cap} = \frac{N_{Cap P}}{N_{Cap P} + N_{Cap F}}$$

where of the sites that pass the contact test,  $N_{Cap} p$  is the number of sites that pass the leakage test, and  $N_{Cap} p$  is the number of sites that fail the leakage tests.

The defect density is calculated from the yield with the following equation:

$$D_{Oox} = \frac{(-\ln Y_{C_{P_n}})}{f_{Ox} A_{max}}$$




FIGURE 1: INTERDIGITATED MEANDER




FIGURE 2: CAPACITOR TEST STRUCTURE

## APPENDIX C: FIELD DESCRIPTIONS

- PART NUMBER is the part identification number of the current device. This field is not required for calculation of the part. This field is required for storage of parameters. There are no constraints on the contents of this field.
- PART DESCRIPTION is the generic part type of the current device. This field is not required for calculation of the part or storage of parameters. The contents of this field is selected from a look up list, to which new entries may be added.
- MANUFACTURER is the manufacturer of the current device. This field is not required for calculation of the part or storage of parameters. The contents of this field is selected from a look up list, to which new entries may be added.
- PACKAGE TYPE is the type of package enclosure of the current device. This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is selected from the look up list, which may not be added to.
- NUMBER OF PINS is the total number of pins (including pins not internally connected).
   on the current device. This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly and must be greater then zero.
- COMPLEXITY is the gate, bit or transistor count of the current device. The UNITS are
  "G" for gate, "B" for bit, and "T" for transistor. This field is not required for calculation
  of the part or storage of parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly.
- DEVICE TYPE is the basic family to which the current device belongs. This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is selected from a look up list, which may not be added to.
- DIE AREA is the size, in square centimeters, of the die of the current device. This field is required for calculations of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly. If the DIE AREA is unknown, use 99.00.
- THERMAL COEFFICIENT is the Junction to Ambient thermal resistance of the device.
   This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly.

- FEATURE SIZE is the size, in microns, of the smallest feature of the device. For example, VHSIC Phase 1 is 1.25 microns. This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly. If the FEATURE SIZE is unknown, use 99.000.
- DEFECT DENSITY is the number of critical defects per square centimeter. This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly. If the actual DEFECT DENSITY for the feature size is unknown, use 9999.00.
- MANUFACTURING PROCESS identifies the device as being manufacturered in accordance with the Generic Qualification Program (QML) or listed on the M-38510 QPL. This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is selected from a look up list, which may not be added to.
- ESD SUSCEPTIBILITY LEVEL is the worst case threshold voltage of the device relative
  to the 100pF, 1500 OHM Model in accordance with MIL-STD-883B, Method 3015.
  This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents
  of this field is entered directly. If a RANGE of SUSCEPTIBILITY is known, use the
  MIDPOINT voltage of the RANGE. If unknown, use 99999.
- METAL TYPE is the metallization material used. This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is selected from a look up list, which may be not added to.
- SCREEN TYPE is the amount of screening the device has been subjected to. This field
  is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field
  is selected from a look up list, which may not be added to.
- SCREEN DURATION is the length of the screen performed on the device in millions of hours. This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly and must be greater then zero.

- SCREEN TEMPERATURE is the ambient temperature of the screen performed on the device, in degrees centigrade. This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly and must be greater then zero.
- SCREEN POWER LEVEL is the power dissipated, in watts, by the device in the screen performed. This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly and must be greater then zero.
- AMBIENT TEMPERATURE is the temperature which the device is exposed to, in degrees centigrade. This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly and must be greater then zero.
- ACTUAL POWER LEVEL is the power dissipated by the device in its intended
  application, in watts. This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of
  parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly and must be greater then zero.
- CURRENT DENSITY is the average absolute value current density of the majority of
  metal runs, in 10E06 Amps/sq cm. This field is required for calculation of the part and
  storage of parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly and must be greater
  then zero.
- ELECTRIC FIELD is the average electric field value in the gate oxide, in megavolts/cm.
   This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly and must be greater then zero.
- ENVIRONMENT is the application environment the device is operating in. This field is
  required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is
  selected from a look up list, which may not be added to.
- RELATIVE HUMIDITY is the average relative humidity expected in the device environment. This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters for non-hermetic packages. The contents of this field is entered directly and must be greater then zero.

- SUBSTRATE CURRENT is the current, in milliamperes, the device substrate carries. This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly and must be greater then zero. If unknown, enter 9999.000000.
- DRAIN CURRENT is the current, in milliamperes, the device drain carries. This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly and must be greater then zero. If unknown, enter 9999.000000.
- DUTY CYCLE is the percentage of total time the device is operated. For example, 50% operation --> duty cycle = 0.50. This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly and must be greater then zero.
- SIGMA OXIDE is dielectric breakdown failures observed from time to failure data on the
  oxide or similar oxide. This field is required for calculation of the part and storage of
  parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly and must be greater then zero.
  If unknown, use 9999.000.
- SIGMA METAL is the sigma for electro-migration failures observed from time to failure
  data on the metal, or similar metal, of the device. This field is required for calculation of
  the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly and must
  be greater then zero.
- SIGMA HOT CARRIER is the sigma for hot carriers failures observed from time to
  failure data on the same carrier, or similar devices. This field is required for calculation
  of the part and storage of parameters. The contents of this field is entered directly and
  must be greater then zero.

### APPENDIX D:

### DETAILED DATA

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Wet Dureling	125 · 100 1000 HOURS	1180 04 0001	1000 मुख्या	1000 HXRS	1000 %2.25	1000 KGRS	1000 KO UKET	1000 NGRS	14/00 PELIRS	1000 HOLKYS
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## RONE AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER VISICAVINSICALIKE/NOS DATABASE

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ROME AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER URSIC/VASIC-LIKE/WOS DATABASE

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ROWE AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER WYGIC/WHSTC-LIKE/MOS DATABASE

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108 Description
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	fes Die		A	teb Kumber		-	Karber
Package Type	Pin Eiz Area Ion	st Type	3	Tested	Isp Tested Test Puretion	Jest Time	Failed Faiture Mode/Mechanism
UNITEDA	0 0.0 9.00 STAT	KT BIGH TEMP LIFE	1	102	1000 HOURS	500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	O UNKHOWN
	<b>6</b> 18.7	it rich tem life	ភ្	102	1060 MOURS	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	O UNKHGAN O UNKHGAN 1 FAILED PARANETER, METAL MASKING DEFECT
	**************************************	IT SIGN TOPP LIFE	<b>3</b>	101	1600 HOURS	158 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	O UNKKOAM O UNKKOAM 1 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, METAL MASKING DEFECT
	\$\$AT	it kick teis Life	ŭ	103	1000 HOMES	168 HOLRS 500 HOLRS - 1900 HOLRS	O UNKROAN O UNKROAN O UNKROAN
	STAT	IT HIGH TEMP LIFE	<b>50</b> ,		1000 #2085	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1060 HOURS	O UNKHOAN O UNKNOAN 1 OPEN NETAL TRACE, ALUMINUM CORROSION
	<u>ā</u>	IBPELLINE CICLE	য়	85	toso cycles	500 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES	G UNIXIOLAN .
		TOWNER CHIE	<del>2</del>	100	1000 CYCLES	580 CYCLES 1060 CYCLES	D URKKOAN D URKKOAN
	M31	DEMOCRATURE CYCLE	125	<u>\$</u>	500 CYCLES	SOO CYCLEC	1 OPEN
	TEM	TEMPERATURE CTCLE	Š	120	1000 EYCLES	SOO CYCLES 1000 CYCLES	D LHIKHOLM D LHIKHOLM
	<b>1</b>	tederande crole	125	62	1000 CYCLES	500 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES	0 UXKNOSN 1 LIFTED BALL BOND
		IBBERTURE CYCLE	\$25	8	1000 CYCLES	SOO CYCLES	O UNKKOAN O UNKKOAN
	16K	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	125	102	1000 CYCLES	500 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES	O UHKNOWN 1 PARAMET. LINIT FAIL., CONTAMINATION
	TEK	IEMPERATURE CYCLE	52	102	1000 CYCLES	500 CYCLES	1 OPEN, WIRE BREAK

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	Kumber 6-71-4	CHILED THI CUTS	O UNENGEN O UNENGEN	O UNICHOSAN	O UNKHOWN 1 OPEN, B	1 WIRE SW O UNKHOWN O UNKHOWN	O THENDRAN O THENDRAN O THENDRAN	1 AC/FUNC O UNXKOM O UNXKOM	O UNIXHOUN O UNIXHOUN O UNIXHOUN	O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN	O UNKNESS
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ROSE A VASIC/V		3.00 TEMPERATURE CYCLE	LEWENNINE CTOLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	Teverance crice	G.OO OTK BIOK TOOP LIFE	DYN NICH TEND LEFE	DYN NICH TEMP LIFE	DTW MIGH TEND LIFE	dth kick tend life	DYS SIGN TEMP LIFE
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		oth High tend life	53	8	1000 HOURS	168 HOURS	I INPUT LEAKAGE FAIL.	I HIPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., : MRES. VOLT. SHIFT
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		DYN RIGH TEND LIFE	ž	<u>\$</u>	1000 KCLRS	168 HOURS 500 HOURS	D UNICHOLM O LINECTOLM	
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		DYK BICH TEMP LIFE	53	<b>1</b> 00	1000 HOURS	168 HOURS	O URKNOWN	
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						1000 HOURS	O UNKHOWN	
	•	STAT BLAS TEMP NUMBO 125	125	2	1000 HOURS	168 HOURS	O UNKKOWN 1 OPFU METAL TRACE ALIMINING CORROSION	ALLENE INSTRUCTORSOSTON
						1060 HOURS	9 OPEN METAL TRACE,	ALUMINUM CORROSION
	·	O'N KICH TEMP LIFE	Ñ	001	1000 HOURS	168 BOURS 500 HOURS	G LHKNOWN O UHKNOWN	

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0 0.0 0.00 078		I KIGE TEMP LIFE	LIFE	5 to		Test Duration 1000 HOURS	1	Test Time 1000 HOURS	Feiled	Failure Rode/Rechanism UNKNUM
•	STAT S	ting Tem	BÍNS TEND MINIO 125	ស្ល	\$	900	1000 KOLRS	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	0 4 10 0	D UKKNORM 4 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, METAL MASKING DEFECT 2 INPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRSS. VOLT. SHIFT 10 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, METAL MASKING DEFECT
	# 14 14 15 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16	1AS 1EM	7 BIAS 1590 MAID 125	Ñ	664	1000	foco kaurs	168 HZMS 500 HCMS 1000 HCMS	0 <del>-</del> 0	2 FAILED PARAMETER, ALLMIMM CORROSION 1 AUNCTION SKORT 0 LHKWGAN
	<b>5</b> 1818	1AS 1'04	BIAS TOWN MINID 125	. <b>2</b>	95	1000	1000 HOURS	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	004	O UNKHOSM O UNKHORM 4 FAILED PARAMETER, KETAL MASKING DEFECT
•	135	IAS TEM	T BIAS TEMP MUNICO 125	窥	8	1000	todo mars	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	3 m % 3 ,	O DNKHOWN  3 FALLED PARAMETER, METAL HASKING DEFECT  2 FALLED PARAMETER, ALUMINUM CORRESION  0 UNKKORN
<del></del>	STAT SI	TAS TEN	81.A5 TEMP BENTO 125	$\bar{z}$	. 68	1000	1000 HOLES	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	00-	O UNKNOSM O GHKNOSM 1 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, METAL MASKING DEFECT
	STAT B	IAS TEN	BIAS TEMP MAND 125	গ্ৰ	ĝ	1000	1000 HOURS	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	Ö	O UNKWOLM 1 INPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES. VOLT. SHIFT 1 INPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES. VOLT. SHIFT
~	STAT 8!	14.5 TEN	BIAS TENP ZANTO 125	Ñ	8	<b>#</b> 000	1000 HOURS	168 KOURS 500 KOURS 1060 KOURS	9 4 9	O UNKWOWN 3 INPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES. VOLT. SHIFT 2 INPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES. VOLT. SHIFT
	18 1412	1AS 1.04	81.45 TEND MUNID 125	523	85	<b>‡</b> 000	1000 KCLRS	168 KOURS 500 KOURS 1000 KOURS	000	O UNICHOUN O UNICHOUN O UNICHOUN
-	STAT 63	14S TEN	BIAS TEND MUNID 125	§3	<b>\$</b>	1506	1606 HOURS	48 HOURS 168 HOURS 500 HOURS	-00	1 INPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES. VOLT. SHIFT O LINKHOLN O UNKKOLN

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4	ALE ALES	EREC LYDO			Ever Code	the Enel lyne Inches Peat Duration	Tert Timo	Failed failure Mude/Mechanism
9	8	WEAT BEAS TEN	SE MEMIO	ĬĮ.	8	1000 HOURS	1000 HOURS	O UNIONOMO
		STAT BLASS VEND NUMBER 125	S HENTS	Ŋ	8	TOTA HOURS	48 HOURS	O UNIXHOUN
		•.			•		168 HOURS	O CHIKESAN
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		TEMPERATURE CYCLE	YCLE	Ŋ	8	1000 CYCLES	SOO CYCLES	O LYKKONAI
		•.					1000 CYCLES	1 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPOUT UNDER BALL
		TEMPERATURE CTULE	TICLE	<b>3</b>	100	1000 CTCLES	500 CYCLES	O CHECOAN
,							total cocks	s orch, butto Livi Al TKOUE
	•	tavelande cicle	3101.6	53	8	topp excres	500 CYCLES	23 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPCUT UNDER BALL
					•		2000	10 FIN LEAKAGE, CHIFUSI USBER BALL
		TEMPERATURE SYCLE	TOLE	Ñ	203	1000 CYCLES	500 CTCLES	1 SHORT, WIRE SAG
-						,	1000 CYCLES	O SAKHCIAN
	·	The Control of the Co	مارئونا الا	e e	č	*****	00 min	the street streets more to the
		I CONTERACINET I	1	9	3	Marie Circles	500 CYCLES	1 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPTOI UNDER BALL 1 FINITION WETA! DATTEDN SHIGHTING
							1000 CYCLES	O UNICHOLIN
	•	TENDER IN: CHETE	SACLE.	\$3	100	1000 RO UNIT	500 CYCLES	9 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPOUT IMDER BALL
							1000 CYCLES	5 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPOUT UNDER BALL
	•	TEMPERATURE CTCLE	TOE	Ŋ	130	1000 CYCLES	500 CYCLES	5 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPOUT UNDER BALL
				•			1000 CYCLES	35 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPOUT UNDER BALL
		TENDERATURE CYCLE	YCLE	\$3	5	1000 CYCLES	500 CYCLES	22 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPOUT UNDER BALL
							1000 CYCLES	14 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPOUT UNDER BALL
	-	TENDERATURE CYCLE	TCLE	8	3	1000 CYCLES	500 CTCLES	G UNKNOWN
				•			1000 CYCLES	O UNKHOLM
		TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TCLE	ž	00;	1000 CTCLES	500 CYCLES 1060 CYCLES	O UNIXHOUN G UNIXHOUN
		TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TOLE	Ŋ	<b>20</b>	100 NO UNIT	100 CYCLES	O UNKKOWN

# ROWS AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER SMELC/WASIC-LIKE/MASS

£124 13		-		RONE AIR	DEVELOR IC-LIKE)	ROWS AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER WINSIC/WASIC-LIKE/MAS DATARASE	ᅩ병		69/22/50
Derfee (Cont.d)		Fest Ofe	9		Asto Kratese	ę.			
104 percription	Pactoge Type	Pin Biz	ings feet fying		IND Test	ed Text Dur		Test Time	Failed Failure Mode/Machanism
7 UNICHOUSE	**DACINO	0.0 0.0 0	S S		Ø	125 SO 95 KCURS		96 HOURS	2 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE
			PLESSAGE POT		ž	\$0 64°	P6 HOURS	96 HOURS	2 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, ALUNINUM CORROSION
			PRESSUE POT		ž	\$0 \$0 \$0	96 ROURS	96 HOURS	1 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, ALUNIMUM CORROSIGN
			PRESENTE POT		8	\$3 96	96 KCLRS	4.6 HOURS 96 HOURS	D UNICHORN
	·		PARESSING		Ñ	8	96 HOURS	96 HOURS 96 HOURS 96 HOURS	O UNICHOLM 1 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, ALLMINUM CORROSION 1 FAILED PARAMETER, ESD
			PRESSIRE POT		125 1	100	P6 HOURS	SALCH 84	O LAKKNOSAL
0-1			PRESSIBLE POT		. 33	100	96 KOURS	48 Hours	1 CPEN NETAL TRACE, ALLMINUM CORROSION O LYKHOUN
.5			THERMAL SHOCK		125	20 300	300 crcLes	300 CYCLES	5 IHPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES. WOLT. SHIFT
			THERMAL SHOCK		83	50 300	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	D LYKNOWN
			THERMAL SHOOT		523	50 300	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	о циклом
			THERMAL SHOCK		53	50 303	303 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	. G UNKNOWN
			THERMAL SWOOT		125	50 300	300 crcLes	300 CYCLES	2 IMPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES. VOLT. SHIFT
			· THERMAL SMOCK		23	100 100	100 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	O UHKNOWN
9 UNTACAN	MCHX80	0.0	0.00 dry bigs temp life		t25 t	100 1000	1098 HOLRIS	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	О СИКИОМИ О СИКИОМИ О СИКИОМИ
			DTB RIGS TERP LIFE		<b>1</b> 83	100 1000	1000 ECLAS	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	O UHKNOWN O UHKNOWN O UHKNOWN

Print 16				NUMB AIR DEFELOMENT LENIER VRSIC/VRSIS-LIKE/NOS DAIABASE	717-915 124-015	kun aik depelameni beriek Maic/Maio-like/Mos databad	erier Tabade		<u>59/27/76</u>	
Device (Cont.d)	STATE OF STATE OF	fes Dis	Offe .	17 to 1	Anth Mumber	their roof Tee	Teast Burne for		Number Failed Calline Mode/Machanisa	
	economic and the second	80°0 0°0 0	0.00	7.8.7 B1938 1580 1.1FE	22 20	8	i	162 HOURS 508 HOURS 1000 HOURS	O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN	
			<b>ia</b>	stat blok temp life	ã	\$	1000 MOURS	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	O USKUCHAN O USKUCHAN O USKUCHAN	
			io.	stat alon tesp life	Ñ	602	1000 HOCAS	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	O UNICHORAL O BACKRORA DA BACK	
			ia	STAT BIAS TOP MAKIO 125	Ñ	<b>103</b>	1000 HOURS	FOZ HOURS SOO HOURS FOOO HOURS	O LIKENOAN O LIKENOAN	
D-16			iii	STAT BIAS TLIP MUNIO 125	ឆ្	100	1000 NO UNIT	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1900 HOURS	G UNICHOUN O UNICHOUN O UNICHOUN	
			=	Temperature cycle	23	50	1000 CTCLES	500 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES	1 FINCTIONAL FAILURE, METAL MASKING DEFECT O UNIXIONAL	
				TEMPERSTURE CYCLE	8	00	1000 GYGLES	500 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES	O UYKKUM 3 OPEN, REEL BREAK 4 OPEN, BALL BOND LIFT 2 FAILED PARANETER, PATTERN SHIFTING 1 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, DIE CRACK	
			••	THERMAL SHOCK	125	. <mark>Q</mark>	300 CYCLES	\$00 CYCLES	O ENKILORN	
			pii.	THEBOAL SHOCK	ž	\$0	100 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	O UNICHONAL O	
10 цихнови	UKKNOW.	0.0	0.00 07%	th mich temp Life	52	203	1000 KOMS	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	O UNKKORM O UNKKORM O UNKKORM	
			۵	DTB NICH TEND LIFE	125	001	1000 BOLIRS	168 HOURS	O UNKNOWN	

Device (Cont'd)
104 Description
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	Teat Duretton	1900 HOURS	1000 KELRES	1000 HOURS	1000 MOURS	1500 HOURS	1000 MCMS	1000 HOLARS	1000 KOURS	1000 KO UNIT
Act Eugher		8	8	8	8	100	100	8	100	8
g	0	S	វិច្ច	Ñ	Ñ	S	<b>2</b>	2	Ñ	23
Fee Die	Pin Sir Area Test Type	0 0,0 0.08 orm NIGH TENP LIFE	DYM MICH TEND LIFE	DTH NIGHTEND LIFE	07% 816% VEND 4.1FE	OTE BICH TEMP LIFE	OTH RICK TEMP LIFE	DTM MICH TEMP LIFE	DT# RIGH TEND LIFE	OTH HIGH TEMP LIFE
	Pactage Ivon	Uncorcia								

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-		And Rumber			Kurber
Parties Tree		er Inted	Test Duration	Test Time	failed failure Mode/Mechanisa
UNTROLM	O O.O O.OO DYN HIGH TEMP LIKE \$	8	125 99 1000 BD UNIT		O LINK HOLF.
				500 HOURS	
				1000 KOURS	1 FUNC., GATE, CKIDE STP, GATE OXIDE DEFECT
	A CONTRACTOR STATE	90.9	24 20 COO 8	38 WH 479	
	1117 A.T. 1 111111			SOO MORES	
٠				1000 KOURS	O CHIKAGAN
•	STAT BIGK TEMP LIFE 1	125 100	TODO NO DIVIT	168 HOURS	O LINKHOWN
				500 HOURS	O LEKKOKH
				1000 HOURS	O UNIXACIAN
	STAT BUCK TEKE LISE	. 8	Sauce adole	S& 10H 87	DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY OF
					Production O
				506 HGBS	WINDERSON O
				1000 VCINES	MADERAL O
	STAT SICH TENS LIFE T	521	1000 NOURS	4.8 HOURS	O UNIXHOLEN
				168 ROURS	O CHININA
				500 HOURS	O UNKNOWN
				1000 HOURS	O UNIXHOLM
	3 3311 ONG! WEST INIS	£25 \$5	1000 HOURS	SM 23 97	1 FESCHORAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
				166 HOURS	
				SOO HOURS	D BHKKOM
				1000 HOURS	0 UNIXIONN
	\$145 WICH 1650 61FC 8	125 77	1960 80 0811	SHON 97	WCHXKI O
	•			168 HOURS	O CHKKOW
				500 HOURS	O CHIKHCHAN
				1000 HOURS	O UNKNOWN
	STAT BIAS TEHN MANIE 225	ਲ ਵੋ	1000 MOLAS	168 HOURS	1 IHPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES, VOLT. SHIFT
				500 HOURS	O DEKNOWN
				\$000 KOURS	2 IMPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES. VOLT. SHIFT
				1000 KOURS	1 FAILED PARAMETER, ALUMINIM CORROSION
	STAT BIAS TEMP MINID 125	502	1000 WOURS	168 HOURS	O UNIXHORA
				500 HOURS	1 IMPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES. VOLT. SHIFT

Device (Cont'd)
196. Description
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				I EMPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES. VOLT. SHIFT							I INPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES. VOLT. SMIFT				1 IMPUT LEAKAGE FAIL ., THRES. VOLT. SHIFT				1 1MPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES. VOLT. SHIFT					1 IMPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES. VOLT. SHIFT								total total cast tubes and total
				ᅙ.	1						ØLT.				<u>8</u>				₫.					Ø.T.								2
				. ES	I PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPOUT UNDER BALL						ES.				. SE				ES.					ES.								000
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ROME AIR	VHSIC/VKSIC-LI

Device (Cont'd)

10# Description
10 UNIXON

		Failed Failure Mode/Wechanism											1 DIE CRACK, IMADEQUATE SCRUBBING										=			1 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPCUT UNDER BALL							
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Device (Cont'd)

10# Pescription
10 Laxacus

Page 19

Number	Maria i isan								O UNKNOWN 2 PIN LEAKAGE, BAKE RECOVERABLE					
	O UNKHOUN	O UNICHOUN	O UNKKOM	D UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN	O UNKKOUN O UNKKOUK	O UNKROSH O UNKROSM	O UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN 2 PIN LEA	O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN	O UNKKOWN	O UNKHOUN O UNKHOUN	O UNKNOWN
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Fea Die Din Riv Acon Teet Tone	0 0.0 0.00 TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	PRESSURE POT	PRESSURE POT	PRESSIRE POT	PRESSIME POT	PRESSURE POT	PRESSUME POT	PRESSIRE POT	PRESSIRE POT	PRESSURE POT	PRESSURE POT	PRESSURE POT	PRESSURE POT

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ROME AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER VHSIC/VHSIC-LIKE/HOS DATABASE

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Number	Foiled Failure Mode/Mechanism 0 UMKNOWN	O UMKNOUM 1 PIN LEAKAGE, BAKE RECOVERABLE	O UNICHORM	O USIKNOGA	1 PIM LEAKAGE, CHIPOUT UNDER BALL	O UNIXHORN	O UNKNOWN	1 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPOUT UNDER BALL	0 UNKNOWN	MHCHCHIM O	O UNICHONN	O CHICKOLAN	O UNICACA	O UNICHOGN	O UNICHOUN	O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN
-	Test Time 96 HOURS	48 HOURS 96 HOURS	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	500 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES	48 HOURS 168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS
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Arth Number	Testod 8	<b>1</b> 00	20	110	\$	20	100	100	<b>169</b>	5	8	25	22	5	100	100
Ą	<u>됨</u> 5	. 125	251	125	125	53	125	125	125	125	2	125	52	23	125	125
	0.00 PRESSURE POT	PRESSURE POT	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE SYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEIPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	0.00 TEMPERATURE CYCLE	O.CIJ DYN HIGH TENP LIFE
Fca Die	Pin Siz Area 0 0.0 0.0														0.00	0.0
	Package Type URKNOM														RECHOM	URKROWN
Device (Cont'd)	10 UNICHOLA								D-2	2					11 UNICHOLAN	3.2 LAKKHOLAK

O UNKROWN

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1000 HOURS

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DYN MIGH TEMP LIFE 125

ROME AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER

12.22		VRSIC/V	VHSIC/VHSIC-LIKE/MOS DATABASE	IOS DATABASE			04/27/89
bevice (Cent'd)		fea Die	And Warber			Number	
104 Description	Packyge Type	Pin Siz Aree Jest Type	Imp Testec	Tested Test Duration	Test Time	Failed Failure Mode/Sechanista	
menen z,	(EXCECSE)	0 0.0 0.00 DYR HIGH TEMP LIFE	125. 100	1000 HOURS	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	O UNKROSA O UNKROJAN O UNKROJAN	
		STAT RIGN TENP LIFE		1000 HOLRS	48 HOURS 168 HOURS 560 HOURS 1000 HOURS	1 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, TARES. VOLT. SHIFT 0 LHF7.AN 0 CH.ACKN 0 LHKKOM	ll. Shift
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		TEMENATURE CYCLE	125 67	1000 CYCLES	500 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES	O UNIXIONAL	
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		PRESSURE POT	125 100	3 96 HOURS	43 Hydrs 96 hours	O UNKNOWN	
FROMBON ES	CHICKOLAN	0 6.0 0.00 bth High temp Life	125 100	) 1000 HOURS	48 HOLRS 168 HOLRS 500 HOLRS 1000 HOLRS	G UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN	•

O UNKNOWN

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DYN HIGH TEMP LIFE 125

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ROME AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER VHSIC/VHSIC-LIKE/MOS DATABASE

Package Type UNXVOIM

Device (Cont'd)
108 Description
13 UNKWORN

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		Fatture Rode/Rechantsm			WICHTH	UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	UNKROWN	FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, METAL MASKING DEFECT	UNICHOLAN	CANADA	UNKNOWN	CANCEL VIEWERS A CARREST TANKS				FUNC., TRACE, DEGRADE	O DEKENDAR	CHKHOPA	UNKHOWN	UNKNOWN	O UNKHOWN	O CEKNOW	DECEMBER	2022		U DHENDHAN 1 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, ELECTROMISRATION	3 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, MET. CONTACT DEFECT
•	No.	200	9 9	0	0	0	•	0	•	9	•	•	0	-	0	0	0	•	- (	<b>-</b>	ο ·	_	0	0	0	0	٥	٥	0	٠	•	<b>→</b>	M
		1est Time 548 serios	500 KOURS		48 HOURS	168 KOURS	500 HOURS	1000 HOURS	48 HOURS	168 HOURS	500 HOURS	1000 HOURS	Sanon 84	168 HOURS	500 HOURS	500 HOURS	1000 HOURS	97	CAUDIN CA	TOS MOUKS	SOU HOURS	1000 HOURS	48 HOURS	168 HOURS	500 HOURS	1000 HOURS	168 BOURS	500 HOURS	1000 HOURS	301W 84F	100 1001	1000 HOURS	48 HOURS
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		O O O O OO NAME WITH TEND 1 155			BYN HIGH TON LIFE				BAN BICH LEAD LIFE				DYW HIGH TEMP LIFE					allon, Chille Heart Hard					SAN HIGH TEMP-LIFE				STAT MICH TEMP LIFE			CTAT USCU TOWS	*127 FT11 19211 1820		STAT HIGH TEMP LIFE

Device (Cont'd)
106 Description
13 UNCION

RONE AIR BEVELOPHENT CENTER VHSIC/VHSIC-LIKE/MOS DATABASE

	Callad Exiles Mode Mochanies	PARAMETRIC FAILURE								INPUT LEAKAGE FAIL THORS WAT SWIFT			sales and the second second	WALE FAIL, THES. VOLT. SHIFT				SHORT, WIRE, WIRESAG, ASSEMBLY ERROR						ě	5				FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, ELECTROMIGRATION			INPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES. VOLT. SHIFT	•				FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, ELECTROMIGRATION					
	1	PROMETR		CRAFF	LAKKAO SA	UNKOROWA			UNICOSAN	April 15		CHKROSS	100	i i		LHKKOKN	UNKROUN	10RT, WIS	O UZZNOM	MICHORN		UNKROAM	CH STATE OF	TO HOUSE			UNXHONAN			O UNKKOW	O CHKHOLY	IPUT LEJ	2000	O CHARGO	O CHKKOW	UNKROWN	MCT 10W	O UNKNOWN	O UNKROWN	O STANSAGE	THOUSE OF THE PERSON OF THE PE	FRCER
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	Toet Time	SAIDH 87	974		SAU HOURS	1000 HOURS		SWIDH 94	168 HOURS		4000	TUGO MOUKS	301201 67	באסטו סר	168 HOURS	500 HOURS	1000 HOURS	SMIOH 87	168 HOURS	500 KCURS	40.000	1600 ROURS	action 27	24.00 070	encon con	500 HOURS	1000 HOURS		48 HOURS	168 HOURS	500 HG "5	1000 HC. 5	0,000	TO BULLE	168 HOURS	500 HOURS	1000 HOURS	48 HOURS	168 HOURS	SOLD HORIDS	Selecti 000\$	TOTAL BOOKS
	Toet Buration							TENO ON COST	•				11781 07 87					1000 HOLIRS					TOWN BURBS						TOUR HOLKS				1000	2000				1000 NO UNIT				
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fea Die	Pin Siz Area Test Ivns	O O.O G.OG STAT HIGH TEMP LIFE						SINE RICH LERY LIFE					STAT BEST TATES					 STAT HICH TEND LIFE					ast onet with this			•							BOTE CHOT WOLK TATO	4141 1741 1841 1914 A				STAT HIGH TEMP LIFE				
	Package Ivos	CHICAGO																													•											

	DATABASE
KUME AIK OF WELLATER	VHSIC/VHSIC-LIKE/MOS

Device (Cantid)
105 Description
13 UNEXIONS

Page 24

Tachar M.	Failed Failure Mode/Mechanism	O LIKKICHM O LIKKICHM O LIKKICHM O LIKKICHM O LIKKICHM	O UNKNOWN  O UNKNOWN  1 AC/FUNCTION  4 INPUT LEAKAGE TAIL, THRES. VOLT. SHIFT  2 INPUT LEAKAGE TAIL, THRES. VOLT. SHIFT	O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN 1 INPUT LEKKASE FAIL., THRES. VCLT. SHIFT O FAILED PARAMETER, ALUMINUM CORROSION 1 INPUT LEKKAGE FAIL., THRES. VCLT. SHIFT	O UNKNOAN O UNKNOAN O UNKNOAN 1 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, ELECTROMIGRATION	O UNKHCAN O UNKHCAN O UNKHCAN 2 FAILED PARAKETER, ALUMINUM CORROSICH	O UNKHOWN O UNKHOWN O UNKHOWN	O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN	О UNKNOWN О UNKNOWN
N. S.		ZERS DURS SURS	48 HOURS 168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	48 MOURS 168 MOURS 500 HOURS 500 HOURS	48 HOURS 168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	48 Hours 168 Hours 500 Hours 1000 Hours	48 HGURS 168 HGURS 500 HGURS 1000 HGURS	48 HOURS 168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	48 KO UNIT
	est Duratton	125 99 1000 NUMS 48 H 168 H 500 K	1080 KOLAS	FOGG HOLINS	1660 HOJRS	TOBO KGRS	1098 KOLRS	1600 NO UNIT	1000 NO UNIT
Anto Wuntber	ested ;	8	8	001	100	8	80	8	50
M chark		0.00 STAT BIAS TENP HAND 125	stat bias temp remid 125	stat bias teap irmid 125	STAT BIAS TEM HAND 125	STAT BLAS TEND HEMID 125	STAT BIAS TEMP (CAND 125	STAT BLAS TEMP MUNIO 125	STAT BIAS TEND HINID 125
fee Die	Package Type Pin Siz Area	0.00							
	Packs	Program							

Package Type UNCHOLM

Device (Cont.d)

106 Description
13 UKNOW

	d Failure Mode/Mechanism	O UNIXHOUN	G LMKHOLM	1 INPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES. VOLT. SHIFT	I INPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES. WOLT. SHIFT	1 INPUT LEAKAGE FAIL., THRES. VOLT. SHIFT	O UNIXHOUN	© UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN	? FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, ELECTRONIGRATION	PERIORIAN O	O LINKSHOUN	O CHICKICAM	. O UNICHORE		O UKKNOWN	O CHICKORY	O UNICHEMA	A DIM HEAKAGE CHIPCHT INDER BALL		THE COURT MACAING STORAGE STORAGE	O UNKNOWN	•	O UNICHOUN	1 AC/FUNCTION	1 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, METAL MASKING DEFECT	LEAD GROWN THROUGH THE CONTRACT THROUGH THE CONTRACT THROUGH THE CONTRACT THROUGH THRO	O UNKNOWN		O UNKNOAN 1 FURCTIONAL FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS	O UNKNOWN
Number	Failed		HOURS (	HOURS	HOURS		HOURS (	HOURS (	HOURS	HOURS	HOURS	HOURS	HOURS	HOURS		HOURS	HOURS	HOURS	, SALIES						CYCLES	CLES					
	Test 'ine	500 NO UNIT 1000 NO UNIT	1CH 97	155 HO	500 HOL	1000 HOURS	158 FE	168 HG	550 KQ	1000 HCK	24 27		500 HOR	1000 HOL			290 HD	1090 HA	), C	1000 CYCLES	4	1000 CYCLES		SOS CYCLES	1000 CY	1060 CYCLES	500 040150	1000 CYCLES		500 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES	S00 CYCLES
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Auth Bromber	reted Tr	<b>153</b>	8				8				8				3				Ç	3		3		<b>1</b> 88			90	3	;	ş	<u>2</u>
A C	8		Š				ž				5				<u> </u>				Ź	}	Š	9		125			£	)	;	ध्र	<b>1</b> 3
fes Die	Pin Dir Area Tost Type	0 0.0 0.00 STAT RIAS TERP HAND	STAT BIAS TEMP-MAND 125				STAT BIAS TERP HINTO 125				STAT BIAS TEMP HAND 125				STAT STAS TER NAID							IENGENIME LILLE		TEMPERATURE CYCLE			a feet and the amount	וניט בוטייטבר פי פי		TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE

Package Type

Device (Central)
108 Description
13 United#

Number	Failed Failure Mode/Mechanism	O UNKNOWS	O UNKNOWN 2 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPGUT UNDER BALL	O UNKNOWN	2 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPOUT UNDER BALL 1 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPOUT UNDER BALL	1 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPCAUT UNDER BALL O UNKNOSSI	O UNICHORA O URICHORA	O UNICHOUSH O UNICHOUSH	8 UNKWOSN 1 OPEN, CHIPOUT UNDER BALL	O LAKKHOWA	O UNICHOSM O UNICHOSM	O UNKHOWN	O UHKNOUM O UHKNOUM	D UNKNOWN D UNKNOWN	O UNKHOWN
;	Test Time	1000 CYCLES	500 CYCLES	500 CYCLES 1600 CYCLES	560 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES	500 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES	530 CYCLES 1600 CYCLES	500 CYCLES 1050 CYCLES	500 CYCLES	48 Hours	48 Hours	48 Hours	48 HOURS	48 KOURS 96 KOURS	48 HOURS
,	Imp Tested Test Duration	1000 CYCLES	1000 CYCLES	1000 CYCLES	1000 CYCLES	1000 CYCLES	1000 CYCLES	1000 CYCLES	1000 CYCLES	१६ भवापड	SWIDH 96	96 HOURS	96 HCURS	96 KOURS	96 HOURS
And Kummer	ested 1	8	100	%	8	%	\$00	8	100	8	168	3	<b>2</b> 0	100	•
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Fes Die	Pin Siz Area Test Type	6 0.0 0.00 TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	temerature cycle	TERPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	PRESTAG POT	PRESSURE POT	Pressure Pot	PRESSURE POT	Pressure Pot	PRESSING PUT

ACME ATR DEVELOPMENT CENTER VISCECURSCIE LIVERIUMS DATABLE

tevice (Contid)

De Description
13 Jecucial

04/21	Number	Failed Failure Mode/Mechanism	O UNKNOWN	O UNKRUGAN 2 FURCTIONAL FAILURE	неожино о	1 PIN LEAKKGE, RECOVERD AFTER BAKE	O UNICHONA O UNICHONA	1 OPEN METAL TRACE, ALUMINUM CORROSTON	U UNIKHEKAN	O UNICHOUSE	C UNKROUSE	O UNERGEN	O UHKHEKAN	О СИКНОМИ О ПИКНОМИ	11 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPOUT UNDER BALL	0 пикноги	5 PIH LEAKAGE, CHIPOUT UNBER BALL	1 PIH LEAKAGE, CHIPCUT UNDER BALL	O UNKROWS	NACHOLIN O	O DHKHOGN	O UNKNOWN	3 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPOUT UNDER BALL
		Test Time	Sarray 96	45 HOURS	\$26,03 37	46 (OURS	SWEW 96	46 HOURS	96 HOURS	4.8 KOURS	Y6 HOLKS	48 HOURS	96 KOURS	48 HOURS	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	360 CYCLES
DATABASE		Ing Tested Fest Duration	96 HOURS	AO MONES	96 HOURS		. 95 HOURS	96 HOURT		96 HOURS		96 HOURS		96 KOURS	300 ercles	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES
KE/MOS	Lich Kinder	les ted	iga (	à	100		<b>3</b>	3		<b>8</b> 2		100		\$13	ů,	50	\$	003	100	5	इ	100	\$00
visic/visic-like/mos database	9		9	9	Ñ		23	53		\$23		523	,	Ñ	125	123	125	123	53	123	125	125	521
\$		Dig Arms Test Type	PRESIDENCE POP	PAES JURE PUI	PRESSURE POT	:	PRESUME POT	Pressure Pot		PRESSURE PLT		PREZSURE POT		Pres <b>ure</b> my	THERFOLL SHOCK	THERMAL SWOCK	THERMAL SWOCK	THERMAL SHOCK	THERMAL SHOCK	THERMAL SPACK	THERMAL SHOCK	THERMAL SHOCK	THERMAL SHOCK
	fee Die	O CO CO CO	79.0																				

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### ROME AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER

25 ave 25		•	VHSIC/VHSIC-LIKE/NOS DATABASE	ISIC-FI	CE/MOS D	ATABASE			0%/27/
havies (Contid)		95		Anto Municiper	ather			Kurber	
195 Description	Package 1750		Test Type	I See I	Pared Te	Test Duration I		Failed Failure Mode/Mechanism	
1	CENTRAL.	0 0.0 0.00 THER	TREDUAL SHOCK	23	125 100		300 CYCLES	MENCHASH O	
		S SPECE	ENERHAL SHOCK	2	50	300 erctes	300 cycles	I PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPOUT UNDER BALL	
		TREE	TREBUAL SHOCK	123	100	300 CYCLES	300 CYCLES	O UNIXECTION	
		THEST	THERMAL SHOCK	ñ	8	300 NO URIT	300 cycles	6 PIN LEAKAGE, CHIPOUT UNDER BALL	
14 URCHOZA	MACHONICA	0 0.0 6.66 STAT	STAT ALGN TEND LIFE	গ্ৰ	163	1000 KD UNIT	168 MOURS 500 MOURS 1000 MOURS	D USKRICHN O USKRICHN O USKRICHN	
15 MASK ROM	UNCROAL.	0 0.9 6.05 57%	OTH HIGH TEND LIFE	ğ	101	10GO KOMIS	168 BOURS 500 HOURS	MACCASIAN O	
D-30		MY C	DYN NIGH TEMP LIFE	521	90	1000 HOURS	168 KOLRS 500 KOLRS 1000 HOLRS	O LANCHCARA  C LAN	
		ET.	DTN RICE TEMP LIFE	ũ	163 5	1600 HEARS	168 MOURS 500 KOURS 1000 KOURS	O UNICHONAL O	
		07%	DYN HIGH TEMP LIFE	125	<b>5</b>	1000 KODES	168 KCURS 500 KCURS 1000 HCURS	U UNICHORM O URICHORM O UNICHORM	
		## / O	O/A RIGA TEND LIFE	ž	100	1000 BOURS	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN	
		5181	SIAT BICK TEON LIFE.	<b>5</b> 2	101	TOGO HOURS	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HT. AS	O UNCHOSN O UNKHOSN O UNKHOSN	

O UNKNOWN

168 HOURS

1600 ROLKS

200

STAT MICH TEMP LIFE 125

Package Type URXXXXX

tevice (Cont'd)

108 Description
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22 45

Kumber	Failed Failure Mode/Nechanism	O UNICHOIAN	O UNICHOMM O UNICHOMM	G CHKKOWN C	O UNKNOWN	O UNICHOUND	O CHKRIOMA	1 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, SOMO PAD CORROSION O UNKNOWN 1 INPUT TRANS. SHORT	1 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, BOMD PAD CORRUSION O UNKNOWN 1 IMPUT TRANS. SHORT	2 FAILED PARAMETER, ALLMINUM CORROSIOM 2 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE, DIE CRACK,MAY'L,ASSM 0 UNKWOMM	12 OPEN, BALL BOND LIFT 2 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE	O UNICHONAL O UNICHEN	1 FAILED PARAMETER, PATTERN SHIFTING 2 10%1C LEAKAGE, BAKE RECOVERABLE	1 PIN LEAKAGE, DIE CRACK 1 OPEN, BALL BOND LIFT 1 OPEN PARAMETER, DIE CRACK
	Test Time	500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	165 HOURS 500 HOURS	168 MOURS	500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	168 HOLRS 500 HOLRS	1000 HOURS	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	166 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	500 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES	500 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES	\$00 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES	\$00 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES
	Test Duration	TOGO HOURS	1500 NO UNIT	Samon COUR		1500 HIDURS		todo Haurs	1000 MOURS	1000 HOURS	1000 CYCLES	1000 crcles	1000 CYCLES	1000 CYCLES
hatb Munder	ested I	125 100	9 9	8		100		<b>2</b>	\$	52	704	3	50	8
Q.	C	ឆ	\$23	ñ	]	125		য়	Ñ	Ñ	\$3	23	125	125
Fes Ofe		0 0.0 0.00 STAT BICK TEND LIFE	STAT HIGH TEND LIFE	HOLE SATE		STAT BIGN TEND LIFE		STAT BIGH TOND LIFE	STAT BIAS TEND NUMID 125	STAT BIAS TEND MENTO 125	TENDERALIME CYCLE	Tenderature cycle	TENDERATURE CYCLE	IENDERATIRE CYCLE

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ROWE AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER VESICAMISTIC-LIKE/HOS DATABAKE

Pres 10			WISTCAMENT CALTENATOR DATABASE	north for the property of the part of the	E/HOS PLA	KTABASE		04/27/89
Cayles (Cont.4d)		Fas Die	•	Anth Michel				timber
tos pascription	Peckage Type	Pin Sig An	ea lest type	100 je		Icat Duration Test Vine		Failed Failure Modo/Mechanism
<b>*</b>	UNIXECUM	0.0 0.0	0.00 TEMPERATURE CTCLE	52	8	100 CYCLES	too crcLes	2 FIRE LEAK FAILURE, VOID IN SEAL
			PERFECTANT CYCLE	<b>53</b>	8	too crcies	100 CYCLES	D INKRUMA
			PRESSARE POT	IJ	50	96 BOLRS	946 HOURS	URKNOWN
			PAGSTURE POT	521	Š	SWICH 95	96 HOURS	O UHENOM
			Pressure Pot	125	<b>9</b>	96 HOMES	96 HOURS	G UHKHOAM
			THERMAL SMOCK	ž.	5	NO CYCLES	300 CYCLES	1 OPEN, BALL BOND LIFT
			THERMAL SHOOK	23	93	300 CYCLES	350 CTCLES	O UNKNOWN
MD 358 D-32 91	UNIXBOLAN	0.0	0.00 stat bias tend nemio 125	22	<b>25</b>	1000 KOURS	168 Keres 500 Horas 100 Kores	O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN I LEAKAGE, MOISTURE
17 MASK ROH	#FEACUS	0.0	0.00 stat bias temp marid 125	ž	45	\$000 NO UNIT	168 NO UNIT 500 NO UNIT 1000 NO UNIT	1 OPEN NETAL TRACE, ALUMINUM CORROSION 2 OPEN NETAL TRACE, ALUMINUM CORROSION 4 OPEN METAL TRACE
			PRESSUE POT	ស៊ី	5	96 HOLES	इस्टाम <del>१</del> ६	O UNEXCOUR
			Properties Par	\$3	20	SHICK 96	95 KOURS	O USKNOWN
			tenderature eftie	123	8	MO CICLES	300 CYCLES	1 OPEH, BALL BOND LIFT
tå EPROK	CERANIC DIP	0.2 45	O.OV DTW HIGH TEND LIFE	123	<b>5</b> 2	262 HINS	168 HOURS	0 ликиолм
			DTW MICH TEMP LIFE	\$2\$	**	SOO HOURS	SOO KOURS	O UKKNOWN
			oth Rich Tend Life	125	. ప	1000 KOURS	1000 HOURS	о пикиоли
			OYM HIGH TEMP LIFE	£21	152	168 ROURS	168 HOURS	O UNKNOWN
			DTH HIGH TEND LIFE	125	8	2000 KOURS	500 HOURS	O UHENOWN

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	Failed Failure Mode/Mechanism	0 UKKKOM 1 IGHIC CONTANINATION	D ENKHOLM O URINIGAN	O UKKROWA O UHKHOWA	O UNKNOWN	O UNKROAM 1 RETENTION FAILURE	U UKKRUME	O UNIXION			O UNKNOW	O UNKHOWN	O UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN	O UNKROWN	O LIKKWOWN	0 UNICHOUN	O UNIXEONAL	O USERSONN	O UNKHOWN	0 UNKHOWN	O UNIXEONAL	O UKUNUNI
	Test Time Fas	URS URS	168 mours 508 Hours	1000 KCJRS 2000 HOURS	168 HOURS	500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	SMCM MAN	500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	od nos		500 MOURS	1000 HOLKIS	2000 KXNRS	48 KOURS	168 KOURS	500 HOURS	2000 KOURS	ts koirs	168 HOLIKS	500 KOURS	1000 KOURS	2000 HOURS	SHICH 87	_
•	Test Duration	2000 HOURS	2000 8008.5		168 HOURS	2080 HOURS	2 8 8 9 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9	1000 KO UNIT		COUNT INCINC				2000 BOURS				2000 EQURS					2000 40 0411	
Tag Esticat	D Tested	\$	χ; 		3 363	\$	5	424	, ,					5 24				02					55	
3	1	53	Ä		52	252	ž	50	Ĭ.					\$3				\$					ž	
Fee Die	Pin Els Area   fest Type	24 5.0 6.00 oth high tens life	DIN RICH TEND LIFE		OTH NEGH TEND LIFE	DYN NIGH TEMP LIFE	SEL CONST. MOTAL BOY	DIM MIGH TEMP LIFE	STAR BOLLMAND BY ACC	אינים איני פין ישני איני איני איני איני איני איני איני				DAIA RETENTION GAKE				DATA RETENTION BAKE					DATA RETENTION BAKE	

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		Kurber	Failed Faiture Mode/Mechaniza	G UNICHORM	O UNIVERSITY	O UNKNOWN	O UNKKORN	O UNIXIONAL	O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN	NOT THE PROPERTY OF	O UNKROWN	O UNKNOWN	O UNIXMONNA	O UNKNOWN	NEW TON COMMITTEE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPE	O LUNKHOLE	O UNICHOUN	O UNKNOWN	O CKKROWN	O UNIXORM	O LEIKNOWN	U UKKUMA G UKKKOAN	O UNKHOWN	NECKNIC O	O UNKNOLM	1 TONIC CONTAMINATION	WONAIS: O	O UKKNOWN
			Test Time	SGO HOURS 1000 HOURS	2000 HOURS	48 KOURS	168 HOURS	SECO ROLLES	1000 KOURS 2000 KOURS	SMICH 87	168 HOURS	500 HOURS	1000 KOURS	2000 HOURS	48 HOLES	168 HOURS	500 HOURS	1000 HOURS	2000 HOURS	48 HOURS	168 HOURS	1000 HOURS	2000 HOURS	D NO UNIT	2000 HOURS	168 KOURS	SOLD MORRES	1000 HOURS 2000 HOURS
RONE AIR DEVELOPIENT CENTER VHSIC/VKSIC-LIKE/NOS DATABASE				2000 NO UNIT		2000 HOURS				2000 HOMES					2000 KOLES					2000 HOURS				D NO UNIT		168 KOURS	SOUND HOWER	
LOSPENT KE/NOS				ĸ		ĸ				Ю	1				**					ស				ప		410	ř	1
IR DEVE				អ្		Ź				ž					2					ž				2		125	<del>1</del> 25	
MONES AT WHISTOLY		fee Dir	Arca	24 5.0 0.00 DATA RETENTION MAKE		HIGH TEND HIGH WOLT				THOSE AND MOTH										RICH TEND HIGH VOLT				DYK HIGH TEND LIFE		24 5.0 0.00 DT# MIGH TEMP LIFE	SEL CARL MOLE MYO	
			Package type	CERANIC DIP																						PLASTIC DIP		
ž,	•	rvice (contrd)	te Description	10 EENCH												D-	34	•								19 EEPECM		

O UNKNOWN

168 HOURS

168 HOURS

DTM BIGN TEND LIFE 125 . 309

Device (Contrd)
106 Description
19 EEPEON

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| ailed Failure Mode/Mechanism | O UNICHOLIN                                 | 0 URKNOWN   | O UNIXIONN   |   | 0 UNICHOSM   | O LNKNOWN  | O UNKNOWN  
   
   | 0 LNKHOW  
   | MUCHONNO O  | D DAKNOUN  | O UNKNOWN  | O CHICKEGEN   | 0 UNKNOWN   | O UNIXAOAN  | 1 RETENTION FAILURE | O CHKNOLM    | O DNICHOUM   | O UNKROLM   | O UNIXMORM  | O UNICHOLIN   
   | O UNICHON    | O UNKROUM    | O DEKNORM   | O UNKNOWN  | O UNKNOWN  | ס האנאסתא ס  |            | C UNKNOWN   
  | O URKNOWN  | O UNKHOWN   | O UHKHOWN  |
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| Test Time F                  | XJRS  | 1000 HOURS  | 2000 HOURS   |   | 168 HOURS  | 500 HOURS  | 1000 HOURS   
   
   | 2000 HOURS  
   | 48 HOURS  | 168 HOURS  | 500 HOURS  | 1000 HOURS  | 2000 HOURS  | SWINH ST  | 168 MOURS           | 500 HOURS    | 1000 HOURS   | 2000 HOURS  | 48 HOURS  | 168 HOURS   
   | 500 HOURS    | 1000 HOURS   | 2000 HOURS  | 48 HOURS   | 168 HOURS  | 500 HOURS  | 1030 KOURS | 2000 HOURS  
  | 48 HOURS   | 168 HOURS   | 500 HOURS  |
| fest Duration                | 2000 NOURS                                  |   |  |   | 168 KOURS  | 2000 MOURS   |  
   
   |   
   | 2000 HOURS  |  |  |   |   | 2000 HOURS  |                     |              |              |   | 2000 HOURS  |   
   |              |              |   | 2000 NO UNIT   |  |  |            |   
  | Samon 89   | 168 HOURS   | 2000 HOURS   |
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  | 23   | 123   | 125  |
| a Test Type                  | CO DTR RICK TEMP LIFE                       |   |  |   | DYN BIGN TEND LIFE   | OTH RICH TEMP LIFE   |  
   
   |   
   | DATA RETENTION SAKE   |  |  |   |   | DATA RETENTION SAKE   |                     |              |              |   | DATA RETENTION BAKE   |   
   |              |              |   | MICH YEND MICH VOLT  |  |  |            |   
  | RICH TEND HIGH VOLT  | RIGN TEND BICK VOLT   | HIGH TEMP MICH VOLT  |
|                              |   |   |  |   |  |  |  
   
   |   
   |   |  |  |   |   |   |                     |              |              |   |   | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
   |              |              |   |  |  |  |            |   
  |  |   |  |
|                              | eat Type Imp Tested Test Duration Test Time | Pin fit first lest fyre Imp Tested Test Duration Test Time Faile 24 5.0 0.00 DTM MIGHTEN LIFE 125 76 2000 NOLMS 500 NOLMS | Pin Elg Area         Interfer         Imp Tested lest Duration         Iest Fine           24 5.0         0.00 DTM BIGM TEMP LIFE         125         76         2000 NGURS         500 HGURS           1000 HGURS         1000 HGURS         1000 HGURS         1000 HGURS         1000 HGURS | 24 5.0 0.00 DTR HIGH TEMP LIFE 125 76 2000 NO.RS 1000 HOURS 1000 HOURS 2000 HOURS | 24 5.0 0.00 DTR HIGH TEMP LIFE 125 76 2000 NGLMES 500 HGLRS 1000 HGLRS 2000 HGLRS 5000 HGLRS 2000 HGLRS 2000 HGLRS | Pin Eig         Area         feat Lipe         Imp Teated leat Duration         Lest Fine           26 5.0         0.00 DTR HIGH TEMP LIFE         125         76         2000 HQLRS         500 HQLRS           2000 HQLRS         2000 HQLRS         2000 HQLRS         2000 HQLRS         168 HQLRS | Pin Eig         Area         Teat Fine         Imp Teated         Teat Our Alian         Institute         Institute <th< th=""><th>Pin Eig         Area         Teat Fire         Imp         Teat of Duration         Test fine           24 5.0         0.00         DTR BIGR TEMP LIFE         125         76         2000 NGURS         500 HGURS           1000 HGURS         2000 HGURS         2000 HGURS         2000 HGURS         168 HGURS         168 HGURS           0TR BIGR TEMP LIFE         125         75         2000 HGURS         500 HGURS           0TR BIGR TEMP LIFE         125         75         168 HGURS         500 HGURS</th><th>  Pin Eig Area   Fast Fype   Imp Tested Test Duration   Iest Fine   26 5.0 0.00 DTM BIGM TEMP LIFE   125   76   2000 NOURS   500 HOURS   1000 HOURS   2000 HOURS</th><th>Pám Elg Area         feat Fire         Imp Teated         Teat Duration         Test fine           24 5.0         0.00 DTR BIGR TEMP LIFE         125         76         2000 NGURS         500 HGURS           2000 HGURS         1000 HGURS         2000 HGURS         2000 HGURS         168 HGURS           0TR BIGR TEMP LIFE         125         75         2000 HGURS         168 HGURS           0TR BIGR TEMP LIFE         125         75         2000 HGURS         1000 HGURS           0ATA RETENTION SAKE         125         51         2000 HGURS         2000 HGURS</th><th>Pin Eig         Area         feat Fire         Top Top Top Top Top Top Top Top Top Top</th><th>Pin Eig         Area         feat Fire         Tap         Teated         Teat Fine         Time         Tool Hours         500 Hours           24 5.0         0.00         DTR RIGH TEMP LIFE         125         76         2000 HOURS         500 HOURS           DTR RIGH TEMP LIFE         125         214         165 HOURS         168 HOURS           DTR RIGH TEMP LIFE         125         15         2000 HOURS         500 HOURS           OATA RETENTION SAKE         125         51         2000 HOURS         48 HOURS           168 HOURS         560 HOURS         560 HOURS         560 HOURS         560 HOURS</th><th>Pin Eig         Area         feat Fire         Tap         Teat of Duration         Teat Fine           24 5.0         0.00         DTR RIGH TEMP LIFE         125         76         2000 HOURS         500 HOURS           DTR RIGH TEMP LIFE         125         214         168 HOURS         168 HOURS           DTR RIGH TEMP LIFE         125         15         2000 HOURS           DTR RIGH TEMP LIFE         125         15         2000 HOURS           DATA RETEXTION SAKE         125         51         2000 HOURS           500 HOURS         500 HOURS         500 HOURS</th><th>  Pin Eig Area   Fast Fyde   175   76   2000 NOURS   500 HOURS   1000 HOURS   1000</th><th>  Pin Eig Appe</th><th>  Pin Eig Appe</th><th>  Pin Eig Appe</th><th>  Pin Siz Area   Test Type   Test   Test Duration   Test Time    </th><th>  Pin Siz Area   Teat Type   155   76   2000 HOURS   500 HOURS   1000 HOURS   1000</th><th>  Pin Fig Arge   Teat Type   185   76   2000 HOURS   500 HOURS   1000 HOURS   1000</th><th>  Pin Siz Arge</th><th>  Pin Fiz Arms</th><th>  Pin Ell Armia   Teat Type   125   76   2005 Hours   500 Hours   1000 Hours   1000 DTR RIGHT TEMP LIFE   125   76   2005 Hours   1000 Hours   1000</th><th>  Fig. 512   Arms   Line   125   76   2000 MOLES   500 MOLES   1000 MO</th><th>  P-17 E12 A-P-RE   124   125   76   2000 MGMPS   500 HGMPS   1000 HGM</th><th>  Pin Siz Area   Teat Inco   Teat   T</th><th>  Prin</th><th>  Prin file Area   Teat Type   125   76   2000 HOURS   1500 HOURS   15</th><th>  FIT SIZE APPRISED   150   15</th><th>  Fin file Area   Last 1509   155   76   2000 MOUNS   100 MOUNS  </th><th>  File file Acres   Test Type   125   76   2000   MOURS   1000   M</th></th<> | Pin Eig         Area         Teat Fire         Imp         Teat of Duration         Test fine           24 5.0         0.00         DTR BIGR TEMP LIFE         125         76         2000 NGURS         500 HGURS           1000 HGURS         2000 HGURS         2000 HGURS         2000 HGURS         168 HGURS         168 HGURS           0TR BIGR TEMP LIFE         125         75         2000 HGURS         500 HGURS           0TR BIGR TEMP LIFE         125         75         168 HGURS         500 HGURS | Pin Eig Area   Fast Fype   Imp Tested Test Duration   Iest Fine   26 5.0 0.00 DTM BIGM TEMP LIFE   125   76   2000 NOURS   500 HOURS   1000 HOURS   2000 HOURS | Pám Elg Area         feat Fire         Imp Teated         Teat Duration         Test fine           24 5.0         0.00 DTR BIGR TEMP LIFE         125         76         2000 NGURS         500 HGURS           2000 HGURS         1000 HGURS         2000 HGURS         2000 HGURS         168 HGURS           0TR BIGR TEMP LIFE         125         75         2000 HGURS         168 HGURS           0TR BIGR TEMP LIFE         125         75         2000 HGURS         1000 HGURS           0ATA RETENTION SAKE         125         51         2000 HGURS         2000 HGURS | Pin Eig         Area         feat Fire         Top | Pin Eig         Area         feat Fire         Tap         Teated         Teat Fine         Time         Tool Hours         500 Hours           24 5.0         0.00         DTR RIGH TEMP LIFE         125         76         2000 HOURS         500 HOURS           DTR RIGH TEMP LIFE         125         214         165 HOURS         168 HOURS           DTR RIGH TEMP LIFE         125         15         2000 HOURS         500 HOURS           OATA RETENTION SAKE         125         51         2000 HOURS         48 HOURS           168 HOURS         560 HOURS         560 HOURS         560 HOURS         560 HOURS | Pin Eig         Area         feat Fire         Tap         Teat of Duration         Teat Fine           24 5.0         0.00         DTR RIGH TEMP LIFE         125         76         2000 HOURS         500 HOURS           DTR RIGH TEMP LIFE         125         214         168 HOURS         168 HOURS           DTR RIGH TEMP LIFE         125         15         2000 HOURS           DTR RIGH TEMP LIFE         125         15         2000 HOURS           DATA RETEXTION SAKE         125         51         2000 HOURS           500 HOURS         500 HOURS         500 HOURS | Pin Eig Area   Fast Fyde   175   76   2000 NOURS   500 HOURS   1000 | Pin Eig Appe        | Pin Eig Appe | Pin Eig Appe | Pin Siz Area   Test Type   Test   Test Duration   Test Time | Pin Siz Area   Teat Type   155   76   2000 HOURS   500 HOURS   1000 | Pin Fig Arge   Teat Type   185   76   2000 HOURS   500 HOURS   1000 | Pin Siz Arge | Pin Fiz Arms | Pin Ell Armia   Teat Type   125   76   2005 Hours   500 Hours   1000 Hours   1000 DTR RIGHT TEMP LIFE   125   76   2005 Hours   1000 | Fig. 512   Arms   Line   125   76   2000 MOLES   500 MOLES   1000 MO | P-17 E12 A-P-RE   124   125   76   2000 MGMPS   500 HGMPS   1000 HGM | Pin Siz Area   Teat Inco   Teat   T | Prin       | Prin file Area   Teat Type   125   76   2000 HOURS   1500 HOURS   15 | FIT SIZE APPRISED   150   15 | Fin file Area   Last 1509   155   76   2000 MOUNS   100 MOUNS | File file Acres   Test Type   125   76   2000   MOURS   1000   M |

PLASTIC OIP

198 Description 19 EPRON

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Musber	Failed Failure Mode/Mechanism	O UNKNOWN	2 OXIDE DEFECT	D UNKNOWN	O LHKHOLM	D UNKHOWN	NACH XXII G	O LAKKACIN	O UNKNOWN	O UNKROIM	O UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN	0 гикноми	O UNICHOUS	O UNKNOWN		· CARACAN	0 UNIXHOUN	0 UHKHOMN	1		O UNKHOWN		O UNKKOWN	D LINKWOLN	O UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN	O UHKHOLM
ž	Test Time	1000 HOURS	2000 HOURS	168 CYCLES	500 CYCLES	1000 CYCLES	168 CYCLES	500 CYCLES	1000 CYCLES	168 CYCLES	500 CYCLES	1000 CYCLES	168 HOURS	500 HOURS	1000 HOURS	301Un 871	TOO BUTTON	500 HOURS	1600 HOURS	001 67 <b>67</b> 1	SAC SCALE	1000 HOURS	168 HOURS	500 HOURS	1000 HOURS	168 HOURS	SOO BOURS	1000 HOURS
	Imp Tested Test Duration	2000 MOUNS		1000 CYCLES			1000 CTCLES			1000 CTCLES		·ē	1000 HOMES			301100 374	SO ECONO	550 HOURS	1000 HOURS	900	coor proces		SOO HOURS		1000 HOURS	168 HOURS	SOC HOURS	1000 HOURS
Auto Starber	ested	<u>:</u>		23			8			2	•		25			Ç	2	\$	63	ű	2		23		23	55	51	<b>6.7</b>
4				Ñ			\$3			\$5			Ñ			525	9	125	125	î,	3		Ŋ		23	វវ	52	125
fee Die	Pin Kit Area Test Type	24 5.0 0.00 MICH TEND MICH YOUT		TEMPERATURE CYCLE			TEMPERATURE CTCLE			TEMPERATIME CYCLE			RELATIVE MANIOITY			Marie Colonia de Cara	Liftiens Stiers	RELATIVE MAIDITE	RELATIVE MANDITY				他ELATIVE MEMIDSTY		RELATIVE HEMIDITY	RELATIVE MANIDITY	RELATIVE REMIDITY	RELATIVE MANIDEET

	Number Failed Failure Mode/Mechanism	O UNIXIONA O UNIXIONA O UNIXIONA	O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN O UKKNOWN	O UNIXIONA G UNIXIONA O UNIXIONA	O UNKNOWN	WYONCH O	D UNKHOUN O UNKKOGN O UNKKOGN 1 OXIDE BREAKDOWN O UNKHOGN	O UNKNOWN  1 PACKAGE  O UNKNOWN  O UNKNOWN  O UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN
	Test Time	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1030 HOURS	48 HOURS 144 HOURS 240 HOURS	48 HOURS 144 HOURS 240 HOURS	45 HOURS 144 HOURS	240 HOURS	100 CYCLES 43 HOURS 168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS 2000 HOURS	45 FOURS 1 CYCLES 168 FOURS 500 HOURS 2000 HOURS	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	A HOURS 00 HOURS 1000 HOURS
kare air developheri center Vrsic/Vrsic-like/Nos datarase	Test Guestion	1030 MOURS	240 HOURS	240 BOSRS	144 HOURS	240 HOURS	100 CYCLES	\$ CYCLES	1000 HOURS	1000 #OJRS
IKE/MOS	Asto Rumber Two Teated T	S . SI	9	ង	. 02	17	<b>2</b> 5	<b>%</b>	8	105
MSIC-L	9	1 12	<del>Ž</del>	Ž	23	Ħ	žī	125	\$	953
C SECTION AND THE COMPANY OF THE COM	is the free free form	0.00	ALITOCIANE	alit oclane	AUTOCLAYE	AUTOCLAYE	DYN RIGN TEND LIFE	ofr aign 1590 1.1fe	6 6,00 at 11 10 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12	oth Bigs tens Life
		6.019	·						C 016	
an a	erics (Contid) Of Description Packson type	19 EEDKON PLASTIC DIP					D-37		20 EPKSH CETAMIC DIP	
1624 35	perfee								8	

RONE ALL CENTERMENT CENTER WASTENANDS LIKE MASS DATABASE

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in Practicalon
& Spice

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	Fea	Fee Dife	1						Tast Time	Felled	railed Follows Mode/Hechanism	
Parkers Inch	Pio Fig. 178. Idea				Contact Series	e N	さない	Service Coop of the Coop of th	165 MPDS	0	O SKKEDING	
はな ないない	D.O	<b>15</b>		PERSONAL PROPERTY	TO ME CANADA	į	ģ		STO HOLES	0		
				•					1000 HOURS	9	BECKEDEN	
					-							
				150	ON TENT. LIFE	Ş	9	1000 NO UNIT	168 HOURS	0	O UNKKOLIN	
									SCO HOURS	<b>~</b> °	O CHKROAM	
									Total educa	•	URINGON	
					!	ţ	i			c	3000	
CERTIFIC DIF	# 1.2		0.00 578 8		GR TEND LIFE	3	ŝ	2000 0002	CACH COS	9 6		
		•	_						SECOND MORES		D LWKKOWN	
		•							2000 HOURS	•	LHKHORN	
						,	;			•		
			072 #	凯研 花	IGH TENN LIFE	<u> </u>		2000 HERES	COO STUDY	•	D CHINESEN 1 CHARGE LOSS, ACCESS TIME, DXIDE DEFECT	
										- c	CHESTAN COOL MANAGEMENT COOL M	
									2000 HOURS		D CHICKGRAN	
			OT# H	BICH TE	ICH TOW LIFE	150	<b>6</b>	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	0	O BAKADIAN	
			9	<u>و</u> 18- د د د د د د د د د د د د د د د د د د د	Service Service	650	*	SOUTH OLDS	SOO ROIRS	ω	O UNICHOUN	
			e S			3	}		1000 KCURS	<b>.</b>	O UNICHEM	
								:		•	TOBOGO SWITT CONTRACTOR SWITTER	
			033	RIGH TE	DTH RIGH TEMP LIFE	<u>N</u>	144	166 HOLRS	165 ROLKS	- 0	1 CHANGE LUSS, ALCOS LINE, UNIDE DEFENT D HAVEDLAN	
									carrie ooc	•		
			#AQ	HIGH TE	MIGH TEMP LIFE	650	777	SOO HOUNES	168 NOURS		O LUKCKOLN	
									500 HOURS	_	O CHKROLM	
			270	RICH TE	RICH TEMP LIFE	120	240	168 MOURS	168 HOLKS	Ū	O UHKROLM	
			50	30.40	23 1 3 6884 8415	, C.	\$	SCHOOL MOONE	SOO ROURS		O UNICHORN	
			Š	T	2115	3	3		1000 HOURS		O UNIXHOUN	
			81438		TEMP STORAGE	200	2	1000 HOURS	168 KOURS		1 ICONIC CONT., BITS FAIL, ASSEMBLY DEBRIS O INVENTAL	'A
							•		1000 HOURS		1 CHARGE LOSS, ACCESS TIME, WEAROUT	
			#1G#	2631	TEMP STORAGE	, 95	2	1000 HOURS	168 HOURS		D UNKHOAN	

STATES ST

ACHE AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER VASICIVASIC-LIKE/NOS DATABASE

Device (Cont.)
106 Cescri

*		Fes Ofe	****	Anto Humber	Jack		į	Kustoer
21 UNEPROK	CEZANIC DIP	27.1.2	24 1.2 0.00 HIGH TEMP STORAGE		200 244 200 24	1000 MOURS	SOO HOIRS	Falled Faltife Rode/Nechanical
							1600 KRRS	2 CHARGE LOSS, ACCESS TIME, WEAROUT
			BION TEND STORAGE	200	4	SOCO HOURS	168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	D UNKNOWN .
22 EPRON	CERMIC DIP	28 0.0	0.00 OTH RICH TEMP LIFE	150	506	168 MOUNTS	168 HOURS	1 ASSM. DAMAGE, LEAKAGE, POOR BOND
			DTM MICH TEMP LIFE	150	<b>5%</b> 6	1000 KOURS	560 HOLPES 1060 HOLPES	D LINKMONN O LINKWONN
23 EPROM	CERANIC OIP	2.6 0.0	0.30 DTH NICH TEMP LIFE	156	127	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	D LHKNOW
			oth bigh temp life	150	<b>t</b> 03	1000 NO DMIT	500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	O LAKKHOAN G LAKKHOAN
25 PLA	100 LCC (FLAT)	150 0.0	0.00 operating life test	<del>2</del>	•	Salch Goot	1000 HOLRS	D LIKIKHOKAN
22 124	CERMATC PGA	120 0.0	G.DO GPERATING LIFE TEST	2	æ	1000 HOURS	1000 HOURS	O UNICHOLAN
			OPERATING LIFE TEST	Š	55	1000 HOURS	1000 KCJRS	р онкноги
			CPERATING LIFE LEST	<b>18</b>	8	1000 HOLINS	1000 KOURS	MANAGEM O
26 PLA	PLASTIC PGA	144 0.0	0.00 DTM HIGH TOWN LIFE	53	2	1000 KCLRS	1680 HOURS	O UNICHOLAN
			MENDITY BIAS LIFE	23	2	1000 KOURS	1000 HOURS	о сикионы
			Widit bias life	52	Ŋ	1000 HOURS	1000 HOURS	о пикноки
			PRESSURE POR	121	vo	256 HOURS	256 HOURS	D UNIXNOLAL
			PRESIDED POT	121	7	256 MOURS	256 HOURS	о тикнови

D-39

Failed Failure Mode/Mechanism O UNIXIONAL O UHKNOWN O UNKNOWN O CHKSGOAN O UNKNOWN MACKED O O UNICHOLIN O UNICHOUS O CECKNOIS O UNKRIGHAN PROKUMO O 140 CYCLES 500 CYCLES 500 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES S HOURS 96 HOURS 165 HOURS 96 HOURS 96 HOURS 1000 HOURS 96 HOLIRS 256 HOURS Axb Number Imp leated Test Time 121 7 256 %0 UMIT 256 10 140 CYCLES \$00 CYCLES saco crcles SOO CYCLES 1000 MOTRS °6 MILKS 96 HOLIES 168 MOJRS 96 HOURS 96 MOURS 96 HOURS VRSIC/FRSIC-LIKE/NOS DATABASE ROME AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER ç Ø g ĸ ĸ S 64 ĸ ដ X Ŋ 121 Ŋ 121 O 121 0.00 OPERATING LIFE TEST TEMPERATURE CYCLE TOWNERS THRE CYCLE TEMPERATURE CYCLE TEMPERATURE CYCLE 0.00 PRESSURE POT O.OO PRESSURE POT 100 0.0 0.00 PRESIMA POT PRESSUE POT PRESSURE POT PIN FIE Area 14XE 1974 144 G.O G.OO PRESSURE POT PRESSURE POT fee Dis 0.0 3 0.0 0.0 CERMIC LCC (FLAT) LEAD PLASTIC CC PLASTIC PCA PLASTIC PGA PLASTIC PCA 26 PLA pevice (Cont'd) £7 PLA 25 P.LA **22** 82.4 3. S. L.

O UKKNOWN O CHKKOMM

4.8 HOURS 4.8 MOURS

PRESSURE POT

PKESSIME POT

O UKKNOWI

96 HOURS 48 HOURS 48 HOURS

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121

0 ОНКИОЛЯ

96 HOLKS SWIDE 98

PRESSURE POT PRESSUME POT

O UNKNOWN

96 KOURS

96 MOURS SE HOURS

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\$21

6.00 PRESSURE POT

0.0 %

LEAD PLASTIC CC

31 PLA

D-40

3

12 121

PRESSURE POT

NHONXHI O

96 HOURS 96 HOLRS

### ROME AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER VISSE/VISSE-LIKE/NOS DATABASE

Pege 29				VISIC/YKSIC-LIKE/HDS DAIABASE	17-01	AIDS DA	Tabase			2
Durice (Cont.d)		Fee. Die	0.1*		Anto Municer	ä			Kumber	
las bescription	Package Ince	Pin Hig	Pin Eig Ares foot Toom		In Tested	ted les	- 1	Test Time	Failed Failure Kode/Nechanism	
25 P.A.		0.0 5	0,00		Ð	ស	48 HOURS	4.5 HOURS	O DRKHOMM	
35 PLA	Cermic Pce.	160 0.0	0.00 TEN	GO TEMPERATURE CYCLE	o	20	too cycles	100 CYCLES	MPICKKOPM	
			1534	TEMP. CYC., CONST ACC	0	5	10 CYCLES	10 CYCLES	O UNICHOIM	
37 PLA	כוככ (מוצנסא)	0.0	0.00 185	DO THERMAL MECH. STRESS	9	ສ	to creaes	10 CYCLES	O CHKNOLM	
38 PLA	CERANIC LCC (CLISTON) 132 0.0	132 0.0	C.00 THE	OD THERMAL PECK. STRESS	0	25	to crees	10 CYCLES	O UNKNOWN	
4.0 Pt.A	LEADED CRIP CARTER 196 0.0	0.0 %1	0.00 75%	00 TEMP. CYC., CONST ACC	0	ĸ	to creles	10 CYCLES	O UNKNOWN	
5 p-	CERMIC POA	0.0	0.00 FEM	OD TEMP. CYC., CONST ACC	0	Ø	10 CYCLES	10 CYCLES	O UNIXHOMM.	
78 29 41	CERARIC PGA	9	0.00 TER	CO TEMP. CTC., COMST ACC	Ö,	,\$ <del>1</del>	10 CYCLES	10 CYCLES	O CHKHCHM	
43 PLA	LEAD STDESSAZE DIP	4.8 0.0	0.00 1230	OO IEWP, CTC., COMST ACC	0	ĸ	to craces	10 CYCLES	O UNICHORM	
			1EM	TEMP. CTC., COMST ACC	0	Ŋ	10 CYCLES	10 CYCLES	O USKNOWN	
			169	TEMP. CTC., CONST ACC	0	ĸ	to crcles	10 CYCLES	0 ОНКИОЛИ	
			1691	IEND', CTC., CONST ACC	0	£3	to craces	10 CYCLES	0 инкнови	
4.6 PLA	CERANIC LCC	148 0.0	0.00 co	00 OPERATING LIFE TEST 1	ឆ	83	1090 HOURS	1000 KOURS	D LWKNOAM	
¥76 59	CERMIC LCC	132 0.0	9.00 CPE	OO CPERATING LIFE TEST 1	Ø	37	1000 MOURS	1060 KOJRS	O CHKKORM	
46 PLA	CERANIC POA	120 0.0	5.00 OPE	OG OPERATIKG LISE TEST 1	123	ŝ	toda kours	1000 HOURS	O USKROLM	

VHSIC/VHSIC-LIKE/MOS DATABASE		Area Test Type Tmp Tested Test Duration Test Time Faile	0.0 0.00 OPERATING LIFE TEST 125 33 1000 HOURS	OPERATING LIFE TEST 125 24 1000 HOURS 1000 HOURS 0 UNKNOWN	OPERATING LIFE TEST 125 48 1000 HOURS 1000 HOURS 0 UNKNOWN	TEMP. CYC., CONST ACC 0 45 10 CYCLES 10 CYCLES 0 UNKNOWN	. 68 0.0 0.00 PRESSURE POT 121 24 264 HOURS 264 HOURS 0 UNKNOWN	PRESSURE POT 0 25 48 HOURS 0 UNKNOWN	: 68 0.0 0.00 PRESSURE POT 0 60 96 HOURS 96 HOURS 0 UNKNOWN	; 132 0.0 0.00 PRESSURE POT 0 15 96 HOURS 96 HOURS 0 UNKNOWN	84 0.0 0.00 TEMPERATURE CYCLE 0 9 10 CYCLES 10 CYCLES 0 UNKNOWN	TEMP. CYC., CONST ACC 0 10 NO UNIT 10 CYCLES 0 UNKNOWN	211 0.0 48.50 BURN IN 125 155 168 HOURS 168 HOURS 1 UNKNOWN	218 0.0 43.30 BURN IN 125 113 168 HOURS 168 HOURS 1 UNKNOWN	219 0.0 42.30 BURN IN 125 107 168 HOURS 168 HOURS 2 UNKNOWN	178 0.0 50.50 BURN IN 125 97 168 HOURS 168 HOURS 0 UNKNOWN	149 0.0 46.20 BURN IN 125 132 168 HOURS 168 HOURS 0 UNKNOWN	
VHSIC/VHSI		a Test Type	OPERATING LIFE TEST			TEMP. CYC., CONST ACC		PRESSURE POT	0.00 PRESSURE POT	0.00 PRESSURE POT	0.00 TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMP. CYC., CONST ACC			42.30 BURN IN			40.30 BURN IN
	Fea D	Siz	180				LEAD PLASTIC CC 68 0.0								_	CERANIC PGA 178 0.0	CERANIC PGA 149 0.0	CERAMIC PGA 220 0.0
Page 40	(prost) 40 mm	ē	46 PLA				47 PLA LEAD		48 PLA LEAD	49 PLA	- 42 20 PĽÝ CERAM		51 UNKNOWN CERAM	52 UNKNOWN CERAM	53 UNKNOWN CERAM	54 UNKNOWN CERAP	SS UNKNOWN CERAN	56 UNKNOWN CERAN

		Mechanism			·											
	Number	Failed Failure Mode/Mechanism	1 UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN	1 UNKNOWN	1 UNKHOUN	0 UNKNOWN	3 UNKNOWN	O UNKNOUN	1 UNKNOWN	5 UNKHOWN	3 UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN	3 UNKNOWN	NENONNO 0	O UNKNOWN
		Test Time	168 HOURS	930 HOURS	999 HOURS	100 CYCLES 500 CYCLES 1000 CYCLES	802 HOURS	922 HOURS	965 HOURS							
VHSIC/VHSIC-LIKE/MOS DATABASE		Imp Tested Test Duration	168 HOURS	168 NO UNIT	930 HOURS	999 HOURS	1000 CYCLES	802 HOURS	922 HOURS	965 HOURS						
KE/MOS	Amb Number	ested	126	216	112	172	203	167	157	255	629	659	<b>2</b>	537	57	173
HS1C-L1	Amp	J. OEL	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	0	125	125	125
VHSIC/V	je je	Vrea Test Type	31.30 BURN IN	42.70 BURN IN	34.20 BURN IN	42.60 BURN IN	39.00 BURN IN	39.30 BURN IN	37.80 BURN IN	38.00 BURN IN	0.00 DYN HIGH TEMP LIFE	44.60 HIGH TEMP OPER.LIFE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	DYN HIGH TEMP LIFE	44.60 HIGH TEMP OPER.LIFE	44.60 HIGH TEMP OPER.LIFE
	fea Di	Pin Siz /	212 0.0 31.3	217 0.0	218 0.0	212 0.0	196 0.0	207 0.0	195 0.0	210 0.0	0.0 %	0.0 %			LAT) 68 0.0	64 0.0
		Package Type	CERANIC PGA	CERAMIC PGA	CERAMIC PGA	CERANIC PGA	CERAMIC PGA	CERANIC PGA	CERAMIC PGA	CERANIC PGA	PLASTIC DIP	CERANIC DIP			CERANIC LCC (FLAT)	CERANIC DIP
Page 41	Device	10# Description	57 UNKNOUN	58 UNKNOWN	59 UNKNOWN	60 UNKNOWN	61 UNKNOWN	62 UNKNOWN	NMONONIN E9	64 UNKNOWN	65 MICROPROCESSOR	66 MICROPROCESSOR			67 MICROPROCESSOR	68 MICROPROCESSOR

CENTER	DATABASE
DEVELOPMENT	C-LIKE/MOS
AIR	VHS1C-1
<b>200</b>	VHS1C/V

Page 42			ROME A VHSIC/V	IIR DEV /HSIC-L	ROME AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER HSIC/VHSIC-LIKE/MOS DATABAS	ROME AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER VHSIC/VHSIC-LIKE/MOS DATABASE	-	<b>3</b>
Device (Cont'd)		Fea Die	Díe	Ą	Amb. Number			Number
10# Description	Package Type	Pin Siz	Area Test Type	T	Tested I	Test Duration	Test Time	Failed Failure Mode/Wechanism
68 MICROPROCESSOR	CERANIC DIP	64 0.0 44.6	0	125	125 · 120		994 HOURS	1 UNKNOWN
69 SENICUSTON GATE ARRY CERANIC PGA	ARRY CERAMIC PGA	144 0.0	0.00 STAT HIGH TEMP LIFE	123	17 1	17 1000000 HOURS	1000 HOURS	O UNKNOWN
70 SEMICUSTON GATE ARRY CERAMIC PGA	ARRY CERAMIC PGA	180 0.0	0.00 STAT HIGH TENP LIFE	125	57	1000 HOURS	1000 HOURS	1 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE
			STAT HIGH TENP LIFE	125	<b>5</b>	1000 HOURS	1000 HOURS	3 FUNCTIONAL FAILURE
71 STATIC RAM	пикиони	0.00	0.00 BURN 1N	125	4048	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	1 DESTROY DURING ANALY, MONINAL MARCH
			DYN HIGH TEMP LIFE	125	300	1008 HOURS	1008 HOURS	D UNKNOWN
			STAT BIAS TEMP HUNID . 85	0 85	100	1008 HOURS	1008 HOURS	D UNKNOWN
D-4			TEMPERATURE CYCLE	0	200	SOO CYCLES	500 CYCLES	0 UNKNOWN
44			BURN IN	52	24394	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	10 UNKNOWN
			BURN IN	125	2400	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	D UNKNOWN
			BURN 1N	125	<del>1</del> 85	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	, 2 UNKNOWN
			DYN HIGH TEMP LIFE	125	1409	840 HOURS	840 HOURS	D UNKNOWN
			DYN KIGH TEMP LIFE	125	1980	840 HOURS	840 HOURS	0 UNKNOWN
			STAT BIAS TEMP HUMID	85	870	1008 HOURS	1008 HOURS	O UNKNOWN
			TEMPERATURE CYCLE	0	099	500 CYCLES	500 CYCLES	O UNKNOWN
			TEMPERATURE CYCLE	C	2868	500 CYCLES	500 CYCLES	32 UNKNOWN
			TEMPERATURE CYCLE	0	1721	500 CYCLES	500 CYCLES	10 UNKNOWN
72 STATIC RAM	UNKNOWN	0.00	0:00 BURN IN	125	26097	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	74 UNKNOWN

Page 43			VHSIC/VHSIC-LIKE/MOS DATABASE	C/VHSIC-LIKE/MO	E/MOS DA	S DATABASE			8
Device (Cont'd)		Fea Die		Amb Number	mber .			Number	
10# Description	Package Type	Pin Siz Area Test Type		Imp Te	sted Tes	Imp Tested Test Duration	Test Time	Failed Failure Mode/Mechanism	
N	UNKNOWN	0 0.0 0.00 BURN IN		125	2199	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	3 UNICHOUN	
		BURN IN		521	11%	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	0 UNIXINGIAN	
		DYN HIGH TEMP LIFE		521	9	1008 HOURS	1008 HOURS	O UNKNOWN	
		DYN HIGH TEMP LIFE		125	1800	840 HOURS	840 HOURS	1 UNKNOWN	
		DYN HIGH TEMP LIFE		125	2532	840 HOURS	840 HOURS	6 UNKNOWN	
		DYN HIGH TEMP LIFE		521	899	168 HOURS	168 HOURS 168 HOURS 168 HOURS	2 POLY DEFECT, NOMINAL MARCH 2 FOREIGN MATTER, NOMINAL MARCH 1 FOREIGN MATTER, MARCH	
73 STATIC RAN	UNKHOWN	0 0.0 0.00 BURN IN		. 22	769	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	1 POLY DEFECT, NOMINAL MARCH	
D-4		BURN IN		125	3405	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	2 UNKNOWN	
<b>4</b> 5		DYN HIGH TEMP LIFE		125	200	1008 HOURS	1008 HOURS	1 POLY DEFECT, NOMINAL MARCH	
		DYN HIGH TEMP LIFE		125	902	1008 HOURS	1008 HOURS	2 UNIXHOUN	
		TEMPERATURE CYCLE	CYCLE	0	100	500 CYCLES	SOO CYCLES	O UNKKOWN	
		TEMPERATURE CYCLE	CYCLE	.0	552	500 CYCLES	500 CYCLES	1 UNKNOWN	
74 STATIC RAM	UNKNOWN	0 0.0 0.00 BURN IN		125	972	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	2 FOREIGN MATTER, NOMINAL MARCH	
		BURN IN		125	4192	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	3 UNKHOWN	
		BURN IN		521	2937	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	9 UNKNOWN	
٠		DYN HIGH TEMP LIFE		125	200	1008 HOURS	1008 HOURS	1 FOREIGN MATTER, NONINAL MARCH	
		DYN HIGH TEMP LIFE		125	1448	840 HOURS	840 HOURS	2 UNKNOWN	
		DYN HIGH TEMP LIFE		125	1194	1666 HOURS	1666 HOURS	12 UNKNOWN	

ROME AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER VHSIC/VHSIC-LIKE/MOS DATABASE

		ode/Rachants:a				1 LIFTED BOND & POST, CONTINUITY 1 BROKEN WIRE BOND, CONTINUITY			2 FOREIGN MATTER, KOKINAL MARCH 1 OXIDE DEFECT, KOMINAL HARCH						4 POLY DEFECT, NOMIHAL MARCH 2 FOREIGN HATTER, WCHINAL MARCH					
	aumber	Falled Failure Hode/Machanista	UNITED IN	O CHICHOAN	0 UNKNOWN	1 LIFTED BG 1 BROKEN WI	O UNKNOWN	O UNKHOUN	2 FOREIGN I 1 OXIDE DEI	S UNKNOWN	9 UNKHONIK	NACHONN 0	- UKKKOWA	10 UNKNOWN	4 POLY DEF 2 FOREIGN	22 UNKHOWN	7 UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN	4 UNKNOW	3 UHKNOW
		i	TOOK MOURS	1008 HOLKS	1038 LOURS	500 CYCLES 500 CYCLES	SOO CYCLES	500 CYCLES	168 HOURS 163 HOURS	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	1008 HOURS	840 HOURS	1686 HOURS	168 MOUKS 163 Hours	168 HOURS	168 HOC.25	1008 HOURS	840 HOURS	840 HOURS
VHSIC/VHSIC-LIKE/MOS DATABASE		Tested Test Duration	1005 HOURS	1008 HOURS	1908 HOURS	See cycles	500 CYCLES	500 CYCLES	168 HOURS	165 HOURS	168 KOURS	1008 HOURS	840 HOURS	1686 KOURS	163 HOURS	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	1008 HOURS	840 HUURS	840 KOURS
KE/MOS	Amb Warber	ested I	80	805	421	150	583	727	. 83	2772	2075	&	1213	286	1291	8979	825	300	110%	301
17-21SI	Amb H	욢	8	88	88	•	<b>G</b>	0	53	য়	5	ঠ	\$2	52	125	13	125	52	125	521
VRSIC/VH	60 CO		0.60 STAT EIAS TEMP HUMID	STAT BIAS TEMP MUNID	STAT BLAS TEMP HUNID	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEXPERATURE CYCLE	0 0.60 H4K38 IM	92 HW18	BURN (N	DYN HIGH TEMP LIFE	DYN HIGH TEMP LIFE	DYN SIGH TEMP LIFE	.0 0.00 BLRW IN	2000年	BLESN IN	DYN HIGH TENP LIFE	DYN KIGN TENP LIFE	DYN NICH TEKP LIFE
	F. S.		0.0 0.0						0.50						0.0 9					
		Package :ype	MACIONAL						PROIDER						LECHZHAM					
Page 44		Device (Cartia)	1 8						75 STATIC RAN	Ď	46				76 STATIC RAM					

Eses 65 Berlice		Fee Die	:	7 <b>qq</b>	VESIC/VESIC-LIKE/NOS DATABASE And Bunder			<u>04/27/89</u> Wumber
percription	Package Type	P. 25.2	Pin Siz Area Test Ivos	8	In tested fe	-1	Test lime	Failed Failure Rode/Mechanism
<b>5</b>		n n		ğ ş	<b>3</b>	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	1 LOW RESISTOR VALUE, ICC STAMD-BY PARAM.
			מיו הווים יכול רווג	9		some poor	TODO METERS	C DAILMONN
			STAT BIAS 1739 HAND	0	197	1008 HOURS	1008 HOURS 1008 HOURS	1 FOREIGN MATTER JUNCT, ICC STAND-BY PARAM. 1 NOMINAL MARCH
			TEMPERATURE CYCLE	Φ	£6 <b>₹</b>	500 CYCLES	500 CYCLES	. 1 HONINAL MARCH
tb static ran	WOOLEN	0.0	0.00 BURE IN	t23	2529	168 HOURS	168 HOURS 168 HOURS	4 FOREIGH MATTER, HOMINAL MARCH 2 NOMINAL MARCH
			OVE BIGS TOND LIFE	<b>13</b>	82	1005 HOURS	1068 HOURS	1 FOREIGN MATTER, NOMINAL MARCH
			STAT BIAS TEND MENID	23	200	1008 HORS	1008 HOURS	2 LOW RESISTOR VALUE, ICC STAND-BY PARAM.
			TENSENTINE CYCLE	ø	&	SOO CYCLES	SOO CYCLES	G UNKKORM
79 DTEMEC RAM	SECONOSIO	0.0	0.00 BUEN 1K	2	5062	168 HOURS	168 KOURS 168 KOURS	1 POLY DEFECT, WOMINAL MARCH 1 MARGINAL ROCMTENP AC, NOMINAL MARCH
			<b>新50新加工</b>	\$3	30936	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	43 UHKNOWN
			#1 #274	10	2701	168 HOURS	168 HOURS	O UNICHORN
			oth sich temp life	23	007	1008 HOURS	1008 HOURS	D UNIXHORN
			DTE HIGH TEMP LIFE	23	1398	840 HOURS	840 HOURS	2 LINKNOWN
			STAT BIAS TEND HIMID	23	150	1008 HOURS	1008 HOURS	D UNIXHOLM
			STAT STAS TEND MINIO	8	752	1008 ROURS	1008 HOURS	3 UNKNOWN
		,	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	9	520	500 CYCLES	590 CYCLES	O URKNOWN
			Temperature etcle	0	1650	SGO CYCLES	SGO CYCLES	5 UHKKOBN
60 DYMANIC RAK	CHICAROLAN	0 1.3	O.O. BURK 14	Ħ	2667	168 KOURS	168 HOURS	3 OXIBE DAMAGE, NOMINAL MARCH

ROME AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER VISIC/VISIC-LIKE/MOS DATASASE

25 284		MASIC/A	HUNG HIK DEVECUMENT LEHTER VRSIC/VRSIC-LIKE/MOS DATABASE	os database			3
Device		fee Die	Auth Rumber			Humber	
104 pescription	Package type	Pin Siz Area Jest Type	Imp Tested In		Test Time	Failed Failure Mode/Mechanism	
SA VARIOUS	UNCHON	0 1.5 0.00 DTN NIGN TENP LIFE	125 43200	1000 NO 1411	1000 HOURS 1000 HOURS 1000 HOURS	16 OXIDE DEFECT 15 UNIXION 5 CONTANINATION	
		OTH RIGH TEMP LIFE	125 \$2500	100 CYCLES	1060 HOURS 1090 CYCLES 1060 HOURS 1060 HOURS	26 OXIDE DEFECT 0 LWKNOWN 27 UKKNOWN 357 CONTAMINATION	
es epton	n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n	O 2.0 O.00 DYM HIGH TEMP LIFE	125 19200	O NO UNIT	1000 HOJRS 1000 HOJRS 1000 HOJRS	8 OXIDE DEFECT 52 UNIXHOUN 1 CONTANINATION	
жох sасондомом 99 В—49	MOCCUE	O 3.0 G.OC OTH RICH TEND LIFE	125 107000	1180 ON O	1000 HOURS 1000 HOURS 1000 HOURS 1000 HOURS	21 OXIDE DEFECT 15 UNKNOM 93 UNKNOM 93 CONTANINATION 1 PACKAGE	
67 EPRC#	<b>MACHORAN</b>	0 2.0 19.72 OTH BICH TEMS LIFE	125 215000	1000 #CURS	1000 HOJRS 1000 HOJRS 1000 HOJRS 1000 HOJRS	1 UNIXHOLAN 19 OXIDE DEFECT 2 UNIXHOLAN 53 CONTAMINATION 100 UNIXHOLAN	
6.8 EPRON	URSTROEM	0 2.0 35.10 DTM RIGH TEMP LIFE	115 11100	100 CYCLES	100 CYCLES 1000 KOURS 1000 KOURS 1000 KOURS	O UNKNOWN 4 OXIDE DEFECT 16 UNKNOWN 2 COMTAMINATIOM	
69 STATIC RAN	CERANIC DIP	13 1.P 0.00 OPERATING LIFE TEGI	55 35	1060 86 0811	43 HOURS 168 HOURS 500 HOURS 1000 HOURS	3 LEAKAGE/SHORT 1 COLUMN FAILURE 0 UNKYOLN 2 LEAKAGE/SHORT	

Preciption By STATIC U.M.

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Serice (Cont.d)

Prz. 42

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	Failed Failure Mode/Mechanism	1 DROPSIE FAILURE	1 VOLT SENS SINGLE BIT	0 UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN	3 LEAKAGE/SHORT	4 College Carriers	COLUMN TAILUKE	O CHKNOWN	1 VOLT SENS SINGLE BIT	2 LEAKAGE/SHORT	TISMUS T		1 VOLT SENS STACTE OFF	O UNKNOWN	1 SINGLE BIT	O UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN	1 COLUMN FATELINE	O UNKNOWN	N TONAMI O	NEO CONTROL O	1 OPEN	1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	O LINKNOWN			U UNKNOWN	0 UNKNOWN	O UNKNOUN	O UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN
	Test Time	48 HOURS	168 HOURS	500 HOURS	1000 HOURS	48 HOURS	168 MAIDS	200 PG	SOU HOURS	1000 HOURS	1000 HOURS	SWINDES	168 HOURS	500 MO105	1000 HOURS	48 HOURS	168 HOURS	500 HOURS	1000 HOURS	48 HOURS	168 HOURS	Saitch 87	0000 07 t	SOO HOURS	SQ1 27 87	168 HOURS	emon oou	500 HOURS	TOOU HOOKS	48 HOURS	168 HOURS	500 HOURS	1000 HOURS
	Test Duration	125 45 1000 HOURS				1000 H7URS						1000 HOURS				1000 HOURS				168 HOURS		500 HOURS			1000 HOLIES					1000 HOURS			
And Number	fested	\$				395						298				199				173		25	,		20	i				20			
₽ Q	Q.	125				125 ·						125				125				125		125			125					125			
٠	Test Type	0.00 HIGH TEMP OPER.LIFE				HIGH TEMP OPER.LIFE						HIGH TEMP OPER,LIFE				HIGH TEMP OPER.LIFE				HIGH TEMP OPER.LIFE		BAKE			LOW TEMP OPER, LIFE					HTRB		•	
Die																															•		
Fea		18 1.0																															
	Package Type	CERANIC DIP																															
Device (Contid)	10# Description	89 STATIC RAM														D-	-5]	•			•												

O UNKNOWN

200 CYCLES

500 CYCLES

20

125

TEMPERATURE CYCLE

CEANET DIP

S STATIC NA Device (Cont'd)

3

22 \*\*\*

ROWE AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER VHSIC/VHSIC-LIKE/MOS DATABASE

Device (Cont'd)

10# Description
89 STATIC RAM

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Number	Failed Failure Mode/Mechanism	O UNICHAN	O UNKNOWN	0 UNKNOWN 0 UNKNOWN 0 UNKNOWN	O UNICHOLM O UNICHOLM O UNICHOLM	1 SINGLE BIT O UNKNOWN	O UNICHOUN O	O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN O	0 UNKNOUN 1 SINGLE BIT 0 UNKNOUN	O UNKNOWN O UNKNOWN	0 UNKNOUN 0 UNKNOUN 0 UNKNOUN	17 UNKNOWN
	Test Time	168 HOURS 500 HOURS	200 CYCLES 500 CYCLES	48 HOURS 168 HOURS 500 HOURS	48 HOURS 168 HOURS 500 HOURS	48 HOURS 168 HOURS	48 HOURS 168 HOURS 500 HOURS	48 HOURS 168 HOURS 500 HOURS	48 HOURS 168 HOURS 500 HOURS	200 CYCLES 500 CYCLES	48 HOURS 168 HOURS 500 HOURS	48 HOURS
	Test Duration	500 HOURS	SOO CYCLES	500 HOURS	500 HOURS	168 HOURS	500 HOURS	500 HOURS	500 HOURS	500 CYCLES	500 HOURS	48 HOURS
Amb Number	Tested	125 100	07	398	300	586	90	30	100	52	8	235
Amb	Ę,	125	<del>.</del> 25	125	125	125	. 125	125	125	125	125	125
	Test Type	HTRB	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	HIGH TEMP OPER.LIFE	HIGH TEMP OPER.LIFE	HIGH TEMP OPER.LIFE	ВАКЕ	LOW TEMP OPER. LIFE	HTR8	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	HIGH TEMP OPER.LIFE	HIGH TEMP OPER.LIFE
Die	Area	0.0										
Fea	Pin Siz /	1.0										
	Package Type Pin	CERANIC OIP 18					·					
	Package	CERANIC										

9 UNKNOWN

168 HOURS

168 HOURS

2345

HIGH TEMP OPER.LIFE 125

ROME AIR DEVELOPHENT CENTER VHSIC/VHSIC-LIKE/NOS DATABASE

Package Type CERANIC DIP

Device (Contid)

10# Description

89 STAIC RAM

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i din i	Failed Failure Mode/Mechanism	6 UNKWOUN	10 UNKNOLM	2 UNKNOWN	14 UNKNOWN	WYONXNO 5	6 UNKNOWN	2 UNKNOWN	1 UNKHOLN	O UNKNOWN 1 PURPLE PLAGUE 15 PURPLE PLAGUE	O UNKNOWN	O UNKHOWN	0 UNKHOWN	O UNKHOWN	5 BAKE RECOVERABLE	1 UNKNOWN	O UNKNOW	O UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN	O UNKNOWN
	Test Time		1000 HOURS	2000 HOURS	48 HOURS	168 HOURS	SOO HOURS	1000 HOURS	2000 HOURS	48 HOURS 168 HOURS 500 HOURS	48 HOURS 168 HOURS	500 HOURS	1000 HOURS	2000 HOURS	48 HOURS	168 HOURS	500 HOURS	200 CYCLES	SOO CYCLES	1000 CYCLES
	Test Duration	125 1037 500 HOURS	1000 HOURS	2000 HOURS	48 HOURS	168 HOURS	500 HOURS	1000 HOURS	2000 HOURS	500 HOURS	168 HOURS	500 HOURS	1000 HOURS	2000 HOURS	48 HOURS	168 HOURS	500 HOURS	200 CYCLES	500 CYCLES	1000 CYCLES
Amb Kimber	Tested	1037	2016	1240	1979	1965	625	1039	297	438	171	35	2	43	'n	101	322	55	180	-
1	5	1	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	Pin Siz Area Test Type	18 1.0 0.00 HIGH TEMP OPER.LIFE	BAKE	LOH TEMP OPER. LIFE	LOW TEMP OPER. LIFE	LOW TEMP OPER. LIFE	LOW TEMP OPER. LIFE	HTRB	HTRB	HTRB	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE	TEMPERATURE CYCLE							

## ROSE AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER VASICARSICARSIC-LIKE/HOS DATABASE

				Vestelffeste-Linches uningabe	17-016 18-016	re/mas u	ATABASE			72/47
Device (Cont'd)		for Div	****		Anth Bustoer	rather.			Kurber	
106 Perer (prior 69 statis sur	CERNAGE DIS	15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 1	0.00 1592	PIN BIE ACCE. Sect 1979. 18 1.0 0.00 IEPPERATIRE CYCLE	<b>19</b> 15	100 T	Tap Tested Test Duration Test Time 125 110 2000 NO UNIT 2000 CYC	ZOOD CYCLES	Failed Failure Mode/Mechanism O UNIXMONE	
8	aro. sn	0 1.2	O.CO 8168	0.00 HICH TEMP COER.LIFE 125	ā	315	572 HGMS	578 HOURS 578 HOURS	1 BAKE RECOVERABLE 1 SINGLE BIT	
			#553 M	HICH TOP COCK.LIFE 200	88	23	54 HOURS	SE HOUSE	O LHIKHOLM	
971 EAM	A COCCATO	0 1.2	0,00 Kies	0.00 KIGN TENP OPER.LIFE 125	ध्य	8	578 KOURS	S78 MOURS	О ПИСИОНИ	
SZ EAK	ACK SAL	0 1.2 38.1		O WICK TEMP OPER, LIFE 200	00.2	ş	SAUCH 39	68 KOURS	O UNKNOWN	
			*10	TEMP OFFILLIFE	002	ä	61 HOLRS	61 KOURS	O UNIXHOUSH	
<b>D-</b> 3			HIGH	NICH TEMP OPER LIFE 200	902	R	500 KOURS	52 HOURS .	1 UNKHOLM 1 UNKHOLM	

#### **MISSION**

of

### Rome Air Development Center

RADC plans and executes research, development, test and selected acquisition programs in support of Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) activities. Technical and engineering support within areas of competence is provided to ESD Program Offices (POs) and other ESD elements to perform effective acquisition of C3I systems. The areas of technical competence include communications, command and control, battle management information processing, surveillance sensors, intelligence data collection and handling, solid state sciences, electromagnetics, and propagation, and electronic reliability/maintainability and compatibility.